A chorus of respected Turkish foreign-policy voices is urging President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government to shelve talk of another cross-border operation in Syria and instead design an orderly exit strategy for the troops it already fields there. The warning is led by former Ambassador to Washington and Tel Aviv Namık Tan, who wrote on T24 that Ankara's agenda should be "working out how to leave Syria, not planning another entry."
Tan's intervention comes after a sudden spike in official rhetoric. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and later Erdoğan himself both threatened an unspecified military response to prevent Syria's "partition". At the same time, the Defence Ministry claimed it had even received an invitation from Damascus to intervene. AK Party spokesman Ömer Çelik amplified the message, fuelling speculation that Ankara could soon launch its fourth large-scale incursion since 2016. Yet veteran diplomat Tan argues that Turkey is already over-extended, with "a Turkish force inside Syria estimated at more than ten thousand soldiers whose cost is unknown". He also reminds policymakers that the country hosts more than five million Syrian refugees, another burden that a fresh offensive would only complicate.
Echoing Tan, prominent columnist and former presidential adviser Cengiz Çandar writes that a new front would jeopardise both Turkey's regional standing and its tentative domestic Kurdish reconciliation. "If Syria unravels, the [Kurdish] process in Turkey will survive only by a miracle", Çandar warns. He questions Ankara's oscillating posture: while top officials reportedly consult jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, they continue to brand Syrian Democratic Forces (SDG) commander Mazlum Abdi an existential enemy, even though, as Çandar sees it, the SDG "does not constitute an existential threat" to Turkey.
The immediate trigger for Ankara's sabre-rattling appears to have been a diplomatic initiative in Paris. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot had planned a rare three-way meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Assad Şeybani and Mazlum Abdi. This gathering could have advanced negotiations on the 10 March accord between the SDG and the new hard-line administration in Damascus. Following Turkish warnings, Abdi was unable to travel; instead, Şeybani and Barrot met with U.S. envoy Tom Barrack, who also serves as the U.S. ambassador to Ankara. Şeybani used the occasion to declare that "no talks on peace and unity can be held at gunpoint", remarks widely read as pressure on the Kurdish-led SDG to disarm.
Events on the ground have meanwhile underlined Syria's volatility. Fighting in the southern province of Suwayda pitted Druze communities against Bedouin tribes; Israeli airstrikes aided the Druze, and the United States stepped in to police a fragile cease-fire. The Druze have since achieved a de facto autonomy, "Suriye üniforması giymelerine de gerek kalmadan" ("without even needing to don Syrian uniforms"). For Tan, that outcome shows why demands that the SDG hand over its weapons and accept less than Druze-level self-rule are "neither rational nor realistic". Persuading the Kurds to disarm while other minorities arm themselves, he argues, would simply reignite conflict.
Both analysts locate Ankara's brinkmanship in the broader contest for influence that has shifted dramatically since hard-line Islamist militia Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTŞ) seized Damascus in December 2024. Gulf monarchies, Azerbaijan, and Israel are all manoeuvring inside Syria; Washington and Paris are mediating between HTŞ leader Ahmed el-Şara and the Kurds. Çandar says Turkey risks "becoming increasingly irrelevant" if it backs HTŞ unconditionally while shunning the SDG. Tan argues that the only sustainable organizing principle for Turkish policy is secular pragmatism: "Ankara can succeed in the field only if it is blind to ethnicity and faith."
The economic case against escalation is also stark. Maintaining the current deployment already drains resources that could be used either to integrate refugees or facilitate their voluntary return. Every additional brigade, Tan notes, would further strain a budget wrestling with inflation that still hovers near 40 percent. Diplomatically, a fresh incursion would likely trigger new Western sanctions and complicate relations with Moscow and Tehran, both of which are still influential despite being sidelined by the HTŞ takeover.
Despite the public drumbeat, some signals hint that Ankara is weighing the risks. Appearing on television last week, Fidan softened his tone, insisting, "I am not necessarily talking about the use of force," and adding that Turkey is merely preparing "for every scenario." Yet analysts fear that domestic political pressures—municipal elections are looming in 2026—could still prompt the government to adopt a short, rally-round-the-flag approach.
Tan and Çandar propose an alternative path: clarify a timetable for drawing down the 10,000-strong footprint, engage both el-Şara and Abdi in shuttle diplomacy, and put secularism, not sectarian calculus, at the heart of policy. In Tan's closing words, "Our priority should not be to plot another entry into Syria." Whether Ankara listens may decide not only the fate of northern Syria but also the trajectory of Turkey's fragile détente at home.
Photo: From archive