Ankara’s High-Wire Act: Turkey’s Quest for ‘Strategic Autonomy’ Navigates Perils of a Multipolar World
Kutlay, a Senior Lecturer at City, St George’s, University of London, highlights Turkey’s assertive role in conflicts from the South Caucasus to the Middle East. Its Syria policy exemplifies this: Ankara’s long-term opposition to Bashar al-Assad eventually saw its influence rise following the regime’s collapse in December 2024. This perceived success, coupled with a belief that multipolarity offers new opportunities, has fueled Turkey’s ambition to become an active player on a global stage less dominated by the post-war U.S. alliance system. Turkey now boasts the third-highest diplomatic missions worldwide, trailing only China and the United States.
This strategic pivot involves a significant diversification of partnerships “Beyond the West,” as Kutlay describes. Turkey’s trade volume with Asian countries, including Russia and China, has surpassed its trade with the European Union, a stark contrast to two decades ago. Its engagement in Africa has also surged, with trade volume jumping over 50% to $33.3 billion between 2014 and 2024, and the number of Turkish embassies on the continent increasing from 12 in 2002 to 44 by 2022. Further signaling its intent to cultivate non-Western ties, Ankara applied to join the BRICS economic bloc last year and became a dialogue partner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2012.
Despite these efforts, “The Economics of Hedging,” as Kutlay terms it, reveals significant vulnerabilities. While Turkey’s trade with Russia and China reached $101 billion in 2024, accounting for almost 17% of its total external trade, it remains highly asymmetric. Turkish exports to these two nations amounted to only $12 billion last year, significantly contributing to Turkey’s external trade deficits. Simultaneously, Turkey remains dependent on Western markets and capital, with the EU and the United States accounting for nearly 70% of foreign direct investment (FDI). Kutlay notes that from 2019 to 2023, Turkey attracted significantly less FDI ($53 billion) than a smaller ‘hedging middle’ country like Vietnam ($84 billion), partly due to domestic political tumult generating investor uncertainty.
Pursuing strategic autonomy has also led to “Relationship Juggling” with tangible consequences. Ankara’s controversial purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems led to its expulsion from NATO’s F-35 fighter jet program. Furthermore, Kutlay argues that transactional diplomacy has not advanced Turkey’s most urgent national interests, such as modernizing its Customs Union agreement with the EU or easing Schengen visa procedures for its citizens. Past overreach, particularly following the Arab uprisings, strained relations with regional and global partners, leading to diplomatic isolation and economic repercussions.
The Foreign Affairs analysis underscores that an “effective hedging policy must start at home.” Turkey requires a comprehensive industrial policy and strong institutions to mitigate economic exposure and bolster resilience. While its economy is diversified, it heavily relies on imports for high-end products; advanced technologies account for only four percent of Turkey’s manufacturing exports, significantly below the world average of 19 percent.
Ultimately, Kutlay cautions that while the allure of transactionalism is strong for middle powers like Turkey in the current global climate, “playing all sides can lead to isolation, and pursuing every opportunity for engagement can overstretch countries that lack superpower resources. The analysis concludes that unless Turkey and similar nations temper their pursuit of strategic autonomy with realistic expectations and a focus on domestic economic strength, the policy is “likely to cost more than it yields.”
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