The US-Israeli war with Iran could spread into a far more dangerous regional confrontation if disrupted trade, soaring living costs and threatened infrastructure push Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia towards military intervention, an editorial in Iran’s Shargh newspaper warns. Its chilling proposition: countries could enter the conflict when remaining outside it becomes economically and politically unbearable.
Writing in Shargh, political scientist Kioumars Ashtarian examines that danger in an editorial titled “On the Threshold of a Regional Crisis.” His central concern is how economic suffering beyond Iran’s borders could become a national-security threat to Iran itself.
The source matters. Shargh is an established reformist daily, described by the Financial Times as a leading newspaper in that political current. Ashtarian, a University of Tehran academic, is therefore raising the alarm within Iran’s domestic policy debate. His argument offers a significant Iranian perspective, although it should not be mistaken for an official government assessment.
Ashtarian distinguishes between military threats and the economic and social pressures that can make escalation politically acceptable. Governments need public justification for entering a war, he argues, and household finances can become a decisive foundation for that justification.
For Pakistan, he identifies a dangerous interaction between imported energy costs, food prices and foreign-exchange pressures. More expensive oil raises transport and production costs while increasing demand for dollars. Currency depreciation then makes imports still dearer, intensifying inflation and public discontent.
Yet his assessment contains an important qualification: stronger informal economic cooperation with Iran could also encourage Pakistanis to oppose entering the conflict. Hardship does not automatically produce support for war.
Turkey’s vulnerability, in his account, centres on commerce. Higher energy costs could undermine purchasing power and industrial competitiveness, while insecure regional routes could damage exports, tourism, transport and manufacturing. Red Sea disruption could therefore impose serious pressure without any direct attack on Turkish territory.
For Saudi Arabia, Ashtarian draws a different distinction. Higher oil prices can support revenue while exports continue. The more dangerous threshold involves disrupted export capacity and threats to energy installations, water systems and urban infrastructure. At that point, economic damage becomes a challenge to the state’s ability to provide security and essential services.
The editorial’s most consequential warning concerns the Houthis. Ashtarian argues that their gains could increase pressure on regional economies and ultimately create additional enemies for Tehran. What appears advantageous on the battlefield could become strategically damaging if neighbouring societies associate their distress with Iran.
However, the article does not establish that intervention is imminent. It supplies neither quantified thresholds nor evidence of decisions to enter the war, and its references to recent Houthi successes lack named supporting reports.
Its closing question is nevertheless stark: how can Iran preserve its advantages without persuading neighbouring populations that fighting it has become a necessity? The warning is that escalation may begin in household budgets and commercial routes long before it appears as a new military front. For Tehran, the danger lies in mistaking its neighbours’ continued restraint for an unlimited capacity to absorb the war’s mounting costs.
Infographic: AI