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The Corridor Question: Can Israel Still Fly to Iran?

By Dr. Nikolaos Stelgias

Analysis · Iran · Turkey · Syria · Iraq

Washington and Jerusalem are arguing about how deep their bombs can reach. The harder question is whether their aircraft can still reach Iran unseen.

The route a third Iran war would take crosses Syrian and Iraqi skies. Ankara has spent a year trying to put radar under that route, and Baghdad can no longer pretend it is not there.

On Monday 19 October, dozens of Israeli fighter jets and tankers flew east across Syria and Iraq on a flight plan that matched a strike on Iran. Short of the Iranian border, they turned around and went home. According to Axios, Israel told Washington in advance that it was an exercise meant to deter Tehran before the 27 October Knesset vote. Some US officials read it differently: they thought Israel wanted Iran to open fire and hand it a reason to strike.

The sortie answered one question and raised another. Israel can still fly the route. But the route itself is now the weak point of any new campaign. It runs over a Syria where Turkey is building a military presence and over an Iraq whose government has promised Tehran neutrality.

Most current coverage, including the Jerusalem Post’s analysis of 1 November, focuses on Pickaxe Mountain, the tunnel complex near Natanz, and whether even 30,000-pound US bunker-busters can destroy it. That debate assumes the aircraft arrive undetected. In the February war they did. In November, that is less certain.


The Corridor Assad Left Open

The fall of the Baath regime in December 2024 gave Israel something it had never had: a near-empty Syrian sky. JINSA, a Washington institute close to Israeli defence thinking, describes Syrian airspace plainly as the corridor to Iran that the IDF cleared after Assad’s fall. Syria’s Russian-supplied air defences were destroyed in the first days after the collapse. Iraq offered little resistance. Israel’s strike packages used that path in 2025 and again in 2026.

The alternatives are worse. A southern route over Jordan would expose King Abdullah as a participant in a war on Iran, and JINSA itself notes that Amman has every reason to refuse that role. A route over Turkey is out of the question. That leaves Syria and Iraq, and both are now contested.


Ankara’s Radar Problem

Israel’s red line in Syria is not Turkish troops as such. It is Turkish sensors.

The pattern is now clear. In spring 2025, Israeli jets hit the T4 and Palmyra airfields before Turkish survey teams could arrive. According to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Ankara had planned Hisar air-defence batteries and armed drones at T4. In July 2026, Turkey installed an ASELSAN HTRS-100 radar at Damascus International Airport. Ankara and Damascus called it a civilian air-traffic upgrade; the Alma Center in Israel warned it gives a far wider picture of regional air activity.

Then came Abu al-Duhur. On 18 August, Israeli aircraft cratered the runway of the Idlib airbase, a few dozen kilometres from the Turkish border. Israeli officials told Kan that Turkey had been preparing to install radar there first, followed by air-defence systems and a Turkish unit to operate them. Turkey and Syria denied any deployment. Ankara said Israel was inventing pretexts to justify unlawful strikes on Syrian sovereignty.

The details of the raid matter more than the rhetoric. According to the Moshe Dayan Center, Israeli planners chose aircraft that kept the F-35’s radar signature away from Turkish surveillance networks along the southern border, and relied on tankers and AWACS to manage the airspace. US envoy Tom Barrack said Turkey had not been warned and watched the jets heading north toward its territory. Israel was hiding its best aircraft from a NATO ally.

Mosaic states the Israeli Air Force’s concern openly: Turkish radar in Syria could detect future strikes on Iran in advance, allowing Tehran to be warned or the aircraft to be intercepted. That is the link the Pickaxe Mountain debate misses. A deep facility is hard to destroy. A deep facility whose defenders get twenty extra minutes of warning is harder.


Turkey Between Tehran and Washington

Ankara’s position in the February war was not neutral, and Israel remembers it. Turkey called the US-Israeli campaign a clear violation of international law. Kan reported that Ankara warned it would act against any Kurdish incursion into Iran and weighed giving Tehran air-defence support. None of this was confirmed by Turkey.

Iran did not make Turkey’s choice easy. NATO systems intercepted Iranian missiles in Turkish airspace four times in March, and on 10 March Erdoğan publicly warned Tehran to stop its provocations. The NATO early-warning radar at Kürecik in Malatya, which Iran has long described as a shield for Israel, sits in the same equation.

This is the classic position of a middle power: Ankara does not want Iran destroyed, does not want Iranian missiles over Anatolia, and wants its own forces, not Israel’s, to set the rules over northern Syria. On 23 October, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan hosted his counterparts from Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Germany, France, Britain and Italy in Istanbul. He told reporters that all agreed a new attack on Iran would widen the war, and that nobody approved it.

For readers in Cyprus, one point deserves attention. Israel’s INSS notes that, operationally, Turkish radar or electronic-warfare systems in northern Syria differ little from the same systems in southern Turkey or in the occupied north of Cyprus. Turkey stationed six fighter jets in the north of the island in March. The corridor question is not only a Syrian question.


Iraq: The Soft Middle of the Route

If Syria is where Turkey can watch the corridor, Iraq is where the corridor can be politically closed.

Baghdad has pledged to stay out of a renewed war. Its skies say otherwise. Media reports put Israeli F-16s and F-35s with tankers over Iraq on the night of 12 October; the 19 October sortie followed a week later. No formal Iraqi protest was recorded. Iranian MP Mahmoud Nabavian publicly demanded that the Iraqi government explain why Israeli jets were training in its airspace to attack Iran, according to Iran International.

The pressure inside Iraq runs in both directions. The pro-Iranian umbrella group Islamic Resistance in Iraq claims US aircraft breached Iraqi airspace 171 times between 30 September and 23 October. When Kataib Hezbollah suspended operations on 30 September, it kept the right to respond to hostile aircraft until Iraq had its own air defences. At the same time, Baghdad closed the Sheeb crossing with Iran in Maysan province on 21 October and earlier suspended flights between Najaf and Iran, which the militias blame on US pressure. Iraqi officials are also investigating explosions at militia depots that they believe were Israeli strikes.

The result is a government that cannot close its sky to Israel and cannot openly keep it open. In a third war, an armed group firing at a tanker over Anbar would be enough to turn Iraq from a transit space into a battlefield.


The Clock: Midterms, Qatar and Pickaxe Mountain

The timing is now tied to Washington. According to Axios, Netanyahu pressed Trump in a call on Saturday to strike Iran immediately after Tuesday’s midterm elections. Trump said talks were going fine and that he was in no hurry. Vice President JD Vance has sent a letter to Iran’s national security chief, Mohsen Rezaei, through Qatari mediators.

Tehran’s position has not moved. Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf says progress depends on Iran’s seven conditions. Foreign Minister Araghchi has listed several of them: removal of sanctions imposed after the Islamabad memorandum, a smaller US military presence in the region, restored oil waivers and the release of frozen assets, including funds in Qatar. According to IranWire, Qatar has proposed cutting the implementation period to five days.

If diplomacy fails, Pickaxe Mountain will head the target list. The Institute for Science and International Security published an elevation profile of the site on 30 October. It shows that the probable ventilation shaft north of the ridge sits at the same height as the western tunnel entrances and could serve either tunnel or both. That is useful for targeteers. It does not change the fact that the bombers must first cross Syria and Iraq.

The Levant Files | Editorial Assessment

Israel’s air superiority over Iran in 2025 and 2026 rested on a geography that is now changing. The collapse of the Assad state opened Syrian airspace; Turkey’s entry into Syria is slowly closing it. Each Israeli strike on a Syrian airfield since spring 2025 has been aimed less at Damascus than at Turkish sensors.

A third war is therefore more than a question of tonnage and tunnel depth. It depends on whether Ankara chooses to see the strike packages, whether it shares what it sees, and whether Baghdad can keep its militias quiet while foreign aircraft cross its territory. Turkey has not given Tehran radar coverage, and there is no public evidence it would. But Israeli planners now have to assume it could.

Watch three things after 3 November: any new Turkish radar or air-defence deployment south of the border, any Iraqi protest or militia fire at foreign aircraft, and the first sign that US and Israeli planners are routing around Syria. Each would tell us more about a third war than another estimate of Pickaxe Mountain’s depth.

Editorial Note: Claims attributed to anonymous officials, to Kan, Axios and Fox News, and to Iranian and Iraqi armed groups have not been independently verified by The Levant Files. Turkey and Syria deny that a Turkish deployment at Abu al-Duhur was underway.

Sources and Further Reading

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