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The Chinese Are Coming



Four air exercises, one state visit and a chip bid: Beijing's August in the Middle East


China and the United Arab Emirates are opening Falcon Shield 2026 at Hotan air base in Xinjiang, the fourth joint air force exercise the two countries have staged in four years. China's Ministry of National Defence, announcing the drill on 21 August, said it runs into mid-September and covers command simulations, flight training and live-force exercises in mixed formations.

The venue is familiar. Hotan hosted the first two editions in 2023 and 2024, when the Emirati air force deployed at least six Mirage 2000-9 fighters backed by an Airbus MRTT tanker. Last December the exercise moved to the UAE for the first time, and Beijing sent J-10 fighters, KJ-500 airborne early-warning aircraft and YY-20A refuelling tankers to the Gulf.

Falcon Shield is no longer an isolated case. In August alone the PLA Air Force announced joint training with four countries — Belarus, Thailand, Egypt and the UAE. On 22 August, Egypt and China launched Eagles of Civilization 2026, their second joint air exercise, at several Egyptian bases. Six J-16 heavy fighters covered more than 6,000 kilometres in nine hours to reach Africa for the first time. The syllabus included air combat tactics, air superiority operations and combat search and rescue.

The diplomacy moves in step. Xi Jinping visits Egypt this week for the first time in ten years, closing a 30 August–3 September tour that opens at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek. Huawei has bid to supply Egyptian state data centres with more than 2,000 Ascend AI chips, prompting Washington to sound out AMD, Microsoft and Nvidia about a rival offer. On 20 August, Chinese and Gulf officials met in Riyadh — their first senior meeting since the February war with Iran — to discuss maritime corridor security and energy supply.

Beijing has reason to be there. China buys more oil through the Strait of Hormuz than any other state. Its crude imports fell from 11.7 million barrels a day in February to 7.12 million in June, the lowest in nearly a decade. Purchases of Iranian crude through the strait averaged some 530,000 barrels a day in July and August, roughly half the pre-war level.

What Beijing has not done is convert any of this into a security guarantee. It vetoed a Bahraini-drafted Security Council resolution on protecting Gulf shipping, then condemned Iran's strikes on Gulf states. It sells drones and fighters. It defends no one. Falcon Shield trains pilots; it does not close that gap. 

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