The analysis contends that the declaration is fundamentally illegitimate in its genesis and substance. Drafted unilaterally by the "de facto authority," it conspicuously bypassed broad national consultation and ignored the internationally mandated roadmap outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 2254. This resolution requires an inclusive transitional body, constitution drafting, and elections—steps crucial for domestic and international legitimacy that the new authorities sidestepped, relying instead on the flimsy justification of "revolutionary legitimacy."
A central pillar of the critique is the dangerous concentration of power baked into the declaration. Establishing a presidential system grants the President sweeping, almost absolute authority, effectively subjugating the legislative and judicial branches. Al-Toaimeh draws a stark parallel to the notoriously authoritarian 1973 constitution of Hafez al-Assad, condemning the failure to institute democratic checks and balances. In this framework, the legislature is rendered largely subservient, lacking genuine oversight capabilities and facing insurmountable hurdles to challenge executive decrees.
The declaration's approach to religion is highlighted as particularly egregious. Article 3, designating Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh) as the primary source of legislation, is denounced as a regressive step that contradicts Syria's historically more secular constitutional tradition. It ignores the nation's rich religious and sectarian tapestry, fatally undermines the core principle of equal citizenship, and risks sowing deep division. The accompanying stipulation that the head of state must be Muslim (Article 3a) is flagged as a direct contradiction to purported equality.
Guarantees of rights and freedoms are also judged inadequate. Rather than being immediately affirmed, the crucial freedom to form political parties and civil society organizations (Article 14) is tellingly deferred pending future legislation – a move Al-Toaimeh interprets as echoing past repression, not enabling present liberty. The right to work (Article 15) is deemed incomplete without a state obligation to provide opportunities and procedural safeguards for home searches, and freedom of movement found wanting.
Finally, the excessively long five-year transitional period (Article 50) draws suspicion. Al-Toaimeh suggests this extended timeframe does not serve the interests of a swift democratic transition. Still, instead, the current authorities' consolidation of power effectively entrenches the status quo under a new guise.
In essence, Nashat Al-Toaimeh's analysis in the Syrian Communist Party's Al-Masar portrays the March 2025 Constitutional Declaration not as a foundation for a new Syria but as a profoundly flawed, authoritarian blueprint. Lacking legitimacy, concentrating power undemocratically, compromising equality through religious clauses, and curtailing essential freedoms, it stands as an obstacle, rather than a pathway, to the democratic future Syrians yearn for.