Solakoğlu contends that the AKP's foreign policy concerns, including Cyprus, often boil down to two primary questions: "How much money can be made from this?" and "Will it help perpetuate my rule?" He argues that this transactional approach ignores the island's complex historical and legal realities, leading to superficial and often counterproductive policies.
The former diplomat provides a comprehensive historical overview, emphasizing the sui generis nature of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus (RoC), established with limited sovereignty due to the guarantor powers (UK, Turkey, Greece). He stresses a frequently overlooked point in Turkey: these powers guarantee the state's existence, not specific communities. Solakoğlu highlights the significance of UN Security Council Resolution 186 (1964), accepted by Turkey at the time, which recognized the Greek Cypriot-led administration as the sole legitimate government after the intercommunal violence and the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from state institutions. This resolution remains the bedrock of international recognition for the RoC.
Regarding Turkey's 1974 military operation, Solakoğlu posits that while the initial phase had legal grounds under the guarantor treaty (responding to the coup against Makarios), the second phase exceeded this authority, leaving Turkey's legal position "in a vacuum." He also clarifies that contrary to familiar rhetoric in Turkey, no UNSC resolution explicitly names Turkey as an "occupier."
Critically, Solakoğlu asserts that the self-declared 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (TRNC), established in 1983 (following the 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' in 1976, a precursor to the TRNC), was conceived, according to its founding documents, as a 'negotiating position' aimed at establishing a 'new partnership' for a reunified Cyprus. This, he argues, explains why Turkey, before and during the AKP era, never genuinely pushed for international recognition of the entity.
He dismisses Turkey's recent outcry over Central Asian states like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan opening embassies in the Republic of Cyprus as "ignorance mixed with jingoism." Solakoğlu points out that these nations recognized the RoC decades ago and, like all countries, prioritized their national interests—a reality that transcends the pan-Turkic sentiment often touted by Ankara.
Solakoğlu directs his most potent criticism towards the current state of affairs in the Turkish-occupied north, describing it as having devolved into a 'regional center for all kinds of crime,' including rampant drug trafficking, prostitution, illegal gambling and betting, and human trafficking. While not initiated by the AKP, he states this deterioration accelerated dramatically under their rule, exemplified by notorious cases like the Falyalı affair, a high-profile corruption scandal involving top officials. He suggests this unchecked criminality, alongside the erosion of Turkish Cypriots' right to self-governance, constitutes the real 'betrayal' and 'selling out' of Cyprus.
He concludes that empty nationalist rhetoric is futile. Instead, he advocates for a more hopeful approach to the Cyprus problem, one that starts by genuinely listening to the Turkish Cypriot people. Their voices, often ignored by those in Turkey who view the island merely as a strategic asset, are crucial for any meaningful dialogue and potential resolution.