Renewed fighting in Baidoa is more than a local power struggle. It exposes the widening fracture between Mogadishu and Somalia's regions, consumes forces needed against al-Shabaab, and places Turkey's expanding military role under an unforgiving spotlight.
The Editorial Team of TLF
What Happened In Baidoa
Somalia's latest outbreak of violence came on September 28 in Baidoa, the capital of South West State and one of the country's most important humanitarian centres. Forces loyal to former regional president Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen fought federal troops and fighters backing the current South West administration. Local reporting put the death toll at at least 10, with dozens wounded. Residents described explosions, sustained gunfire and fighting near major junctions before the immediate confrontation eased later that day.
The figures should be treated cautiously. Somalia's wars are full of rival claims, delayed casualty reports and fast-moving propaganda. What is clear is that Baidoa has now seen repeated rounds of fighting in a matter of weeks. On September 3, the city's hospital received 71 wounded people, including 15 women, and one dead civilian after a previous clash. August had already brought another serious confrontation.
For Baidoa's people, this is a grimly familiar pattern. A city that hosts more than half a million people displaced by conflict and drought is being pulled into a battle among actors who all claim to be defending it.
The Political Fight Beneath The Gunfire
The immediate dispute centres on who has the right to govern South West State. Laftagareen had led the state since 2018. In March, federal forces moved into Baidoa, seized control and Laftagareen resigned. He was replaced by Sheikh Aden Mohamed Nur Madobe after a new regional political process backed by Mogadishu.
Laftagareen's supporters reject the settlement. They see it as a federal removal of an elected regional leader and continue to describe their armed campaign as an effort to restore South West authority. Mogadishu and the current regional administration see a challenge to constitutional order. Neither side is merely arguing about personalities. They are fighting over the balance of power in a federal state whose centre has repeatedly struggled to secure the consent of its periphery.
That struggle has become sharper under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's push for constitutional and electoral changes. His allies argue that Somalia needs stronger national institutions after decades of fragmentation. Opponents fear that the reforms concentrate power in Mogadishu and weaken the autonomy promised to federal member states. The same argument has fuelled tensions with Puntland, where regional forces seized a camp held by troops aligned with the federal government in Galkayo in August.
Somalia therefore faces several crises at once. Baidoa is the most violent current flashpoint, but it sits within a wider contest between the federal centre and regional authorities. Puntland, Jubaland, South West State and the political opposition in Mogadishu all have different grievances. The country's political map is becoming harder to hold together.
Al-Shabaab Benefits From Every Rift
The government says fighters loyal to Laftagareen have cooperated with al-Shabaab. Laftagareen's camp denies this. No independently verifiable public evidence has established operational coordination between the two. That distinction matters. In Somalia, branding an opponent an al-Shabaab ally can carry enormous political and military consequences.
Still, the deeper danger is real whether or not the accusation is proved. The longer federal forces are tied down fighting Somali rivals in Baidoa, the less energy they can devote to the insurgency. ACLED recorded at least 78 armed engagements between opposition factions and federally supported forces in Bay region from February 2 to August 28. It also recorded more than 75 al-Shabaab attacks in Bay after the new South West administration took office in June.
That is the trap. The state deploys scarce troops against internal challengers. Al-Shabaab watches the gaps open. It does not need to command every local dispute to profit from the exhaustion, mistrust and territorial vacuum left behind.
Why Turkey Is Being Drawn Into The Story
Turkey is Somalia's closest external security partner. Ankara has invested in the country since 2011, opened a major military training academy in Mogadishu in 2017 and trained thousands of Somali personnel. Its support now reaches well beyond training. Turkey provides equipment, advisory assistance, maritime security cooperation and an increasingly visible military presence.
In July, Turkey's parliament extended the Turkish military deployment in Somalia for another two years, until July 2028. The mandate covers support against terrorism, piracy, smuggling and other security threats, including operations in Somalia's maritime jurisdiction. Turkish F-16s were reportedly deployed to Mogadishu earlier this year, while Turkish aircraft have also been linked to strikes against al-Shabaab targets in Lower Shabelle.
This relationship gives Somalia capabilities it badly needs. It also creates a political vulnerability. Laftagareen's camp alleged that Turkish F-16s fired six missiles during the September 28 fighting in Baidoa, causing civilian casualties and property damage. The allegation has not been independently verified, and Turkish authorities have not publicly confirmed involvement. It should be reported as an allegation, not as established fact.
Yet the claim alone shows the risk Ankara now carries. Turkey entered Somalia as a partner in reconstruction, training and state-building. As its security role expands, every Somali internal confrontation can produce pressure to answer an uncomfortable question: is Turkish power protecting Somalia from militant groups, or could it be seen as taking sides in Somalia's own political battles?
A Crisis On Land And At Sea
The crisis is not confined to Baidoa. In August, pirates hijacked the Cameroon-flagged M/V LUTUF off Puntland while it was carrying weapons, communications equipment and satellite equipment for a Turkish military training facility in Mogadishu. Somali officials said Turkish helicopters and drones monitored the episode. The vessel was later freed.
The incident underlined how much is at stake for Ankara. Somalia is central to Turkey's Horn of Africa strategy, its maritime ambitions and its wider influence around the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Somalia, in turn, sees Turkey as a partner able to provide military help without the colonial baggage associated with some older foreign relationships.
But strategic partnership cannot substitute for a Somali political settlement. Foreign aircraft, naval deployments and military trainers can improve a government's capacity. They cannot settle the argument over how Somalia should be governed, who commands regional forces or whether political rivals believe they still have a place inside the system.
What Comes Next
The immediate priority is to stop Baidoa from becoming a rolling front line. That requires credible local mediation, protection for civilians and a political channel that does not begin with the assumption that every armed opponent is beyond dialogue. The government also needs to avoid letting the al-Shabaab accusation become a shortcut around evidence. Once political disputes are treated as counterterrorism operations by default, reconciliation becomes far harder.
For Turkey, the task is delicate. Ankara has every reason to support Somali state institutions and counter al-Shabaab. It also has a strong interest in making clear that its military presence is not a blank cheque for domestic factional warfare. Transparency, civilian-protection standards and a visible commitment to Somali-led political dialogue would protect both Somali civilians and Turkey's long-term standing.
Baidoa is a warning. Somalia's crisis is no longer only the familiar war against al-Shabaab. It is also a fight over the shape of the state itself. If that fight keeps moving from negotiating rooms to city streets, the country may find that the forces meant to defend its future are busy tearing at one another.
Sources
- Somalia Today, September 28, 2026: At least 10 killed in renewed Baidoa fighting
- Associated Press, September 3, 2026: Fighting in Baidoa between government forces and militias
- ACLED: Analysis of the South West political crisis and violence in Bay region
- Al Jazeera and AFP: Puntland's clash with federal-aligned forces in Galkayo
- Turkish Minute: Extension of Turkey's Somalia military deployment
- Associated Press: Hijacking of a ship carrying Turkish military equipment off Puntland
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