The Middle East is again at a crossroads after two turbulent years that saw Gaza in flames, Hizballah routed, the Assad regime collapse, and a 12-day U.S.–Israeli air campaign batter Iran. What happens next, diplomats say, will depend less on battlefield momentum than on whether Tehran, Jerusalem, and Washington can turn hard-won military gains into lasting political settlements.
Paul Salem, writing in his analysis “Inflection Point or Continuing Spiral in the Middle East?”, argues that the region now faces “a once-in-a-generation opening to recast security on more stable, state-centric lines.” Yet he warns that the same window could slam shut if leaders pursue maximalist goals or revert to short-term tactics. His essay, published by the Middle East Institute, sketches two diverging futures: one in which diplomacy cools the front lines from Gaza to the Gulf, and another in which the wars of the past 24 months simply morph into the wars of the next 24.
Iran Counts Its Losses, but Not Its Red Lines
Of the three pivotal capitals, Tehran has the most soul-searching to do. The U.S.–Israeli strikes “shattered Iran’s deterrence and exposed the limits of its Axis of Resistance,” Salem writes, yet they also reinforced the regime’s instinct to cling to missiles, proxies, and at least residual uranium enrichment. Iranian officials hint that they could revive a “spruced-up” version of the 2015 nuclear deal—encompassing very low enrichment, intrusive monitoring, and complete sanctions relief—but only if Washington drops its demand for zero enrichment altogether.
Inside the White House, aides say President Donald Trump is tempted: a limited accord would let him “tell his base he has made peace as he had promised,” Salem notes, and position him for the Nobel nod he covets. The obstacle is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who, in Salem’s words, believes that “Israel and the US have a decisive (and perhaps temporary) military advantage over Iran.” From Netanyahu’s perspective, now is the time either to compel Tehran to dismantle its entire nuclear and missile program or to keep squeezing until the Islamic Republic itself unravels.
Israel’s Military High Tide, Political Undertow
Netanyahu’s dilemma is not confined to Iran. In Gaza, a war launched to “destroy Hamas” has dragged on for twenty-two months. “As long as there is one Hamas fighter standing, Israel’s objectives have not been met and the war must go on,” Salem writes, calling it “a seemingly perpetual war” that blocks a landmark U.S.–Saudi–Israeli normalization package. That deal, which U.S. officials say is “tantalizingly close,” would pair Saudi recognition of Israel with significant concessions to the Palestinians. Riyadh has already drafted a multibillion-dollar reconstruction plan, contingent on a cease-fire and a credible political horizon for Gaza.
To Israel’s north, Hizbollah’s withdrawal above the Litani River and the advent of a more nationalist Lebanese government initially looked like a rare strategic clean break. But Israel still holds five enclaves in contravention of a U.S.-brokered truce and continues near-daily border strikes. Salem argues that such actions “directly undermine the rising Lebanese state’s case to its people … and feed Hizballah’s narrative that the Lebanese state cannot ensure security.” Senior Israeli officers counter that retaining a forward presence deters any Hizballah resurgence and buys time for U.N. peacekeepers to take root.
The picture grows murkier in Syria, where Israel helped topple Bashar al-Assad only to watch the radical Islamist Ahmad al-Sharaa seize Damascus. While Washington, Ankara, and the Gulf states have opted to back Sharaa as “the best chance for the war-torn country to move forward,” Netanyahu has ordered repeated airstrikes near the presidential palace, citing protection of Druze communities. Critics in Israel’s security establishment worry that, absent a course correction, the government is risking a failed Syrian transition that could “spiral into a fate even worse than that promised by a continued Assad regime,” as Salem puts it.
Washington Holds the Leverage—For Now
If Tehran is unconvinced and Jerusalem undecided, Washington is uniquely positioned to tip the scales. “When he wants to, Trump is still able to step in as the most influential player in the Middle East,” Salem writes, noting that last month’s strikes on Iran demonstrated both capability and will. The administration’s challenge is sequencing: an Iran nuclear fix may require concessions that Netanyahu dislikes, yet without Israeli buy-in, Gaza will burn on and Saudi normalization will stall.
Senior U.S. officials outline a four-part push for the remainder of 2025: secure at least a five-year cap on any Iranian enrichment; wrap up a Gaza cease-fire that frees remaining Israeli hostages and installs a technocratic Palestinian administration; finalize a Saudi deal that bundles reconstruction funds, Arab recognition and Palestinian state-building benchmarks; and lock down Lebanon’s border while steering Syria’s transition away from jihadist infighting. Each track, one diplomat concedes, “depends on the others not falling apart.”
An Inflection Point, or Just Another Bend in the Spiral?
Salem’s verdict is blunt: “The region can still go one of two ways … translate recent battlefield ‘wins’ into diplomatic frameworks that usher in relative security and economic integration, or slide back into an open-ended cycle of proxy and direct wars.” The coming months will test whether the principal actors can accept imperfect deals now rather than chase perfect victories later—a calculus that has eluded them in past crises from Oslo to the JCPOA.
For ordinary people in Gaza’s ruins, Lebanon’s border towns, Syria’s fractured provinces, and Iran’s sanctioned economy, the stakes are immediate. “Winning the peace is often as hard or harder than winning the war,” Salem reminds readers. In 2025, the Middle East either learns that lesson—or relives it.
Map: Cedid Atlas, 1803, Wikimedia Commons