Turkey Steps in as the Pakistan–Afghanistan Crisis Boils Over

A week of intense cross-border fighting between Pakistan and Afghanistan in mid-October has thrust Ankara and Doha into a high-stakes mediation effort aimed at halting a spiraling crisis. On October 9, suspected airstrikes hit Kabul, Paktika, Khost, and Jalalabad; Afghan authorities blamed Islamabad. Two days later, Taliban forces mounted a ground assault on the Pakistani border district of Chaman, claiming to have inflicted dozens of Pakistani casualties, while Pakistan reported 23 soldiers killed. Islamabad, which did not formally claim the October 9 strikes, said subsequent operations had killed approximately 200 Afghan fighters; the Taliban countered that it lost nine. After clashes resumed in Spin Boldak on October 15, a 48-hour ceasefire took hold that evening. However, Pakistan launched another air raid on Paktika on October 17, killing eight people, including three national-team cricketers, according to BBC reporting. Afghanistan then pulled out of a planned cricket series.

This fast-moving picture and its roots are dissected in a new analysis by İsmet Horasanlı for SETA Perspektif (Issue 437, October 2025). SETA—the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research—is widely regarded as closely linked to Turkey’s government, and Horasanlı’s piece underscores both Ankara’s leverage and its “regional ownership” approach to conflict resolution. His assessment highlights why Turkey’s ties with Kabul and Islamabad, layered across historic, cultural, and strategic domains, make it a credible broker when the violence surges.

At the core of the dispute lies the 2,640-kilometer Durand Line, drawn in 1893, which divided the Pashtun heartland across today’s borders. The Taliban does not recognize the line as Afghanistan’s official border, and Horasanlı points to Pashtunwali—tribal codes such as kavim dosti (kin loyalty) and nanawatai (offering sanctuary)—as social drivers that complicate state-to-state security demands. Pakistan accuses the Taliban of allowing Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leaders safe haven; the Taliban, in turn, says Pakistan enables Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) networks. The conflict’s ripple effects reach further: Russia has warned of ISIS expansion in Afghanistan, the United States is debating the strategic value of Bagram Air Base, and India–Pakistan rivalry partially overlays the crisis. Notably, Taliban foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi visited India as New Delhi signaled it would upgrade its presence in Kabul to full embassy status—developments Islamabad views warily.

Against this backdrop, Turkey and Qatar facilitated talks that led to a de-escalation after roughly 14 hours of negotiations, with Turkish National Intelligence Organization chief İbrahim Kalın participating directly. A framework set in Doha on October 19 is due to be expanded at a meeting in Istanbul on October 25. Diplomats expect Pakistan to press the Taliban to sever ties with TTP and prevent threats emanating from Afghan territory toward India or the United States. The Taliban is likely to demand assurances about Pakistan’s stance on ISKP. Recognition of the Durand Line as an official border is expected to be the most sensitive sticking point in Kabul.

The near-term outlook favors containment over resolution. The Taliban, recognized officially only by Russia so far, needs economic links—many of them channeled through Pakistan—and is ill-positioned for a prolonged conflict. Pakistan, meanwhile, faces rising domestic attacks by TTP and similar groups and has little appetite for a wider war that could inflame Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Horasanlı argues that Turkey’s mediation dovetails with its broader push for region-driven solutions and hints at a potential Turkish (or Turkish-Qatari) guarantor role if the parties opt for managed, verifiable commitments. A durable peace remains elusive, but a structured, monitored de-escalation may be the most realistic path to preventing the next border firestorm.

Photo: The source