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October 7 and the Forever War It Unleashed, From Gaza to Yemen

Gaza was only the beginning, as the widening conflict now reaches Yemen, Iran, Syria and Lebanon, with the regional balance at stake, writes Mounir al-Rabih.

By Mounir Rabih
7 October 2026

Netanyahu

Photo: The New Arab / Romy Arroyo

The war triggered by the events of 7 October 2023 will drag on for years to come. What began that day quickly revealed much broader objectives, many of which had been taking shape well before the fighting erupted.

Just a month earlier, in September 2023, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, or IMEC, was announced in New Delhi. The project, backed by the United States, India, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, was designed to connect Asia with Europe through the Middle East.

IMEC was conceived as an integrated network spanning energy, oil, telecommunications, technological infrastructure, subsea cables, ports and railways. The aim was to bind these countries together economically and strategically, partly as a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

In political terms, the corridor would connect South Asia to the Middle East and Europe, while helping contain China and its allies. It would also create a framework for deeper integration between Israel and regional states, reinforcing the path towards normalisation and the Abraham Accords.

Then came 7 October.

Israel soon made clear that it saw the war as part of a much broader regional project. It openly spoke of reshaping the Middle East and began pursuing geographic and demographic changes in the arenas where it was fighting, particularly Gaza and Lebanon. It has continued along the same path in both, while extending its military operations into Syria.

With firm US backing, Israel remains committed to that wider project. The war eventually led to direct confrontation with Iran, a conflict Israel still appears keen to revive, with preparations seemingly continuing in coordination with Washington.

Washington has its own objectives. It wants to bring Iran to heel while opening the country to Western investment and economic influence, including in its oil sector. The broader aim is to loosen Tehran’s ties with China and pull it closer to the West. If that effort fails, Washington may once again turn to war.

But the conflict is about more than the Middle East. At stake is the wider balance of power that will emerge globally.

The United States wants to preserve a world in which it remains the dominant power, without a serious rival. To achieve that, Washington is willing to pressure allies and adversaries alike, and at times even exploit the pressure exerted by its rivals to keep its own partners in line.

Donald Trump’s approach to the Russia-Ukraine war offers one example. His strategy towards Europe is based on extracting concessions, reminding European states of their military and political dependence on Washington, and reinforcing the idea that they remain vulnerable without US support.

A similar logic is at work in the Gulf, where regional states are now confronting a major war in Yemen.

None of this means the United States has abandoned Saudi Arabia. Security, military and intelligence coordination continues, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio has publicly insisted that Washington will stand by the kingdom.

But for Trump, support is never free. Every war, intervention or security guarantee comes with a political price. In this case, that price is to draw the Gulf states, much like Europe, more firmly into Washington’s confrontation with Iran.

Some now see the war in Yemen as preparation for another strike on Iran and for the formation of a new coalition built around that objective, just as the wars in Gaza and Lebanon preceded the direct confrontation with Tehran.

There is no consensus, however, on how the Yemen war will unfold.

Some expect a prolonged war of attrition that drains all sides. Others believe it could be decided far more quickly, pointing to changes in military tactics since Operation Decisive Storm, shifts in the regional balance of power, the emergence of the Mecca Alliance, and US support for Saudi Arabia against the Houthis at a time of continuing US-Iranian hostility and renewed fears of war.

What is clear is that this is no longer simply a war over Palestine. It has become a struggle over the regional order itself, with consequences for the balance of power both in the Middle East and beyond.

Israel sees the Yemen war as another opportunity to expand its influence. It has little interest in seeing large, powerful states emerge around it and will continue trying to weaken those it regards as potential rivals.

Netanyahu has hinted at this logic before. After Israel struck Iran and its regional allies, he spoke of turning next to what he described as an emerging “radical Sunni axis”. The author understood this as a reference to the growing alignment between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey.

The Yemen war gives Netanyahu an opening to offer Israel’s services to Riyadh, while trying to pull Saudi Arabia away from Turkey and Pakistan and towards an agreement under the Abraham Accords framework.

Trump is likely to push in the same direction, while also seeking to recalibrate relations between Turkey and Israel.

The war therefore presents a major test for the states of the region, particularly the members of the Mecca Alliance and, above all, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

The interests of Ankara and Riyadh have already converged in Syria. There, both have faced serious challenges but have so far managed to avoid the worst outcomes, while helping preserve Syria’s territorial unity against Israeli efforts to fragment the country. That has also been aided by a degree of strategic overlap with the United States.

Yet the Israeli threat has not disappeared.

Israel has little interest in seeing Syria re-emerge as a unified, strong state with the ability to rebuild economically. Its incursions and attacks continue, as does the seizure of additional Syrian territory.

As the fighting began, the members of the Mecca Alliance quickly convened and announced the activation of its collective defence mechanisms. In practical terms, that means greater Turkish and Pakistani support for Saudi Arabia through military technology, weapons and intelligence, while also limiting the space for Israel to exploit the war or insert itself into the conflict.

Only hours after the meeting, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa arrived in Riyadh for talks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, raising the prospect that Syria could also move closer to the Mecca Alliance.

Such a development would deepen security and military cooperation and help fortify other regional fronts, particularly if the Yemen war intensifies, if Iran and its allies retaliate elsewhere, or if Israel decides to expand its military operations in southern Syria.

Damascus is already preparing for such possibilities. It has reinforced its military presence along the borders with Iraq and Lebanon in anticipation of further escalation.

Israel, meanwhile, could look for other ways to increase pressure on the Mecca Alliance. That could mean further action against Syria, or moves elsewhere, including in Somaliland and the wider Horn of Africa.

Lebanon is also firmly in the eye of the storm.

The war there has not ended. Israel continues its military operations and territorial encroachments while maintaining intense political pressure.

Its strategy is to isolate Lebanon through political, military and economic pressure, force it to the negotiating table, and prevent it from remaining part of a broader Arab bargaining position.

If Israel succeeds in drawing Lebanon into this framework, the consequences would extend beyond Beirut. It would increase pressure on Arab states more broadly, place Syria under even greater strain, and help constrain Turkey’s position in the Mediterranean.

The war, then, did not truly begin on 7 October, and it will not end any time soon.

When it does, the regional order that emerges will bear little resemblance to the one that existed before it.

First published in The New Arab on October 7, 2026.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Levant Files.