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The Winners and Losers of the Trump Plan*


Yasser Shoora

In February 2025, Donald Trump announced the United States' intention to assume control of Gaza, transforming it into a vast reconstruction project that would involve relocating a significant portion of the Palestinian population to other areas. This initial proposal was met with widespread rejection, particularly from Arab nations and Egypt, as it was seen as tantamount to the forced displacement of the Palestinian people and a violation of international law.

In September 2025, Trump, alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, unveiled a new 20-point plan aimed at ending the conflict in Gaza through a phased approach.

Among the plan's most prominent provisions is an immediate ceasefire, contingent upon all parties agreeing to halt the war, with the stipulation that all hostages, both living and deceased, be returned within 72 hours of the agreement.

This would be followed by a gradual Israeli withdrawal following the ceasefire and the disarmament of Hamas. Simultaneously, an international transitional administration would be formed for an interim period. The proposal suggests establishing a temporary body—a "peace council" or an international authority—to manage Gaza's affairs until control can be transferred to a permanent, reformed Palestinian administration.

This would be coupled with massive reconstruction and economic development, including infrastructure projects and investments to rebuild what has been destroyed. The plan envisions the launch of a special economic zone under international security oversight and the deployment of an international force to ensure security and prevent violations during the transitional period.

The plan alludes to a potential path toward a Palestinian state, but this remains conditional on several changes and lacks clear guarantees.

The pressing question is this: Will Hamas and other Palestinian factions agree to the plan, sacrificing their own interests to end the war of annihilation being waged against the people of Gaza?

The plan grants the United States a leading role in Gaza's reconstruction, thereby bolstering American influence in the region. It also meets several key Israeli demands, such as disarmament, the return of hostages, a ceasefire, and a gradual withdrawal. For Trump, the plan could be leveraged as a significant political achievement domestically, casting him in the role of "peacemaker."

However, there are also significant criticisms and potential risks. The plan lacks clear, binding mechanisms to guarantee the rights of Palestinians in Gaza, such as the right of return or protection from forced displacement. The condition of disarming Hamas could be perceived as a demand for surrender—a term the movement is unlikely to accept easily. Furthermore, the proposed transitional administration, to be managed largely by international experts with limited Palestinian representation, effectively excludes Palestinians from the decision-making process. The presence of an international security force and partial control over borders also raises serious questions about the extent of Gaza's future sovereignty.

Hamas faces a difficult dilemma. Outright rejection could be used as a pretext to continue the military campaign, subjecting the Strip to further devastation. The more likely scenario is that Hamas will respond positively while requesting amendments. Yet accepting the terms as written would mean relinquishing a significant portion of its political and military power.

At its core, the plan appears to be an attempt to reshape the situation in Gaza in a way that marginalizes armed resistance. Political authority would be confined to a constrained transitional administration, with international bodies acting as guarantors for all parties.

Should Hamas accept, it would cede a significant portion of its political and military power in exchange for an agreement that may not grant Palestinians their full rights. If it refuses, the plan will likely be used as a pretext to justify continuing the war or launching an even larger operation to complete the Strip's destruction.

In practical terms, the choice may not be a simple binary of acceptance or rejection. Hamas could enter into negotiations to amend certain provisions, such as limiting the scope of the international administration, ensuring greater Palestinian participation, and refining the withdrawal process. However, securing even minor amendments will be challenging in the face of Israeli and American pressure. Yet despite the clear winners and losers, the greatest beneficiary of accepting the plan would be the Palestinian people in Gaza. 

* The article was first published in the Al Wafd, on October 3rd, 2025. It has been translated from Arabic to English with the kind support of the Levant Files team members. The Levant Files does not share all the arguments that have been expressed in the republished articles. We share the article due to the ongoing historical developments in the region. 

Photo: Gemini AI