The analysis points to a significant recent event: the temporary opening of the Turkey-Armenia border on March 21, 2025, to allow Armenian humanitarian aid trucks to pass through to Syria. This marked only the second opening since the border's closure in 1993, following a similar gesture in 2023 after a devastating earthquake in southern Turkey. However, the move provoked a sharp backlash from Azerbaijan, with state-controlled media accusing Turkey of betraying its ally and pandering to "imperialist forces" and the European Union. This reaction underscores Azerbaijan's resistance to any Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, a stance that Ohanyan argues is stifling regional progress.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev's apparent veto over Turkish regional policy is central to the issue. Despite a finalized peace accord between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Aliyev has stalled on signing, effectively blocking the Armenia-Azerbaijan treaty and the potential normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations. Ohanyan suggests that Aliyev views such normalization as a threat to his domestic legitimacy, which is heavily rooted in nationalist rhetoric against Armenia, and as a constraint on his ability to balance relations with multiple geopolitical players like Russia, China, Turkey, and the EU. This strategy mirrors past tactics of leaders like Belarus's Aleksandr Lukashenko, prioritizing regime survival over regional stability.
Turkey, however, stands to lose the most from this deadlock. Ohanyan emphasizes that the South Caucasus offers Ankara a rare opportunity to position itself as a bridge between Europe and Asia, primarily through initiatives like the "Middle Corridor," a transport and development project linking the Black Sea to Central Asia and China. An open border with Armenia would diversify trade routes and enhance Turkey's strategic role in Eurasian geopolitics. Yet, despite its smaller population and economy, Azerbaijan's influence continues to hinder these prospects. This leverage stems from deep commercial ties, including energy pipelines, military cooperation, and softer power through personal connections between Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Azerbaijani-funded media support for Erdogan's government.
Ohanyan also highlights Azerbaijan's domestic challenges, including a stagnant economy reliant on declining oil and gas reserves and increasing repression of dissent, which further fuel Aliyev's reluctance to embrace peace. Meanwhile, Turkey faces a critical choice: defy Baku and pursue normalization with Armenia independently or work with Western partners to push for the Armenia-Azerbaijan treaty's conclusion. Failure to act, Ohanyan warns, could entrench regional fractures, benefit adversaries like Russia, and allow China to expand its influence in the Middle Corridor. As Ankara's strategic autonomy wanes under Azerbaijan's sway, the risk of missing a transformative moment in Eurasia looms.