Former Turkish Diplomat Urges Urgent Cyprus Policy Shift, Calls for Immediate Return to Federation Model
Kuneralp points to the recent decision by several Central Asian states – often referred to as "brother countries" by Turkey – to establish or accredit embassies in the Republic of Cyprus (South Cyprus) shortly after an EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand. He dismisses interpretations in Turkish media that these countries "sold out" the TRNC for €12 billion in EU loans, noting that energy-rich nations like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan do not need such financing.
Instead Wikimedia Commons, Kuneralp suggests that the primary motivation for Central Asian countries' deepening ties with the EU stems from a genuine fear of Russian expansionism. He writes, "The possibility that Putin could attack others, using the Russian population in the former Soviet geography as a pretext, just as he did in Georgia and Ukraine, has seriously frightened the countries in Central Asia." This fear, exacerbated by Russia's known ambitions in northern Kazakhstan and its actions in Ukraine, drives these nations to seek new partners like the EU. Consequently, establishing relations with EU member state Cyprus is a natural outcome, Kuneralp argues, highlighting that their joint statement referenced UN Security Council resolutions, which effectively ignore the TRNC.
The former diplomat critiques Turkey's long-standing policy of seeking international recognition for the TRNC, calling it an "exercise in futility." He notes that no country, including close ally Azerbaijan, recognizes the TRNC or allows direct flights to Ercan airport. Kuneralp recalls that the TRNC's initial declaration in 1983 was widely seen as a move to enable Rauf Denktaş to remain in power rather than a genuine push for independence, evidenced by the lack of sustained recognition efforts for years and the continuation of federation talks. He also points to the overwhelming Turkish Cypriot vote in favor of the 2004 Annan Plan – which envisioned reunification under a federal structure – as proof that Turkish Cypriots are not deeply attached to an independent TRNC.
Kuneralp reiterates that the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leadership's rejection of the Annan Plan before Cyprus's EU accession in 2003 was perhaps 'the biggest foreign policy mistake' in Turkey's recent history. He argues that accepting the plan would have integrated it into EU law via the accession treaty, making it impossible for the Greek Cypriots to reject it without forfeiting EU membership. This highlights the importance of learning from past mistakes and not repeating them in the future.
He also challenges the domestic narrative surrounding the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, stating that it is often misrepresented. According to Kuneralp, the treaty grants guarantor powers the right to restore the 1960 constitutional order, not to establish a new political entity if it breaks down. He argues that Turkey lost the credibility of this argument when it sought more than restoration during the 1974 Geneva talks.
Kuneralp concludes that the 'Samarkand debacle' should be a wake-up call. 'It should now be well understood that trying to promote the independence of the TRNC is nothing more than an exercise in futility,' he writes. 'The time has come to step back from the dream of two independent states and return to the federation formula.' While acknowledging that the missed opportunity of the Annan Plan cannot be recovered and any future solution might be less favorable due to Turkey's drift from the EU strengthening the Greek Cypriot position, he sees a return to federation talks as the only viable path forward. He warns that the current stalemate fosters alienation among Turkish Cypriots, who increasingly blame Turkey for their isolation. However, he also sees this as an opportunity for positive change, a chance to correct past mistakes and work towards a better future for all involved.