Turkey may be poised to abandon a years-long policy of cautious "appeasement" in Syria and adopt a more explicit deterrent posture in response to Israel's expanding footprint there, according to a new analysis that frames Syria as the latest arena of strategic competition between Ankara and Tel Aviv. The assessment comes as Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan steps up engagement with Damascus, including a recent meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem, and as Ankara recalibrates its approach to Kurdish forces and the regional security architecture.
According to Murat Yesiltas, director of security studies at the SETA Foundation in Ankara, Turkey's initial post-Assad strategy—defined by "regional ownership," restrained military activity, and low-visibility diplomacy—helped preserve leverage but no longer delivers results amid Israel's more aggressive moves and the Kurdish People's Protection Units' (YPG) evolving calculations.
According to the commentary, published in the Middle East Eye, Ankara had sought to prevent the YPG from gaining international legitimacy by encouraging it to reach an accommodation with the new Damascus administration, a pathway Turkey viewed as consistent with Syria's territorial integrity and as a counterweight to outside sponsorship of the group. The YPG, in turn, used talks with Damascus to buy time and ease pressure from both Ankara and the Syrian government, the piece says.
In parallel, Turkey tried to defuse Israeli interventionism through back-channel diplomacy, intelligence coordination, and technical deconfliction, aiming to avoid confrontation. During this period, Israel degraded Syrian military capacity, expanded control in the Golan Heights, and even launched a symbolic strike on Damascus framed as protection for Druze communities in the south, the analysis contends.
Yesiltas argues the ground has shifted. He says Israel seeks a direct sphere of influence in southern Syria to exclude Turkey and weaken Damascus, with developments around Sweida and sectarian dynamics undermining Ankara's envisioned security order. Israel is also pursuing air superiority through routine strikes and intelligence operations, while warning that Turkish-Damascus military institutionalization and basing deals are a "red line." The piece characterizes that red line as a strategic bluff, suggesting neither Tel Aviv nor Washington would court a direct military clash with Turkey if Ankara acts decisively.
The YPG remains central to this contest, the analysis says, with Israel allegedly offering indirect security assurances that complicate Ankara's calculations and discourage a YPG-Damascus accord. The author argues Israel aims to narrow Turkey's room for maneuver, block Kurdish reintegration under Damascus, and tilt U.S. Syria policy away from Ankara.
Yesiltas outlines three Turkish options on the YPG: long-term dominance and control (unlikely given current posture); transformation via a sustainable YPG-Damascus agreement (politically coordinated and preferable for both Ankara and Damascus); or military weakening of the group (operationally feasible but risky for Turkey's PKK disarmament process, ties with Washington, Arab support, and Syrian resilience vis-à-vis Israel). He notes recent statements by Fidan signal a time-bound threshold strategy: if a YPG-Damascus deal fails, Ankara will consider force more openly.
To arrest Israel's momentum, the analysis urges a proactive military-diplomatic strategy: deepen institutional ties with Damascus, expand joint diplomacy with Arab states, and move swiftly to integrate or neutralize the YPG before it becomes a larger spoiler. The author concludes that only by moving beyond appeasement can Turkey preserve strategic depth in Syria and counter Israel's growing influence. The views expressed are the author's.
Photo: Generated by Gemini AI.