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Syrian Druze Region Sees Third Day of Clashes as Kurds Seek to Revive Deal with Damascus

   


Syrian government forces and Druze militias loyal to prominent community leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri have engaged in a third consecutive day of armed clashes in the southern province of Suweida, as tensions between Damascus and local actors intensify on multiple fronts across the country.

According to reporting by The New Arab, fighting on Thursday was concentrated in Suweida’s western countryside, particularly around the areas of al-Majdal, al-Naql, Tal Hadid, al-Tha'la, Najran, Ara, Atil, and Salim. Sources cited by the outlet’s Arabic-language sister site, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, said an unspecified number of Hijri-aligned fighters were killed, while members of Syrian government forces were also injured. Both sides have reportedly sent substantial reinforcements to the contested zones, raising fears of a broader escalation.

Syria’s state news agency SANA, citing a security source, described the opposing forces as “criminal gangs” accused of targeting several towns in Suweida’s countryside with mortar shells and machine-gun fire. Suweida governor Mustafa al-Bakour echoed that narrative, saying on Telegram that “undisciplined armed factions” had opened fire on security forces with the aim of destabilising the province, and called on residents to oppose any attempts to undermine security.

Local security officials have moved to counter claims circulating among residents that the army is violating ceasefire understandings or attacking civilians. Suleiman Abdul Baqi, head of the security directorate in Suweida city, urged people not to be influenced by “rumours and lies” alleging misconduct by state forces. Nevertheless, local activists say distrust of Damascus is deep-rooted in the area, where many Druze accuse the government of neglect, corruption, and heavy-handed tactics.

The latest flare-up follows an incident on Saturday in which militias aligned with Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri reportedly killed a member of Syria’s security forces, further straining relations. The province was already on edge after deadly confrontations in July between government forces and Druze fighters left dozens dead on both sides. That earlier bout of violence marked one of the most serious challenges to Damascus in Suweida since the start of the Syrian conflict, highlighting the Druze community’s growing willingness to confront central authority over economic hardship, conscription, and local autonomy.

While the south remains volatile, political manoeuvring continues in the country’s northeast. Kurdish officials there met on Thursday to review stalled negotiations with Damascus over the future of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and its military wing, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and representatives of the AANES discussed the March 10 agreement signed by Abdi and Syrian President Ahmed al‑Sharaa, which outlines the integration of SDF units into Syria’s national army.

The deal has yet to move forward, with disputes persisting over how far SDF forces would be merged into the regular military, command-and-control arrangements, and the extent of self-rule to be retained by Kurdish-led institutions. The SDF said on X (formerly Twitter) that attendees at the meeting stressed that “national dialogue is the most successful path to achieving stability,” indicating a desire to keep the door open to a negotiated settlement despite the deadlock.

Suwayda’s violence stands out in the Syrian landscape for several reasons. The Druze-majority province, long seen as relatively quiet compared with other frontlines, has gradually transformed into a hotspot of localised rebellion against Damascus, driven more by community self-defence and socio-economic grievances than by the ideological cleavages that shaped much of the wider war. Militias there often frame their struggle as protecting Druze areas from state abuses, criminal networks, and perceived Iranian or militia encroachment, while simultaneously rejecting jihadist influences.

The recent deadly clashes between Syrian forces and Druze militias thus reflect a distinctive pattern: a communal, locally rooted confrontation in a region that historically tried to keep the wider conflict at arm’s length. Unlike other provinces where opposition structures were more clearly tied to external backers or formal rebel coalitions, Suwayda’s armed actors are largely homegrown and driven by Druze religious and tribal authority figures such as Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. This dynamic complicates Damascus’s efforts to reassert control, raising the risk that further missteps could ignite a broader Druze backlash and add yet another layer of instability to Syria’s fragmented map. 

Photo: The source

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