TLF Exclusive. Sovereign Equality Not Necessary; 1960 Constitution Is Sufficient, States Turkish Paper

As United Nations-sponsored five-party talks seek momentum on the decades-old Cyprus question, new voices argues that insisting a priori on "sovereign equality" or "equal sovereignty" may be unnecessary. Those principles were already enshrined in the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), which identified the island's Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities as the two rightful co-inheritors of sovereignty from the United Kingdom—an original design that may still light the way to a durable settlement.

That argument is set out in a new Cyprus Working Paper (September, Issue: 1) by the Turkish Think-tank TEPAV, which revisits the foundations and breakdown of the 1960 partnership republic. The paper argues that a return to the spirit—and many of the mechanics—of the original bicommunal compact, updated to reflect post-1974 realities, could unblock negotiations and reinforce Cyprus's growing role as a regional security, humanitarian, and diplomatic hub amid the widening turmoil in the Middle East.

Forged through secret Greek–Turkish talks in 1958, codified in the 1959 Zurich and London agreements, and implemented when the UK transferred sovereignty in 1960, the RoC was a compromise neither community initially sought: Greek Cypriots had fought for Enosis with Greece, while Turkish Cypriots favored partition. Sovereignty was transferred to a bicommunal state acting conjointly, a "functional federation" based on political—not numerical—equality between distinct and equal components.

Under the Constitution, executive power rested with a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice President, whose signature was required for executive acts. Article 50 gave the Vice President a robust veto over key legislative and executive decisions—foreign affairs, defense, taxation—while the Council of Ministers (Article 46) comprised seven Greek Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots chosen by their respective leaderships. In the House of Representatives (Article 62), seats were apportioned 70–30, and separate Community Chambers (Articles 86–87) governed religious, educational, cultural, and personal-status matters. The system was often likened to the "gas pedal and brake" of bicommunal checks and balances.

The partnership collapsed amid violence in December 1963, followed by Greek Cypriot moves to implement 13 constitutional amendments rejected by Turkish Cypriots, abolishing the Vice Presidency, replacing Turkish Cypriot ministers, and filling reserved parliamentary seats. UN Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) authorized a peacekeeping mission and, in practice, enabled the Greek Cypriot side to be treated internationally as the Government of Cyprus—an arrangement Turkey accepted to shield Turkish Cypriots. Subsequent milestones included the Turkish invasion in 1974, the EU's 2004 accession of the RoC, the Annan Plan referendum (approved by Turkish Cypriots, rejected by Greek Cypriots), and unfulfilled EU promises to ease Turkish Cypriot isolation, even as Turkish Cypriots enjoy EU citizenship while the acquis is suspended in the north.

TEPAV argues that, because neither community possessed separate sovereign rights in 1960, the crux is restoring the co-owned constitutional order—while recognizing the geographic separation that has existed since 1974—within a bizonal, bicommunal framework. That approach aligns with the 1977 Denktaş–Makarios and 1979 Denktaş–Kyprianou high-level agreements envisioning a federal republic, though some proposals contemplate confederal features, alongside territorial adjustments and property settlements. Reanchoring the talks in that shared inheritance, the paper suggests, could finally move the process beyond preconditions and toward a security-enhancing settlement for Cyprus and the wider region.