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Why Did ISIS Target the “Apostate Sharaa Regime” for the First Time?



According to Raialyoum, a significant shift in Syria’s internal conflict dynamics is emerging as ISIS has launched its first attack against the new interim Syrian government led by Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly known as al-Jolani). The attack marks a troubling development in Syria’s post-Assad security landscape.

The Islamic State organization has officially claimed responsibility for detonating a remote explosive device targeting a vehicle belonging to what they described as the “apostate Syrian regime” in Sweida province. According to their statement, the attack killed one person. It wounded three others, signaling that al-Shara’s forces have become openly targeted through methods difficult to control amid widespread weapons proliferation and Damascus’s weakened central authority.

This attack comes despite al-Sharaa’s ongoing campaigns against ISIS. Just last week, Hussam al-Tahhan, the transitional internal security commander in rural Damascus, announced the arrest of several ISIS members and the seizure of various light, medium, and heavy weapons, including rocket launchers, explosive devices, and suicide vests.

The operation appears to be a response to al-Sharaa’s targeting of ISIS based on American requests. These requests reportedly came directly from U.S. President Donald Trump during his summoning of al-Shara to Riyadh in the presence of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

This marks ISIS’s first attack since the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, suggesting that “sleeper cells” have been activated. The attack coincides with ISIS’s verbal assault on al-Sharaa in its weekly newspaper “Al-Naba” in an article titled “On Trump’s Doorstep,” which condemned al-Shara’s meeting with President Trump as a “betrayal of the jihadist methodology.”

ISIS is attempting to entice al-Sharaa’s fighters to return to its ranks by claiming that al-Jolani has “changed his Islamic skin” and “trimmed his beard.” This appeal primarily targets “foreign fighters,” whom al-Shara is under pressure to eliminate due to Washington’s concerns. Michael Mitchell, the U.S. State Department’s regional spokesperson, has warned that ISIS threats continue to endanger Syria’s security and expressed concern about the presence of foreign fighters in the country.

Despite Arab and Gulf media attempts to present a positive image of al-Sharaa’s era, Mitchell confirmed that Syria continues to face difficult security conditions, adding that some parties aim to drag Syria backward and inflame a mixture of violence and sectarianism.

The new regime acknowledges threats from ISIS. Nour al-Din al-Baba, spokesman for Syria’s transitional Interior Ministry, stated that ISIS activity has increased since the regime change, as the group obtained weapons from the former regime’s remnants. Al-Baba noted that ISIS cells attempted to infiltrate sites belonging to Syria’s transitional Defense Ministry and tried to recruit elements from the former regime into its ranks.

This creates a dangerous potential alliance where both former regime loyalists and foreign fighters might find a common cause in joining ISIS to fight al-Sharaa’s government, each for their reasons. Former regime elements have been marginalized by the “new state,” while foreign fighters face elimination under American orders.

ISIS has indicated methods for joining their ranks, referring to “companies spread among you in the countryside and outskirts” of Syria. The escalation of confrontations between ISIS cells and the new Syrian security forces coincides with ISIS attempts to target the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in eastern and northeastern Syria.

This first operation launched by ISIS against al-Shara’s forces will not be the last. The organization is known for its bloody operations involving car bombs, which it previously carried out against the former Syrian army in Damascus despite existing security controls. The enmity between the al-Nusra Front and ISIS is longstanding. It has been renewed, but with a significant difference: al-Nusra forces, now operating as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, have transitioned to governance while attempting to shed terrorism accusations.

Photo: The Source

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