Zarounas points to the recent informal five-party talks as evidence of this impasse. He notes that substantive issues were avoided mainly, likely to prevent official acknowledgment of the deadlock. Instead, discussions focused on confidence-building measures (CBMs), a topic Zarounas believes did not necessitate a five-party summit and could have been handled between the community leaders. He suggests Turkey's participation served primarily to gain a "certificate of good behavior," potentially aiding its positioning within Europe's evolving security architecture, similar to how it leveraged the Athens Declaration for arms deals. Further complicating matters are Turkish Cypriot objections to the mandate of UN Envoy María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar, insisting she focus solely on CBMs, reinforcing the sense of stalemate.
After 50 years of negotiations, Zarounas contends that the current deadlock demands deep reflection and a search for a viable exit strategy. He observes that the "Present State of Affairs" (Status Quo) persisted for decades mainly because it suited the key players involved – the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, the guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey, UK), and broader international actors like the EU, US, Russia, and recently Israel. Most of these players historically supported a BBF solution, as reflected in UN resolutions and the Annan Plan.
However, Zarounas stresses that the geopolitical landscape has shifted. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side have not only abandoned the BBF model but are actively challenging the Status Quo through "faits accomplis" on land and sea. They perceive the current situation as unfairly favoring the Greek Cypriot side (due to EU membership, Exclusive Economic Zone rights, and natural gas) and believe the new geopolitical climate allows them to demand more.
Evaluating potential solutions, Zarounas deems the BBF currently unfeasible due to Turkish and Turkish Cypriot rejection, with little international will evident to pressure Turkey back to this framework. He notes the UN Secretary-General's tolerance of Turkey formally tabling its two-state proposal in 2021. Conversely, the two-state solution is unacceptable to the Greek Cypriot and Greece. Nicosia and Athens also rejected British ideas of confederation.
Zarounas argues that even maintaining the Status Quo is becoming untenable. Once considered a "second best" option by some Greek Cypriots, it is increasingly unstable and dangerous due to Turkey's revisionist "Blue Homeland" doctrine and actions like incursions into the EEZ, the buffer zone, developments in Varosha, and efforts to upgrade the international status of the internationally unrecognized 'TRNC.'
Therefore, Zarounas proposes an 'Improved State of Affairs' (Velitiomeni Katastasi Pragmaton - VKP) as the only realistic path forward. This interim solution, he argues, could bring about significant improvements without compromising the ultimate goals of the parties. He suggests secret, intensive negotiations for a New Joint Declaration (NKD), replacing the 2014 Eroglu-Anastasiades declaration.
Under this NKD, the Greek Cypriot side would agree to initially focus negotiations on four chapters (excluding the constitutional one). In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot side would accept starting with the territorial chapter, including maritime zone delimitation. Crucially, the final status of the Turkish Cypriot entity (independent state or constituent state in a BBF) would only be discussed after agreement and on-the-ground implementation of these initial chapters, based on strict timelines.
Recognizing the UN's weakened global role, Zarounas advocates for joint G/C-T/C requests for direct US involvement, potentially appointing a US mediator akin to the 1964 Acheson model, citing successful US mediation in the Lebanon-Israel maritime deal.
Zarounas concludes that this phased approach allows both sides to maintain their positions while achieving tangible, mutually beneficial improvements on the ground, starting with territory. Success, even partial, could build crucial trust, create new momentum for a comprehensive settlement, and help overcome the difficult issue of implementation guarantees.