White House Courts Baku and Central Asia for a Second-Wave Abraham Accords

President Donald Trump has authorized a quiet but determined diplomatic push to fold Azerbaijan and several Central Asian republics into the Abraham Accords, a move U.S. officials say could redraw both the political and commercial map of Eurasia’s southern rim.

According to a July 31 Reuters exclusive by Gram Slattery, five officials familiar with the talks say the administration’s goal is not formal “recognition”—all of the prospective entrants already maintain relations with Israel—but rather a symbolic umbrella that would deepen trade, technology and security ties while enlarging Washington’s footprint between Russia, Iran and China.

A more modest—but faster—expansion

Unlike the headline-grabbing quest to bring Saudi Arabia on board, the new initiative sets its sights on countries that need no diplomatic ice-breaking with Jerusalem. “We’re not asking Baku or Astana to open embassies—they already have them,” a senior U.S. official told reporters on background. “What we want is a structured platform that links their existing cooperation with Israel to the financing, investment, and defense mechanisms created by the Accords.”

Steve Witkoff, Trump’s special envoy for peace missions, traveled to Baku in March and was followed this spring by his aide Aryeh Lightstone. Azerbaijani officials, according to sources, have since approached Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and others about joining a broader agreement. Two of the officials quoted by Reuters believe a deal with Azerbaijan “could be reached within months, even weeks,” provided Baku finalizes a peace treaty with Armenia.

Why Azerbaijan matters

Strategists see the energy-rich Caucasus state as the keystone of a prospective mega-corridor linking the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) to the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. Political-economy scholar Michael Tanchum argues that Israeli Mediterranean ports and Azerbaijan’s Caspian hub of Baku “could create a crescent of commercial cooperation from India to Central Asia, providing a counterweight to the westward expansion of Chinese economic hegemony.”

Azerbaijan already supplies roughly 30 percent of Israel’s oil, hosts SOCAR’s new 10 percent stake in Israel’s Tamar gas field, and shares a 689-kilometre border with Iran—an alignment that makes trilateral U.S.–Israel–Azerbaijan defense projects attractive in Washington. Supporters inside the White House say a formal Accords signature would help integrate those projects with Gulf Arab investment capital, turbo-charging port, rail, and green-energy schemes that bypass both Russia and Iran.

Central Asia’s calculus

Kazakhstan is viewed as the next logical candidate. The oil-rich republic enjoys warm relations with Israel and is eager to diversify away from pipelines that traverse Russia. Analyst Joseph Epstein notes that joining the Accords could unlock U.S. financing for a “Middle Corridor” that carries Kazakh crude and critical minerals westward through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Mediterranean or European markets.

Astana already hosts Israeli agritech pilots and medical partnerships; Accords entry would provide access to U.S. export-credit facilities and the cross-investment networks established between the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel since 2020. “For us, the attraction is technology and logistics, not diplomacy,” one Kazakh official said. “If being in the same club makes American and Emirati funds easier to tap, we will look hard at it.”

Obstacles: Karabakh and Gaza

Two geopolitical land mines threaten the rollout. First is the decades-old Armenia–Azerbaijan dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. Though Baku regained the enclave in 2023 and 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled, Washington has privately conditioned Accords admission on a final peace treaty acceptable to Yerevan. Secretary of State Marco Rubio insists the sides are “pretty close,” yet diplomats caution that border-demarcation talks remain fraught.

Second is the Gaza war. More than 60,000 Palestinians have been killed since October 2023, according to local health authorities, fanning widespread anger across the Muslim world. Saudi Arabia has frozen normalization, and any appearance of Baku or Astana “rewarding” Israel may carry domestic political costs. “Our public watches Gaza on television every night,” a Central Asian diplomat admitted. “We must show concrete benefits for Palestine—or at least for our economies—before signing anything.”

A symbolic win for Trump?

Expanding the Accords to countries that already recognize Israel would not rival the breakthrough of UAE-Israel ties in 2020. However, aides say it still offers the president a foreign-policy trophy in an election year. “Symbolism matters,” a White House source argued. “If we can unveil a Muslim-majority, Turkic, post-Soviet bloc under the Accords banner, it underscores Trump’s pitch that only he can realign the world.”

Regional reactions

• Israel: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has publicly endorsed “upgrading the strategic alliance with Azerbaijan” and ordered ministries to prepare joint infrastructure proposals.

• Armenia: Officials in Yerevan, traditionally close to the U.S., warn that hasty Accords admission could embolden Baku. “Link peace first, trade second,” an Armenian diplomat told Reuters.

• Iran: Tehran, already wary of Israeli drones on its northern border, condemned the idea as “a Zionist pincer movement.”

• China: Beijing, which invested heavily in its own Belt and Road corridors through Kazakhstan, has so far remained silent, but analysts expect quiet lobbying against any U.S.–backed transport network that diverts freight from Chinese-controlled rail lines.

The economic upside

Studies by the World Bank indicate that a 10 percent reduction in overland transit time can lead to a 20 percent increase in bilateral trade. If the IMEC-Trans-Caspian link materializes, containers from Mumbai could reach Europe in ten days, while Kazakh copper and rare-earth metals could hit Mediterranean ports without touching Russian soil. Emirates-based DP World already owns 60 percent of Georgia’s new Tbilisi Dry Port, positioning the Gulf capital to dominate the entire east-west chain.

What happens next

Witkoff is expected to return to Central Asia this month, and sources indicate that a “Accords 2.0” memorandum could be unveiled at the annual C5+1 summit of Central Asian leaders and the U.S. president in October. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, meanwhile, has hinted that a peace treaty with Yerevan could be signed by early autumn.

Should those pieces fall into place, Trump may head into November’s election claiming he not only ended America’s “forever wars” but also stitched together a commercial crescent from Haifa to Almaty—while boxing out both Tehran and Moscow. Whether the symbolism translates into new factories, railways, and jobs across Eurasia will determine if this second wave of the Abraham Accords is remembered as geopolitical showmanship or a genuine pivot in twenty-first-century connectivity.

The Levant Files

Search This Blog