In a new commentary, former Turkish ambassador to Washington and current CHP lawmaker Namık Tan argues that Turkey squandered a rare diplomatic opening in the South Caucasus. Despite Ankara’s decisive support for Azerbaijan’s 2020 military campaign to restore sovereignty over Karabakh, he contends that Turkey failed to convert its battlefield leverage into diplomatic leadership. The Azerbaijan–Armenia peace was signed in Washington under Donald Trump’s auspices, not in Ankara—and Tan sees that as a telling verdict on recent Turkish statecraft.
Tan’s central charge is that the Turkish government prioritized public-relations spectacle over sustained, balanced diplomacy. He says Ankara fell out of step with strategic timing, mistook energy flows and investment ties for political influence, and ultimately allowed itself to be pulled along by Baku rather than steering a broader regional settlement. In his view, Turkish policy oscillated between two incompatible impulses: on the one hand, seeking to dilute Western, especially French, influence in the Caucasus and the Middle East; on the other, participating in NATO’s posture that treats Russia as a primary adversary. The result, he suggests, was a kind of institutional split personality that left Turkey at odds with its diplomatic tradition and unable to shape outcomes.
A Trump Stage and a Sidelined Europe: What About Russia?
Tan contends that Trump seized the initiative and orchestrated an Azerbaijan–Armenia accord in Washington, effectively closing the chapter on the OSCE Minsk Group and once again marginalizing the European Union, above all, France. He argues that Ankara, having tied itself to Washington’s rhythm under Trump, could do little more than offer a muted written endorsement of a deal it did not shape. Tan sees this as part of Trump’s broader drive to project himself as a global dealmaker, even as he has struggled to unlock settlements in Gaza and Ukraine. According to Tan’s account, world capitals now acknowledge that progress on these conflicts may necessitate Trump’s direct intervention—an assessment he presents critically rather than approvingly.
Tan also presents a stark assessment of Moscow’s shrinking footprint. After being squeezed in the Middle East, he says Russia has now been pushed out of the South Caucasus as well. He notes that while the Kremlin cannot set the agenda, it can still spoil it—citing Armenia’s experience under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, whom he calls a genuine opportunity for both Armenia and Turkey, and who, he claims, has survived multiple coup attempts with Russian fingerprints. Tan also points to reports of sabotage against the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline as an example of the kinds of disruptive tactics that could surface. Even a prospective Putin–Trump meeting, he argues, would be driven by Moscow’s search for relief from secondary U.S. sanctions rather than by strategic initiative.
What Turkey Should Have Done—And Must Do Now?
Tan’s prescription is a return to coherent, integrated policy. He argues that the South Caucasus file should have been woven into a comprehensive approach that connects:
- Energy transit (including Iraq–Turkey pipeline talks and East Med gas tensions)
- Cyprus negotiations and sustained, multi-level dialogue with Greece
- A constructive role in Syria’s political future
- Engagement with Iran’s nuclear diplomacy
- A credible, forward-looking European Union path for Turkey itself
Within that framework, he says, Ankara should have pursued simultaneous normalization with Armenia and developed the Middle Corridor in a way that aligns Turkey’s economic interests with regional stability. He urges caution about rhetoric that frames policy through “Turkic depth,” suggesting it risks alienating Arab partners and diluting the universalist, rules-based ethos that would better serve Ankara’s interests. Ultimately, Tan argues, Turkey should aim to be the democratic and economic heartbeat of its neighborhood—encompassing the Caucasus, Middle East, and Balkans—while restoring unambiguous military deterrence and exporting stability rather than insecurity.
While he does not claim authorship or stewardship of the Washington agreement, Tan highlights elements he sees as pivotal:
- The transport link across Zangezur is defined as a “road” rather than a “corridor,” affirming Armenian sovereignty over the route. He calls this a constructive concession by Baku that makes a durable settlement more plausible.
- He asserts that oversight of this road will be entrusted to the United States for 99 years—evidence, in his view, that Armenia is extracting itself, for the first time in its modern history, from de facto dependence on Russia.
- He stresses the asymmetries that shaped the negotiations: Armenia’s dual reliance on an influential diaspora in the United States and France and on Russia’s security cover; Russia’s diplomatic isolation after Ukraine; Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon wealth and privileged ties with Israel; and Washington’s willingness under Trump to impose outcomes that reduce the role of multilateral formats.
For Tan, these features underscore why Turkey needed to lead and why its absence at the decisive moment is so striking.
The Political Cost of Misreading Leverage
The broader lesson Tan draws is about leverage, timing, and credibility. In his telling, Turkey misinterpreted the momentum in 2020 as a structural advantage that would endure without sustained diplomacy. He is critical of the notion that the flow of Caspian oil through Turkish territory and the expansion of Azerbaijani investments in Turkey could substitute for a political strategy. Instead, he argues, leverage atrophied as Ankara missed windows to normalize with Yerevan, over-personalized ties with Baku, and outsourced regional architecture to Washington—only to find itself applauding from the sidelines when the deal was finally signed.
Tan’s verdict is unsparing: despite “stars aligning” after Karabakh’s return to Azerbaijani sovereignty, Ankara allowed the Azerbaijan–Armenia peace to be concluded not in Ankara but in Washington. He presents this as another squandered diplomatic opportunity, born of delayed diplomacy, strategic incoherence, and a failure to integrate the Caucasus into a larger, disciplined foreign policy. His remedy is not maximalist nationalism or performative brinkmanship, but a return to the measured, rules-based statecraft that once underwrote Turkey’s most durable successes.
Photo: Generated by Gemini AI.