According to a recent analysis by The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), the concept of a cohesive "Shiite Axis" under Iran's leadership requires urgent reassessment following significant regional developments since the Gaza conflict began. INSS researcher Raz Zimmt argues that the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah's strategic erosion, and mounting pressures on Shiite militias have fundamentally altered the dynamics of Iran's proxy network.
The traditional understanding of Iran's regional influence network as a centralized structure appears increasingly outdated. What was once described as a tightly coordinated "axis" now functions more as a decentralized network of actors with independent interests and identities, exercising considerably more autonomy than previously acknowledged.
The concept of a "Shiite Crescent" first emerged in December 2004 when Jordan's King Abdullah II warned about Iran's growing transnational influence stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. This warning reflected Sunni Arab concerns about Iran's expanding regional footprint, particularly following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Over the past two decades, Iran has worked to consolidate what it terms the "Axis of Resistance" – an anti-American, anti-Israeli coalition including Assad's Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and even Sunni groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This network enhanced Iran's strategic depth across the Fertile Crescent.
However, Iran faces fundamental limitations in establishing regional hegemony. As a Persian-majority nation operating in a predominantly Arab and Sunni region, Iran is often viewed with suspicion even by its allies. Research indicates a crisis of trust between Hezbollah fighters and Iranian Revolutionary Guard commanders, with Lebanese operatives reporting condescension from their Iranian counterparts.
Even among Shiite populations, Iran's influence faces constraints. Iraqi Shiites maintain historical suspicions stemming from the Iran-Iraq war, while most reject Iran's governing principle of velayat-e faqih. Similarly, the Houthis in Yemen, who belong to the Zaidi rather than the Twelver Shiite branch, have demonstrated considerable independence from Tehran's directives.
The recent Gaza conflict provided Iran with an opportunity to implement its "convergence of arenas" strategy, which involves coordinated action across multiple fronts. This included Hezbollah's partial integration, attacks by Iraqi Shiite militias against US bases, and Houthi missile launches toward Israel and shipping in the Red Sea.
Yet the war exposed Iran's limitations in leveraging its proxy network effectively. Tehran failed to end the fighting in Gaza to minimize Hamas's losses and couldn't pressure the United States to withdraw support for Israel. Moreover, tensions emerged between Iran and its proxies due to divergent interests during the conflict.
Photo: Wikipedia Commons