As winter approaches, Turkey's energy debate once again takes center stage. A fresh wave of agreements, cautious optimism, and geopolitical tension swirls around Ankara's handling of natural gas and nuclear investments. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's recent visit to the United States generated headlines about new long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) deals, but left experts wondering: Is Turkey truly shifting its energy axis, or merely trying to keep the lights on?
According to Haber Sol, the much-discussed U.S. trip included a set of contracts between Turkey's state energy company BOTAŞ and global energy giants Mercuria and Woodside Energy, securing up to 70 billion cubic meters of U.S.-sourced LNG over the next two decades. Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar described the agreements as a guarantee of long-term supply during peak-demand periods. Yet analysts caution against reading this as a sweeping realignment. "Turkey is still tethered to pipeline gas," experts told soL, underscoring that without doubling LNG import terminal capacity, American gas is unlikely to replace Russian supplies in a meaningful way.
This distinction matters because Turkey's gas appetite is not shrinking—it's ballooning. Last February's cold snap sent consumption surging to record highs, a trend seen almost annually. LNG has increasingly functioned as a safety valve when seasonal demand spikes overwhelm pipeline capacity. Locking in long-term LNG purchases, therefore, represents an effort at stability, not an ideological leap to the West. In the words of one observer, "to say U.S. LNG is displacing Russian gas, Turkey would need at least twice the current LNG entry points. For now, those facilities already run full throttle in winter."
Still, the symbolism of Ankara looking to Washington is rich. Alongside LNG contracts came talk of nuclear cooperation. While U.S. officials hinted at an extension of peaceful nuclear collaboration agreements, sector insiders say the substance is thin. Turkey has walked this road before—previous memorandums with U.S. firms on nuclear projects fizzled without results. The framing of the New Deal as "symbolic" suggests more political theatre than engineering blueprints.
If American gestures are light on content, Moscow's are anything but. Russia continues to dangle its massive Akkuyu Nuclear Plant project as leverage, with officials floating the idea of redirecting investments to Iran. Financing delays already strain the situation, given Akkuyu, and the Kremlin's veiled threats land heavily in Ankara. The geopolitical ballet is further complicated by U.S. demands that Turkey reduce or cease energy trade with Russia. Those requests clash with reality: Turkish gas contracts via Blue Stream (16 billion cubic meters annually) and TurkStream (5.75 billion cubic meters annually) expire in 2025, but alternatives are lacking. In blunt terms, the pipes must continue to flow until an alternative route is established.
The convergence of these developments—Washington's LNG push, Moscow's nuclear maneuvering, sanctions punching holes in regional trade—leaves Turkey navigating a precarious middle path. Energy is never just about energy for Ankara; it is about diplomacy, economic survival, and national image.
For now, the notion of an "axis shift" might be more illusion than fact. What is visible is a carefully improvised juggling act: importing LNG from America, maintaining pipeline flows from Russia, and keeping nuclear cards on the table with both sides. As the first cold winds of autumn brush across Anatolia, Turkey faces the same sobering reality every winter: no matter how tangled the geopolitics, someone still has to keep the radiators warm.
Photo: Akkuyu Nuclear Plant under construction, Wikipedia Commons