According to a recent analysis published in Asharq Al-Awsat by senior columnist Abdulrahman Al-Rashed, Israel's military operations have shown stark contrasts in effectiveness between Lebanon and Yemen, highlighting significant strategic differences in approach and outcomes.
Israel's campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon last year has been described as one of its most outstanding military achievements since the Six-Day War of 1967. The 13-month operation demonstrated unprecedented precision and intelligence capabilities, with Israeli forces successfully eliminating most of Hezbollah's top leadership and turning off their offensive arsenal while largely sparing civilian infrastructure.
"During last year's battles in Lebanon, civilian life in most of the country remained nearly normal, and infrastructure wasn't targeted," notes Al-Rashed. This stands in marked contrast to Israel's 2006 Lebanon war, when the country's civilian infrastructure suffered extensive damage, including airports, ports, power stations, and approximately 100 bridges.
The precision of Israel's recent Lebanon operations was so remarkable that photographers and journalists could position themselves to document airstrikes after their announcements, filming targeted buildings from proximity while civilian aircraft continued normal operations at nearby Rafik Hariri International Airport.
However, Israel's military actions against Yemen's Houthi rebels have proven far less effective. Since January, Israel has conducted six strikes against Houthi targets. Still, these operations have been described as "more theatrical than effective" despite the Houthis lacking air defense capabilities or a substantial missile arsenal.
Military analysts cite several factors to explain this disparity. First, Israel likely lacks the extensive intelligence network in Yemen that it has cultivated in Lebanon over decades. Without detailed intelligence, precision targeting becomes significantly more challenging.
"Israel doesn't have a strong target bank in Yemen, which is why it resorted to bombing ports, the airport, and roads to halt the reception and transport of weapons," explains Al-Rashed. This approach mirrors Israel's less successful 2006 Lebanon strategy rather than its more sophisticated 2024 operations.
Another possibility is that Israel may be deliberately limiting its Yemen operations, content with proportional responses to the relatively limited threat posed by Houthi missiles and drones. Most Houthi projectiles have missed their targets or caused only brief disruptions to Israeli air traffic and civilian life.
The Houthi movement itself represents a small minority of Yemen's population—approximately 7 percent—and maintains control through intimidation and tribal alliances. These alliances could quickly dissolve if the group's military strength were to diminish significantly.
Despite their technological displays through drone and missile launches, Al-Rashed characterizes the Houthis as "primitive cave fighters from the Middle Ages" who are "like moths drawn to a flame" in their confrontation with Israel's superior military capabilities.