A hard-charging, expanded High Military Council is poised to approve more generals, admirals, and an additional five years of service—changes that critics argue could turn promotions into political favors rather than professional achievements. The issues outlined below are primarily drawn from veteran journalist Murat Yetkin’s column on August, in the politics section of YetkinReport.
Remaking the Chain of Command
On August 5, the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) will convene in Ankara, under the Presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Thanks to a fast-tracked amendment passed through parliament last month, the retirement age for force commanders has been increased from 67 to 72, with presidential approval. This single clause opens the door to what may become the oldest senior command structure in any NATO army.
The council will decide whether to prolong the tenure of up to 75 generals and admirals whose mandates would otherwise expire. To grant an extension, YAŞ now requires a two-thirds majority—a threshold that appears substantial on paper but, in practice, cements civilian dominance. Of the eleven voting members, only five are uniformed officers; the other six are cabinet ministers personally appointed by Erdoğan.
Personnel Shortages Papered Over by Mass Promotion
Since the post-coup purges of 2016, the Turkish Armed Forces have faced a chronic lack of mid-career officers. Last year, YAŞ retired 31 flag officers while promoting 23 and elevating an extraordinary 77 colonels directly to general or admiral rank. The net result was an increase from 281 to 327 flag officers in a single sitting. This year, the figure is expected to climb again, fueling charges that Ankara is inflating titles to mask a drain of experienced talent.
Retired Rear Admiral and opposition CHP deputy Yankı Bağcıoğlu lists three rule changes he says will “institutionalize arbitrariness”:
- Raising the upper age limit of commanders to 72 by presidential decree.
- Abolishing the requirement that an Air Force candidate be a pilot and a Navy candidate belong to the deck/sea officer class.
- Dropping the obligation that lieutenant-generals seeking a third star must be graduates of the War College.
“These adjustments weaken the corporate fabric, create the perception of tailor-made promotions, and ultimately erode combat readiness,” Bağcıoğlu warns.
Political Lobbying and Wider Considerations
The composition of YAŞ itself amplifies these concerns. With the defense, foreign, finance, interior, justice, and education ministers all voting, the path to an extra star or an extension arguably relies on political goodwill as much as operational performance. Observers recall the “FETÖ conspiracies” of the 2000s and question whether Turkey is merely swapping one brand of factionalism for another.
Deniz Force Commander Admiral Ercüment Tatlıoğlu, whose mandate was extended last year, will participate in decisions regarding his further extension—an arrangement that would raise eyebrows in any corporate boardroom, let alone a military one.
YAŞ will meet the same day parliament launches a commission intended to shepherd the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) toward disarmament. This timing is no mere coincidence. If negotiations collapse, Erdoğan—as constitutionally designated “Commander-in-Chief”—must rely on a command cadre he helped shape. Supporters call it prudence; detractors see creeping politicization.
Meanwhile, nationalist parties outside the ruling coalition are mobilizing against both the commission and the troop-age reform. İYİ Party leader Müsavat Dervişoğlu attracted an unexpectedly large crowd at a Bursa rally on August 3, while the National Sovereignty Platform plans to petition parliament on August 5 to prevent constitutional changes that might result from either process.
“More Generals, More Ambassadors, More Rectors” – A Systemic Habit?
Yetkin draws a parallel between the military surge and the government’s broader tendency to multiply prestigious posts. Turkey now boasts an embassy in almost every African capital and a university in virtually every Anatolian town. Still, figures from the Council of Higher Education show that 1,278 academic departments—including medicine, law, and AI engineering—have no professors. The foreign ministry similarly sidelines seasoned diplomats at headquarters while politically appointed ambassadors populate new missions abroad.
Inflating top ranks may satisfy short-term political needs, but it leaves legitimately qualified officers fighting for credibility in a saturated field. Should a future crisis erupt—whether against PKK militants in Iraq or along Turkey’s volatile Syrian frontier—the public will expect professional excellence, not political connections.
By extending careers and loosening technical criteria, Ankara claims it is avoiding the proverbial “changing horses mid-stream.” Critics counter that it is instead changing the very rules of horsemanship—at the precise moment when strategic clarity, institutional trust, and operational merit are most desperately required.
At stake in Tuesday’s YAŞ meeting is not only who wears which epaulettes but whether Turkey’s Armed Forces can preserve their professional core while navigating an era of heightened political oversight and regional danger.
Photo: Generate by the Gemini AI.