Thousands of former Syrian government military personnel have reportedly joined the ranks of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeast Syria, forming a new, experienced power bloc around key oil and gas installations and raising questions over the region’s political and security future.
In an investigative report published on 16 November, the independent Syrian outlet Enab Baladi said that at least 4,500 members of what the current authorities describe as “remnants of the former regime” have been absorbed into SDF structures in Raqqa and Hasakeh provinces. The report cites four sources, including a Syrian intelligence official, two SDF-affiliated figures, a journalist working with SDF media, and local eyewitnesses.
According to Enab Baladi, more than 2,200 officers, non-commissioned officers, and rank‑and‑file fighters entered the al‑Omar oil field in July as an initial batch. The new arrivals are said to come from elite formations of the former Syrian army, including units from the 4th Division, 17th Division, Republican Guard and formations once deployed in the Syrian desert. Many are accused by opponents of involvement in earlier crackdowns and bombardments and are believed to have sought refuge in SDF-held territory to avoid accountability and economic collapse.
The report says these forces are concentrated in strategically vital locations, especially the al‑Omar oil field and nearby Conoco gas plant, areas where U.S. forces have recently reduced their presence. Some have been folded into SDF special forces formations, including commando units and the U.S.-trained YAT counterterrorism force, while others are undergoing training in camps near al‑Melbiya and Kawkab in Hasakeh and the Jabal Abd al‑Aziz area.
Behind the scenes, Enab Baladi describes a pattern of indirect coordination involving SDF commanders, former regime officers and external powers. A journalist working for an SDF-linked outlet reported frequent helicopter flights—believed to be Russian—out of Qamishli airport, while Deir ez‑Zor journalist Ibrahim al‑Hussein told the paper that Moscow appears to encourage the integration of ex-regime officers into SDF structures to stabilise the oil region and prepare for a gradual re‑embedding of these areas into a future Syrian state. The United States, he argued, is cautious but tolerant as long as the arrangement supports the campaign against the Islamic State group and preserves relative stability.
For the former officers, joining the SDF offers a chance to retain influence and secure a stake in any future settlement east of the Euphrates, which remains Syria’s main hydrocarbon hub. For the SDF, absorbing experienced cadres both boosts its manpower and, analysts say, creates a larger bargaining chip ahead of a planned integration into a “new Syrian army” under a 10 March agreement signed between transitional president Ahmad al‑Shar’a and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi.
Economic incentives are central. Enab Baladi reports that SDF salaries for newcomers range from about $350 a month for regular fighters to up to $1,000 for senior officers—far above the meagre pay available in former government areas before the collapse. However, this pay gap has already fuelled internal tensions: more than 50 long‑serving SDF fighters have reportedly defected since October, protesting that they receive no more than $150 despite years of combat.
Local civil society workers cited by Enab Baladi describe a sharp rise in complaints about extortion and theft at checkpoints in Deir ez‑Zor’s eastern countryside, often blamed on new arrivals speaking coastal Syrian accents associated with the old security apparatus. In one reported case, an NGO employee said $6,000 and other belongings were confiscated at the al‑Sanour checkpoint. Residents in towns such as Hajin, Abu Hammam and al‑Bseira say ID inspections and the tone of questioning increasingly resemble practices of the pre‑2021 security services, rekindling fear and anger.
Political analyst Abdullah Abdoun told Enab Baladi that by integrating “remnants” of the former system, the SDF risks turning into a “refined copy” of the state it once opposed, recycling its security networks instead of building a different model. He argued that the expanded force is meant to bolster the SDF’s military and political weight before any final negotiations with Damascus.
Researcher Bassam Suleiman, also quoted by the outlet, warned that hardline currents within the SDF, linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leadership, are using ties to ex‑regime and sectarian networks to obstruct implementation of the March 10 integration deal. He estimates that some 5,000 such fighters are now embedded in SDF ranks.
According to Enab Baladi, whether this influx of former regime officers becomes a stabilising bridge toward a unified national army, or entrenches a rebranded version of Syria’s old security architecture, may prove decisive for the trajectory of the country’s northeast—and for any broader political settlement.