A new article by international politics and strategic communications expert Shay Gal argues that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is advancing Turkey’s “Middle Corridor” overland trade vision while tacitly enabling Yemen’s Houthi movement to disrupt Bab al-Mandab and Red Sea shipping, thereby undermining the Suez route. According to the piece, this approach serves security, political, and economic aims, positioning Turkey’s trans-Caspian routes as safer alternatives amid maritime instability.
Gal, who in a previous article proposed that Israel intervene in the Turkish-controlled northern part of Cyprus in coordination with the Cypriot and Greek governments, argues that Ankara built channels to the Houthis through a regional network with Iran, Qatar, and allied Yemeni factions. He cites a 2014 decision to shut down a Turkish probe into Quds Force activity and the subsequent rise of Istanbul-based fronts that allegedly helped funnel funds and arms to Yemen. The article notes U.S. Treasury actions: sanctions on the Al Aman network (2022) and Al Aman Kargo (2023) for moving Quds Force money to Houthi networks, and an April 2025 designation of Iran-based money launderer Hossein Jafari, said to be operating from Turkey, as a facilitator of multimillion-dollar transactions from stolen Ukrainian grain to Russian arms via Turkish intermediaries.
According to Yemeni sources cited by Gal, secret meetings in Doha and Ankara after the 2017 Gulf rift helped produce “field understandings” that enabled coordinated withdrawals and handovers on Yemeni front lines. The article further claims that at least 10,000 rifles were smuggled from Turkey to the Houthis over the past decade, hidden in sugar and plastic consignments, without resulting prosecutions. UN reporting is described as tracing a procurement chain in which German-made sensors passed through Turkish firms and ports to Iran, eventually appearing in Houthi missiles used in the 2019 Abqaiq attack, strikes on the UAE, and rockets fired toward Israel.
The alignment is presented as visible in events: a January 2022 Houthi attack on Abu Dhabi coincided with Erdoğan’s outreach to the UAE; from November 2023 the Houthis launched more than 100 attacks in the Red Sea, sinking vessels, seizing one, and targeting “Israel-linked” shipping; in January 2024 Erdoğan publicly praised the Houthis’ “successful defense,” while Al Jazeera’s coverage was characterized as favorable. After a Turkish ship was hit in November 2024, senior Houthi figure Mohammed Ali al-Houthi was quoted as calling Turkey “a partner in the struggle against the Zionists.”
Gal links the alleged policy to Turkey’s broader trade strategy: by elevating risk in the Red Sea, Ankara can pitch the Middle Corridor and the prospective Zangezur Corridor, alongside Iraq’s Development Road, as resilient complements or alternatives to China’s Belt and Road for Chinese, European, and U.S. stakeholders. He points to Turkish footholds at the Red Sea’s gates—Somalia and Sudan’s Suakin port lease—as elements of a “controlled crisis” doctrine, using allied non-state actors to create managed friction at Bab al-Mandeb and steer traffic toward overland routes. Turkey’s muted response to Iran’s January 2024 seizure of an Iraq–Turkey oil tanker is presented as consistent with tolerating low-intensity disruption.
Legally, the piece argues that Turkey’s alleged support for the Houthis contravenes UN Security Council Resolution 2216 (banning arms and assistance to the Houthis), the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (freedom of navigation), and the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism—grounds, in Gal’s view, for sanctions, trade restrictions, suspension from alliances, and exclusion from international tenders. He frames the issue as a test for NATO: whether a member state can aid forces attacking partners and global shipping without consequence, warning that delays raise costs from Eilat to Egypt and across Mediterranean trade lanes.
The article portrays the Houthis as both a proxy abroad and a political symbol at home for Erdoğan—evidence, Gal suggests, that Ankara can defy Western and Arab rivals while advancing its strategic logistics ambitions.
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