Brussels failed to deliver the concrete openings expected by Turkey, while making progress on Cyprus a precondition for any advancement in Turkey–EU relations. Ankara’s response was not to soften its Cyprus policy, but to adopt a more cautious and rigid stance. The cautious optimism prior to UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ visit is now giving way to an increasingly pronounced uncertainty.
Until recently, UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ visit to Cyprus was viewed against the backdrop of an unusually hopeful atmosphere—one not seen in a long time. On the island, there was a Turkish Cypriot leader who had returned to the framework of a federal settlement, a Greek Cypriot leader claiming readiness for negotiations, a UN Secretary-General putting his personal political weight behind the process, and finally, a European Union eager to assume a more active role.
This alignment raised expectations that a new and serious diplomatic process could, at the very least, be initiated. As Guterres approached the end of his term, his investment of personal political capital in the Cyprus dossier, the intense shuttle diplomacy conducted by his Personal Envoy María Ángela Holguín across Ankara, Athens, Brussels, and the island, along with both leaders demonstrating a willingness to re-engage, fostered the impression that the post–Crans-Montana stalemate could finally be overcome.
However, hope in Cyprus is often built on the premise that both sides attribute the exact same meaning to the same words. The real trouble begins when sitting down at the negotiating table reveals that this premise does not hold up. Today, we seem to have reached a similar impasse.
The EU as Leverage, Ankara Seeking Reciprocity
The Greek Cypriot side views deeper EU involvement in the Cyprus process as effective political and economic leverage over Turkey. Ankara, on the other hand, regards the EU’s role not as an impartial contribution, but as a pressure mechanism that risks further deepening existing asymmetries.
By bringing the EU more actively into play, the Greek Cypriot administration aims to compel Turkey to make concessions on Cyprus. Turkey, meanwhile, makes it clear that unless Brussels takes concrete and reassuring steps regarding bilateral relations, Ankara is unprepared to demonstrate any fresh flexibility in its Cyprus policy.
That, in essence, is where things stand.
Turkey’s expectations from the European Union were hardly new. Modernizing the Customs Union has been on the agenda for years. Progress was expected regarding visa facilitation for Turkish citizens, leading eventually to long-term visa liberalization. Given Turkey’s role in European defense architecture, its participation in the SAFE program was expected to proceed without running into political hurdles. Ankara also argued that excluding Turkey—an actor declared indispensable to European security—from decision-making and financing mechanisms posed a strategic contradiction.
Despite this, Brussels failed to achieve any concrete progress on these fronts. More crucially, the messaging signaled that the future of Turkey–EU relations hinges on developments in Cyprus. In other words, Ankara was told to take steps on Cyprus first before expecting reciprocity on issues like the Customs Union, visas, or defense cooperation.
Putting the Cart Before the Horse
As we have written before, it was obvious that progress could not be achieved by insisting on putting the cart before the horse. Expecting major movement from Turkey on Cyprus first, while offering vague hints of unspecified openings in Turkey–EU relations at an uncertain later date, is a sequence that simply fails to build trust for Ankara.
In diplomacy, an incentive is not a bonus awarded after the outcome; it is the very tool that makes reaching an outcome possible. If Brussels merely tells Turkey, "you move first," it should come as no surprise when Ankara counters with, "you build trust first."
Such an approach could hardly be expected to be well received in Ankara. Turkey maintains that the European Union disrupted the foundational balance in 2004 by admitting the Greek Cypriot side without a settlement. It recalls that despite 64.9 percent of Turkish Cypriots voting "yes" to the Annan Plan, promises were broken, and pledges regarding direct trade and easing isolations were never fulfilled. Therefore, a renewed formula of "you take the first step, then we'll see" holds zero credibility in Ankara.
On the contrary, this language of imposition has only hardened Turkey’s stance.
Ankara Re-emphasizes the Two-State Line
The messages delivered following Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s meeting with Holguín clearly demonstrated this shift. Turkey reaffirmed that the most realistic solution lies in the side-by-side coexistence of two states on the island. It stressed that no progress can be made without recognizing the sovereign equality and equal international status of the Turkish Cypriot people.
This rhetoric does not easily align with Guterres’ quest to initiate a new process within a federal framework. UN Security Council resolutions base a solution on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman also advocates for a time-bound, result-oriented process rooted in political equality that preserves previous federal convergences. Ankara, however, is bringing the narrative of two states, sovereign equality, and equal international status back to the forefront.
There is a risk that the diplomatic space opened by Erhürman’s election could narrow due to tensions between Ankara and Brussels. While the Turkish Cypriot side prepares to negotiate on an implicit federal-confederal ground, Turkey’s louder reiteration of a two-state solution makes Guterres’ task all the more difficult.
It may be premature to speak of an outright rupture. However, it is clear that Ankara’s appetite to make a heavy political investment in the proposed negotiation process under current conditions has diminished significantly.
The Greek Cypriot Calculation, Ankara’s Reaction
The Greek Cypriot calculation is different. South Nicosia believes that Turkey’s desire to improve relations with the European Union can yield concessions on Cyprus. The Customs Union, visa facilitation, SAFE, and broader European defense cooperation are, in the eyes of the Greek Cypriot side, vital bargaining chips. Consequently, it views linking every track in Turkey–EU relations to progress in Cyprus as a diplomatic victory.
But leverage only works if it generates a willingness to move in the counterpart. Otherwise, it becomes an instrument of coercion and produces backlash. That is precisely what is happening now.
Ankara reacts against the Greek Cypriot side’s continuous use of EU membership as a veto and imposition tool against Turkey. It worries that the European Union acts not as a neutral facilitator, but as a strategic extension of the Greek Cypriots. As this perception solidifies, one should expect Turkey not to display flexibility on Cyprus, but to cling even tighter to its existing position.
The EU is Necessary, but Not an Arbitrator
The EU’s contribution to a Cyprus settlement is undoubtedly important. Brussels’ support will be required to adapt a potential agreement to EU law, finance property settlements, foster economic convergence, invest in infrastructure, and manage the transition period.
However, the EU’s role must not be to replace the UN or to empower one side against the other. The European Union should be a source of incentives facilitating a settlement, rather than an actor driving negotiations through punitive impositions.
This is precisely where the knot tightens. The Greek Cypriot side wants the EU to exert greater political weight on the process. Turkey, meanwhile, expects the EU to take concrete, trust-building steps in bilateral relations first. The Greek Cypriots argue that nothing should be granted to Turkey without progress on Cyprus, whereas Ankara demonstrates that it will not take new steps on Cyprus without tangible reciprocity for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot people.
This is a classic diplomatic deadlock. Yet in the Cyprus issue, every deadlock over time erodes not just the negotiating table, but the very possibility of a solution.
Guterres’ Narrowing Room for Maneuver
This stance of mutual waiting represents one of the most serious political obstacles facing Guterres’ visit. The Secretary-General is not coming to the island expecting to deliver a final solution in three days. His true objective is to determine whether common ground for negotiations exists, and to forge a roadmap where previous convergences are preserved, political equality is functionally defined, and the process is not left open-ended.
However, in an atmosphere where Ankara has toughened its stance and the Greek Cypriot side relies ever more heavily on EU leverage, achieving this goal becomes increasingly difficult.
Guterres’ mission has not failed yet. But the positive momentum built ahead of the visit has largely dissipated. The discourse of a "historic opportunity" spoken of weeks ago has given way to an uncertainty where parties question each other’s intentions.
Although my sources emphasize that the likelihood of a dramatic shift is quite limited, it remains possible for Guterres to depart the island having announced the next phase. Nevertheless, the issue no longer depends solely on the will of the two community leaders; the deadlock along the Ankara-Brussels line directly impacts the negotiating table in Cyprus.
A New Beginning or Another Lost Opportunity?
The European Union failed to take expected steps in its relations with Turkey. Instead, it turned Cyprus into a decisive prerequisite. In the face of this approach, Ankara did not soften its posture—on the contrary, it hardened it. The Greek Cypriot side seeks to leverage the EU against Turkey, while Turkey makes it clear that it will not move on Cyprus without tangible reciprocity from Brussels for both itself and the Turkish Cypriot people.
It is amid these contradictions that Guterres now arrives in Cyprus.
To prevent yet another dossier from being dumped into Cyprus’ diplomatic graveyard, it is not enough for the parties to merely profess a desire for a solution. The European Union must recognize the distinction between incentive and imposition, while Ankara must maintain the line between diplomatic pushback and permanent strategic deadlock.
Otherwise, the Secretary-General’s visit will remain not the harbinger of a new beginning, but merely the record of another missed opportunity. In such a climate, reports circulated by media outlets close to the Greek Cypriot Presidency—claiming Guterres will call for a new process via a "Guterres Plus" proposal extending beyond the framework he set out at Crans-Montana—resemble wishful thinking reported as news, or deliberate attempts to steer public expectations, rather than serious diplomatic realities.
*Yusuf Kanlı’s latest article was published on July 26, 2026, in Haber Kıbrıs and has been translated from Turkish into English for the readers of The Levant Files. The views and opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily align with the editorial line of The Levant Files.