Ankara is addressing a looming capability gap in its air force with a multi-track plan that combines new foreign purchases, deep upgrades to existing fleets, and an accelerated push for indigenous fifth-generation combat aircraft. The approach, framed around the twin pressures of aging F-16s and a more volatile regional threat environment, centers on potential Eurofighter Typhoon acquisitions, confirmed F-16 Block 70 “Viper” purchases, and the phased entry of the domestically developed KAAN fighter from 2028.
In a new paper from the pro-government Turkish think tank SETA, defense analyst Murat Aslan argues that Turkey must rapidly balance quantity and quality in its combat aviation to deter simultaneous, externally supported threats. The study, titled “Turkey’s Fighter Jet Needs and Procurement,” lays out criteria for force planning; urges a Eurofighter buy or a comparable air-superiority alternative of 40–50 aircraft; underscores the importance of integrating active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars such as the MURAD 100-A across the fleet; and recommends redoubled efforts to rejoin the F-35 program while accelerating the KAAN timeline.
The assessment lands as Ankara continues talks on a Typhoon package. This track resurfaced publicly in July when the Wall Street Journal reported Turkey was nearing a preliminary understanding on a Eurofighter order. Any deal would still require export approvals from partner governments, including Germany, which has previously signaled reservations. In parallel, Turkey has finalized the U.S.-approved sale of new-build F-16 Block 70s and associated munitions, while dropping earlier plans to purchase 79 modernization kits, according to comments cited by Aslan from Defense Minister Yaşar Güler during 2025 budget deliberations. Ankara is also advancing its homegrown ÖZGÜR upgrade, which delivered its first modernized F-16s in 2023, featuring Turkish mission computers, sensors, and the integration of locally made stand-off weapons.
SETA’s analysis frames the modernization drive around a shifting strategic map. The paper points to widening capability disparities in the region, recent combat lessons from the June Iran–Israel flare-up, and the consolidation of defense ties among Israel, Greece, and their Western partners. It argues that Turkey’s “cutting its own knot” policy line—maximizing autonomy in procurement, sustainment, and operations—requires a force capable of maintaining air superiority, projecting power at range, and neutralizing sophisticated, integrated air defenses, even without assured external support.
Regarding requirements, Aslan outlines a layered mix of platforms and technologies aligned with Turkey’s varied operating environments—from the hot, dusty conditions of the Middle East to the maritime and mountainous theaters of the Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean, and Balkans. Priority attributes include long-range detection and engagement, high-altitude performance, strong kinematics for within-visual-range maneuvering, low observability in air-to-air roles, resilient datalinks, and robust electronic warfare and cyber defenses. The report highlights rapid fielding of AESA radars, advanced electro-optical targeting pods, and a broad suite of national munitions as essential “force multipliers.”
The study also draws on recent Turkish experience with unmanned systems in the fighter calculus. It foresees shifting a significant share of strike and close air support missions to armed drones—freeing manned fighters to focus on air dominance and complex suppression of enemy air defenses. This concept encompasses current platforms such as ANKA and AKSUNGUR, sea-based TB3 operations, and the stealthy, jet-powered ANKA-3 and Kızılelma prototypes, with greater autonomy and teaming capabilities envisioned alongside KAAN later this decade.
Force structure remains a central tension. While multirole F-16V deliveries would sustain the backbone of the fleet, SETA stresses that an air-superiority type, such as the Eurofighter, will be needed to contest high-altitude airspace and shape the fight, especially if Turkey were forced to manage a two-front crisis. In that extreme scenario, the paper estimates that the Turkish Air Force would need an inventory of approximately 500 fighters to maintain sustained operations. If Eurofighter is blocked, the think tank urges Ankara to pivot quickly to a comparable option in similar numbers.
On fifth-generation capabilities, the report underscores two parallel tracks. First, it contends that resolving outstanding issues with Washington and reentering the F-35 program would immediately bolster deterrence and reinforce Turkey’s role in NATO’s southeastern flank, especially as deliveries could overlap with ongoing F-16 recapitalization. Second, it casts KAAN as the backbone of Turkey’s long-term airpower, with domestic software, sensor fusion, and manned–unmanned teaming expected to confer “sixth-generation” features as the platform matures. Integration with national air and missile defenses—and radar systems capable of detecting low-observable threats—will be crucial to realizing that architecture, the paper notes.
The industrial base is another pillar of the plan. Beyond avionics and weapons integration under ÖZGÜR, the report highlights ongoing engine research at TEI and broader airframe, sensor, and software development at TUSAŞ as crucial to reducing lifecycle costs and shielding operations from export controls or political vetoes. The goal, SETA argues, is a supply chain resilient enough to support high-tempo operations without foreign permissions, from spares and software updates to deep maintenance.
Political headwinds remain. The paper flags active lobbying in Athens and Jerusalem against Turkish fighter acquisitions and warns that narratives within the U.S. and EU continue to complicate export decisions. That, it says, reinforces the logic of a hedged approach: secure what can be bought now to bridge immediate needs, while investing in indigenous solutions that narrow foreign dependencies over time.
What to watch next:
- Whether Berlin greenlights Eurofighter export licenses or pushes Turkey toward alternative suppliers
- The delivery schedule and configuration details for F-16 Block 70s, and the scope of further ÖZGÜR upgrades
- Concrete milestones for KAAN flight testing, sensor integration, and early operational capability
- Progress on AESA radars, electronic warfare suites, and networked munitions, including their integration across manned and unmanned fleets
- Any movement on Turkey’s prospects for returning to the F-35 program
SETA’s bottom line: Modernize what’s in hand, buy what’s needed fast, and double down on national programs—so Ankara can deter, punish, and prevail in a crisis without waiting on foreign approvals.
Photo: Wikimedia Commons