By Editorial Team of TLF
Analysis · 5 Q&A
On 3 November Americans elect all 435 House members and a third of the Senate, and with them the Congress that will sit for the last two years of Donald Trump's presidency. For the Levant the vote touches four files at once: the war with Iran, US military aid to Israel, Turkey's return to the F-35 programme and the oversight Washington applies to its partners in Syria and Lebanon.
By Dr. Nikolaos Stelgias · Nicosia/Pyla · 2 November 2026
1. Why does a domestic US vote matter so much for the region?
Because the Iran war has been on the ballot for months. Trump launched it on 28 February, and he has since tied its end to the electoral calendar: in September he said he did not expect the war to end, or oil prices to fall, before the midterms, and more recently he predicted it would finish right after the vote. Tehran reads the same calendar in reverse. Chatham House's Sanam Vakil told AFP that Iran is using pressure on the Strait of Hormuz to raise the political price of the war for Washington before election day.
The price is visible. The Congressional Budget Office put the cost at more than $38 billion by 1 August, with $2 to 3 billion added every month, and expects the war to push inflation half a point higher into 2027. Trump's approval stood at 33 per cent in a recent Reuters/Ipsos poll, the lowest of his presidency, with the war and living costs cited as the main reasons.
2. Can a Democratic Congress end the Iran war?
Not on its own, and not quickly. The House has already passed three war powers resolutions. The latest, on 15 September, carried 220 to 204 with seven Republicans joining every Democrat. The Senate approved one on its tenth attempt, but Republican senators reversed the vote a day later after Trump confronted them at a closed-door lunch. No resolution has reached the president's desk, and he would veto one if it did.
A Democratic majority would change the tools, though. Control of the House brings control of appropriations and subpoenas, which means hearings on war costs, conditions on funding and pressure on the Pentagon's posture in the Gulf. House Foreign Affairs chairman Brian Mast has argued the opposite case: that Iran remains a direct threat and that the war is closing decades of hostility. Forecasters give Democrats a strong lead for the House and a narrower one in the Senate; the Silver Bulletin model recently put their odds at 92.9 per cent for the House and 73.9 per cent for the Senate. A Chicago Council analysis warns that the war has left Washington cornered in the Middle East whoever controls Congress.
3. What changes for Israel?
The tone in Washington has already changed, and the election will measure how far. In July, 103 House Democrats voted to strip $3.3 billion in aid to Israel, against 98 who voted to keep it. The amendment came from Republican Thomas Massie and failed because most Republicans backed the funding. Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries opposed the cut while calling for a change in US Middle East policy.
A House under Jeffries is unlikely to cut aid outright. More probable are conditions on end use, reporting requirements and hearings on Israeli operations in Lebanon and Syria. Public opinion is moving faster than Congress: a Pew poll cited by Truthout found 60 per cent of Americans now hold an unfavourable view of Israel. Netanyahu's visit to Washington in late July was aimed at locking in US support for Israel's military goals in Iran and Lebanon before the vote.
4. Where does Turkey stand?
Ankara has the most to lose from a stronger Congress. In July Trump said he would lift CAATSA sanctions and "certainly" consider selling F-35s to Turkey, which wants 40 aircraft. Section 1245 of the 2020 defence authorisation act still bars the transfer, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged before the House in June that the administration is bound by that law. The Congressional Research Service notes that Israel and Greece have voiced concerns, and that blocking a presidential decision could require veto-proof majorities.
The administration also notified Congress in June of a sale of about 80 F110 engines for Turkey's KAAN fighter, overriding an informal hold by a committee leader. Democratic committee chairs would have more room to delay such sales, though the June episode shows a hold can be bypassed. Turkey's position is not a party line issue: Republican Joe Wilson backs Ankara's return to the F-35 programme and has urged Israel to stop striking Syria. For Nicosia and Athens, this is the file where the result counts most directly.
5. What should the region watch on 4 November?
Three things. First, whether Trump moves to wind down the Iran war as he promised, and whether Tehran eases pressure on Hormuz once the electoral leverage is gone. Second, the Senate: it confirms ambassadors and approves treaties, and it is where the F-35 and engine fights would be settled. Third, the gap between the vote and the new Congress, which sits on 3 January 2027. The outgoing majority keeps control for two months, and a president facing a hostile Congress at home usually has more freedom abroad, where he needs no votes.
THE LEVANT FILES | EDITORIAL ASSESSMENT
A Democratic House would not end the Iran war or cut off Israel, and it would not by itself keep F-35s from Turkey. It would make each of these files slower and costlier for the White House. Regional capitals that bet on direct deals with Trump, Ankara and Jerusalem above all, face a Washington with more veto points from January.
The bigger risk sits in the next two months. Tehran has framed the vote as a deadline and Trump has framed it as a turning point. If neither side moves after 4 November, the war enters 2027 with a weaker president and a Congress that can obstruct but cannot command.
Editorial note: Forecast figures reflect published models before election day and may shift with final turnout. Results will be covered as they come in.
THE LEVANT FILES · REAL NEWS. DEEPER ANALYSIS.