By Engin Solakoğlu (former high-ranking Turkish diplomat)
The results of the presidential elections in Northern Cyprus resonated in Turkey in several dimensions.
Firstly, the defeat of Ersin Tatar, who was supported by the AKP/MHP alliance—an effort that saw the deployment of their high-caliber "weapons" like (the singer) Yavuz Bingöl, (the former Interior Minister) Süleyman Soylu, and (the former commander of the Turkish army) Hulusi Akar—was met with joy by a large segment of the Turkish public who are fed up with this duo. Although it is difficult to draw a direct link, this development reinforced the idea that the AKP/MHP can be defeated at the ballot box, no matter how hard they try. This idea is neither entirely wrong nor entirely correct. Let us explain.
Yes, the "People's Alliance" (Cumhur İttifakı) heavily invested in the TRNC election, repeating the nonsense that "if Nicosia goes, Mersin goes, Ankara goes, and God forbid, Jerusalem goes." However, this effort remained at the local level. Unlike the 2020 elections, there was no fierce confrontation between the Turkish government and the candidate supported by the Turkish Cypriot people, Mustafa Akıncı. One reason for this was that the gap had widened significantly, despite the manipulative, fabricated polls circulated in the public sphere. In other words, the Tatar ship had long since sunk, and there was no possibility of refloating it. Intervention at the ballot box, either before or after the election, might have closed a 5-6 point gap, but nothing could be done about a 20-point difference. The only way to win would have been to completely blow up the election process, as Devlet Bahçeli later suggested. I will try to explain why this was neither a possible nor a desirable option later in the article.
Returning to Turkey, it is true that the AKP/MHP could be defeated even if they use all the state's resources and resort to fraud in a hypothetical Turkish election, but for that to happen, their current vote share would have to drop even lower. Let's keep that in mind.
The second reason was Erhürman's careful stance, which took into account the realities of the Eastern Mediterranean. Let us recall: the bitter reality of the island of Cyprus in a world dominated by imperialism is the limited say of the people living on it. The island cannot move on its own. It moves along the route determined by the minimum common denominator of the quartet: the US, the UK, Turkey, and Greece.
The third reason is the organization of the Turkish Cypriots and the fact that they are a small community living in a confined area with intense communication. Although Turkish Cypriots and the people of Turkey speak the same language, they have different cultural, social, and political backgrounds. Consequently, the elections held in Northern Cyprus do not set an example comparable to a by-election in a Turkish province.
Another reflection of the TRNC election result was seen in domestic politics. Devlet Bahçeli, in short, said, "If we don't abolish the TRNC and annex Northern Cyprus, I will be offended." The AKP pretended not to hear. This led to the conclusion that the disagreement between the two partners was growing and the alliance was shaky. Honestly, it does not make sense to me that a party controlling almost half of the state mechanism with only seven percent of the vote would leave this profitable holding over impossible demands like the partial annexation of Cyprus or an alliance with China and Russia.
The diplomatic dimension of this internal political debate was quick to emerge. A new negotiation process was starting in Cyprus, and the MHP was preempting the AKP as it prepared to sit at the table.
Indeed, there is currently talk of a "Trump plan" for Cyprus. Trump's political style is well-known. He dives into an issue, uses threats and blackmail to bring the parties to the table, and then says, "I did it, it's over," and rushes off to another place. The burden of cleaning up the mess, or rather, his filth, falls to the targeted peoples. The situation in Palestine is clear. At this rate, Lebanon will soon suffer a similar catastrophe. But let's not get sidetracked.
Can the table be set again in Cyprus? Undoubtedly, yes. For one, the AKP's will to lean towards the West has strengthened considerably since 2023 and has become almost its sole objective. Erdoğan's party has high expectations from the US and the EU, and Cyprus is one of the bargaining chips it can use. To be fair, this is a historical reflex of the Turkish right. The AKP did not start it. Tansu Çiller, that personality, also performed many acrobatic feats in Cyprus to get into the EU's family photo (not the EU itself, but the photo). Between 2002 and 2004, the AKP and Turkish capital had convinced almost everyone that the road to Brussels passed through Nicosia.
But what about the paradigm shift? At least Hakan Fidan and his boss, who had to create their own productions because they couldn't find a suitable role in Kurtlar Vadisi (Valley of the Wolves), have been saying this for years. After all the talk of "two states up, two states down," how will they now sit at the table?
Özdil Nami, the former Foreign Minister and Chief Negotiator of the TRNC, is one of the most competent living figures on the Cyprus negotiations. Nami, who is a close friend in addition to his expertise, stated in an interview with the experienced Turkish Cypriot journalist Yusuf Kanlı that sovereignty determines the difference between a confederation and a federation, and he argues that a solution in Cyprus will be realized on the basis of a Federation, even a loose one, where sovereignty is distributed from top to bottom.
I cannot dispute Nami's technical knowledge, but I have a different view, perhaps because I am more familiar with the AKP's way of thinking.
Cyprus has an acquis of negotiations spanning nearly 70 years. We can call this a kind of statute or regulation. No parameter discussed on Cyprus is ever lost; it is added to this regulation. The altitude of the island's highest mountain, Troodos, is 1952 meters. The height of the Cyprus acquis in terms of A4 paper is close to that.
The peak this acquis has reached today is called a Federation. Let us remind ourselves again that Federation is a thesis developed by the Turkish side in Cyprus. The Greek-Cypriot side has always advocated for a centralized structure that hosts a minority with poorly defined cultural rights. The Republic of Cyprus, established in 1960 and buried in history three years later, is defined by political scientists as a "functional federation." One of the reasons for its collapse was the veto power of the Turkish Cypriot people, and the other was the issue of Municipalities. More clearly, it was the insistence of the Turkish Cypriots on maintaining separate local government units, electing their own Mayors—that is, exercising sovereignty. The rejection of the Annan Plan, which foresaw a federal solution, by nearly three-quarters of the Greek Cypriot people in 2004, was rooted in their reaction to the idea of sharing sovereignty with Turkish Cypriots at any level.
What were we saying? In the context of Cyprus, "Federation" was just a title. How it would be filled, and how previously filled elements would be interpreted, is determined by the conjuncture and the negotiations. The title may be a federation, but the content could be, in Nami's words, a "loose federation" or a full-fledged confederation. Both a confederal structure and a loose federation can easily accommodate the claim of "two states." One side can easily market the same solution to its own base as a federation, while the other markets it as a two-state solution.
In short, if Donald Trump says, "Solve it, already!" the representatives of the two communities at the table, with four states and the European Union in the background, will present us with a structure that is neither fish nor fowl and sell it as a solution.
Doesn't Trump have other things to do than focus on Cyprus? At first glance, it seems like a fair question. With so many problems in the world where blood is being shed, why would the island of Cyprus enter US President Trump's radar? Especially when NATO is sitting in the north, the south, and the British bases in the middle of the island, despite all the fuss being made, why spend the energy and time?
It is plausible that a kind of efficiency logic is being pursued here. The contribution of a unified Cyprus to the imperialist design in the Middle East, versus the current situation where fellow travelers like Turkey, Greece, Israel, and the UK serve the same master while bickering among themselves, certainly cannot achieve the same level of efficiency. It is preferred that they act together for more war and more exploitation.
Therefore, it would not be a surprise if a new negotiation table is set up in Cyprus, and the AKP, which hangs on Trump's every word, rushes to the table with the new, more experienced and equipped Turkish Cypriot leadership, completely ignoring the complaints of Bahçeli, which will not go beyond an attempt to raise the stakes.
Whether the AKP's political life will be long enough to extract a so-called solution from this is another matter.
* First published in Haber Sol on November 2, 2025, and translated by The Levant Files for its readers.
Photo: Gemini AI, inspired by the proposed flag for the Federal State of Cyprus in the Anan Plan (2004).