The void felt by the European Union in the Balkans is opening up space for Russia and China through Serbian leader Aleksandar Vučić. Turkey is active on the ground, but its influence has limits.
by Ahmet Erdi Öztürk
Truck drivers in the Western Balkans are preparing for renewed blockades at the European Union borders on September 14. At first glance, the issue appears technical. The Schengen rule allowing only a 90-day stay within a 180-day period is increasingly complicating international transport in the region. Drivers are transporting Europe's goods and working for the European market, yet they are still treated under tourist status. It is reported that around 5,000 drivers are affected by this situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina alone. Similar complaints exist in Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. If a solution is not found, new border blockades may be on the agenda.
This is actually a small example of a much larger problem between the Balkans and Europe. The region is economically tied to Europe and is a part of Europe in terms of security, but politically, it remains outside the door. For years, the EU has been offering a membership perspective to the Western Balkans. Summits are held, reform packages are announced, and support programs worth billions of euros are prepared. However, the underlying sentiment in the region remains unchanged: they are heading toward Europe, but they just can't seem to arrive. This also concerns Turkey, situated on the other side of the map, representing both an opportunity and a risk. And this is our main issue as well.
Europe's Endless Waiting Room
At the EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Tivat, Montenegro, in June, the same message was conveyed again. The region's future appears tied to the EU. Brussels views enlargement as crucial for Europe's security and stability. Furthermore, in the face of the growing Russian threat, Europe also needs the Balkan buffer. In this context, the 6 billion euro growth and reform program for the Western Balkans is ongoing. However, the problem is no longer about the promises made, but rather when these promises will be realized.
The political landscape in the region is also not calm in itself. Protests against Aleksandar Vučić's administration in Serbia have been ongoing for a long time. The future of the central state and ethnic balances are once again being debated in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Kosovo-Serbia line remains fragile. The European Union continues to be the largest economic partner for these countries, but its political influence does not always seem to match its economic might.
Following the cancellation of EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos's visit due to the organization of a state funeral in Belgrade for Ratko Mladić—known as the "Butcher of Bosnia," who died in prison as a convicted perpetrator of genocide and war crimes—Vučić abandoned his plans to attend the funeral.
Turkey is Already in the Region
The void created by Europe naturally opens up space for other actors. Russia is trying to maintain its influence, particularly through Serbia. China is expanding in the region through infrastructure and financing. Investments from Gulf countries are drawing attention. Turkey, on the other hand, is following a different path. Ankara is no longer acting in the Balkans solely on the basis of history, culture, or identity; it also has other concerns here, primarily its own economic challenges.
Turkey's current Balkan policy rests on a much broader foundation. Trade, the defense industry, energy, transportation, infrastructure, military presence, and diplomatic contacts have become the main pillars of this relationship. Ankara's greatest advantage is not merely its closeness with a few countries. It can simultaneously communicate with almost all the actors who are at odds with one another. Serbia is one of the most striking examples of this. During the meeting between President Erdoğan and Aleksandar Vučić in Ankara in February 2026, it was decided to expand cooperation in the fields of the defense industry, energy, transportation, and technology. The Turkey-Serbia trade volume reached approximately 3.5 billion dollars in 2025. The current target is 5 billion dollars.
Turkey, the Balkans, and NATO
At the same time, Turkey explicitly supports the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It plays a significant military role in the NATO force KFOR in Kosovo. It is also one of the largest non-EU contributors of personnel to the EUFOR operation in Bosnia. This landscape enables Ankara to establish contact with Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Pristina simultaneously.
The Balkan Peace Platform, which convened for the second time in Istanbul in January, served as an excellent example of this approach. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia gathered around the same table. Turkey's increasingly visible role in the region emerges precisely here. Ankara is not only developing its own bilateral relations but is also striving to open channels of communication between countries that have difficulty speaking to one another.
As Much Risk as Opportunity
However, this picture does not solely represent an opportunity for Turkey. Being able to talk to everyone is a significant advantage, but when a serious crisis erupts, remaining equally close to everyone is much more difficult. If a new political crisis breaks out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ankara's balancing act between Sarajevo and Belgrade will be tested. If Kosovo-Serbia tensions escalate again, Turkey's military role within NATO and the close relationship it has fostered with Serbia could simultaneously come under pressure.
Turkey is no longer a country with only historical ties in the Balkans. It is an actor with economic investments, a military presence, defense relations, and political weight. And this brings responsibility. Europe's indecision may grant Turkey more room to maneuver in the short term. However, if the region becomes severely polarized once again, that same space could turn into a serious burden for Ankara.
The Real Issue is Managing the Void
Turkey cannot take the EU's place in the Balkans. That is not the point anyway. Europe is still by far the largest economic and institutional power in the region. However, the longer the Balkan countries wait at Europe's door, the larger the resulting political void grows.
The visa issue for drivers actually illustrates exactly this; seemingly small practical conveniences can open up space for Ankara, but Turkey must not exaggerate this space and get carried away by a sense of strategic superiority. For Turkey, the real issue is not filling this void. It is managing it correctly.
Because it is easy to establish relationships in the Balkans. It is much more difficult to preserve all of those relationships simultaneously when a crisis breaks out.
*This article was originally published in the Yetkin Report on September 6, 2026. The opinions expressed within do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of The Levant Files.
** The graphic was created with the help of AI technology.