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From Ankara's View: Regime Change in Iran Deemed Unlikely

Recent Israeli airstrikes targeting Iran have catapulted the question of potential regime change in Tehran to the forefront of international discourse. The attacks, reportedly causing significant losses to the Iranian Armed Forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have been followed by direct appeals from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the Iranian populace, urging them to rise against their government. These calls, amplified by simultaneous declarations from Kurdish armed groups operating in Iran, have intensified speculation about the vulnerability of the current Iranian leadership and the prospects of a popular uprising.

However, a sober assessment of Iran's internal dynamics suggests that the path to regime change remains fraught with significant challenges. An analysis by researcher Çağatay Balcı, published by the Turkish Iranian Studies Center, posits that Netanyahu's tactics are unlikely to foster a movement potent enough to topple the regime under current conditions. Balcı highlights that despite external pressures, the Iranian regime's internal control mechanisms and historical resilience should not be underestimated. The crucial question, therefore, is not just whether external actors desire regime change but whether the internal conditions in Iran are conducive to such a dramatic shift.

A primary factor tempering expectations of an imminent collapse is the robustness of Iran's internal security apparatus. Key structures like the Sarallah Headquarters, responsible for securing Tehran against social unrest, and the nationwide Basij militia network have reportedly not been significantly degraded by recent Israeli actions. These organizations are deeply embedded, with the Basij operating at a local, neighborhood level, allowing the regime to detect and swiftly suppress dissent. Their proven effectiveness in quelling past protests, such as those in 1999, 2009, 2017, and 2022, underscores their critical role in maintaining regime stability. While these past uprisings voiced substantial socio-economic grievances, none managed to shake the regime's foundations fundamentally; indeed, their suppression often led to a consolidation of power.

Furthermore, any potential popular movement faces a critical structural impediment: the lack of unified and charismatic leadership. Unlike the 1979 revolution, which was spearheaded by a recognizable figure and a cohesive ideology, current opposition forces within Iran are fragmented and lack a singular, galvanizing leader or a shared strategic vision. Protests, when they occur, tend to be localized and uncoordinated, making it difficult for them to coalesce into an organized, nationwide challenge capable of overthrowing the established order.

Finally, the socio-psychological landscape within Iran presents another hurdle. There is a palpable fear among large segments of the population regarding the potential for chaos and national fragmentation should a power vacuum emerge. The experiences of neighboring countries like Syria, Iraq, and Libya, where regime change led to prolonged instability and conflict, serve as a potent deterrent. In a diverse nation like Iran, concerns that ethnic or sectarian groups might pursue separatist agendas if central authority weakens are widespread. This collective anxiety, even amidst dissatisfaction with the current regime, makes many Iranians wary of radical alternatives, thereby limiting the appeal of widespread upheaval.