If the focus of the latest İmralı visit is Syria, should we assume that Ankara has granted Öcalan proxy authority over its Syria policy?
By Namık Tan
There is no center in Syria yet—no state center—that can stand on its own or lift the country up by itself. For such a center to take root and grow stronger, to put it simply, the United States must lift its sanctions.
President Trump has been using his authority to suspend these sanctions for 180-day periods. However, he does not have the power to lift them unilaterally. For Congress's view of El-Shara to align with what Trump and Ambassador Barrack want, Damascus must mend its ties with the SDF and Israel—or at least with one of them.
According to the leaked phone call recordings between Special Envoy Witkoff and Russian officials, as well as Army Secretary Driscoll's contacts in Kyiv—including with ambassadors from NATO member states—the Trump administration is pressuring Ukraine to surrender by gifting Donbas and Crimea to Putin. Should we expect the same Trump to adopt a different stance on the Golan Heights, which Israel has occupied and expanded its occupation to the foothills?
Just this past weekend, Israel's military operations against Syria by land and air resulted in the deaths of at least 13 people. How could al-Shara agree to make such a concession—one that even the Assads, father and son, resisted for 50 years? Even if we assume he would agree, how long could Shara protect himself? How long could he maintain control over the jihadist fighters in his inner circle?
From the SDF's perspective, integration into a Syrian army that is equal to or even weaker than its own forces does not seem to be a problem. On paper, this integration could easily be achieved in the form of a few divisions and a brigade, maintaining the chain of command and serving within their own region.
The problem for the SDF lies in the sequencing of steps. The SDF naturally understands that if it takes the step of army integration first, its hand will weaken in negotiations over the future shape of the Syrian state.
Because contrary to what some in our country claim about certain things being "above politics," everything is political. And bargaining or negotiation is not shameful—it is necessary, or at the very least, it is in the nature of things.
Moreover, Damascus currently lacks a government that, despite having a weak state center, possesses a strong vision, has established a monopoly on violence, can move toward a specific goal with a degree of cohesion, and offers its citizens a shared hope for the future. It will not be easy for El-Shara to forge a new nation from the Syrian people.
It is also clear that civic consciousness in Syria cannot flourish overnight. There is no citizenship in Syria—only identities based on beliefs, ethnic origins, or localities. It is known that Sunni Arabs form the majority in Syria, followed by Kurds, Arab Alawites, Druze, Christian Arabs, and Turkmens. Beyond that, little is certain.
Syria also lacks a "bonanza" that would make potential investors' eyes sparkle—nothing like the oil fields in neighboring Iraq. The country's gas and oil resources are barely sufficient for its own needs. This year, drought devastated the olive harvest. The situation is no different in the SDF-controlled region, often called the country's breadbasket.
Syria's economic and ancient cultural centers stretch from Gaziantep southward: Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus, along with the coastal cities of Latakia and Tartus. In these areas, only potential tourism revenues can be mentioned. Sectors such as transportation, education, and healthcare await substantial and sustained investment.
Turkey's border provinces like Hatay and Kilis could be revitalized if the situation in Syria achieves relative stability. Construction materials, pharmaceuticals, and food products could be exported. This would amount to "border trade," and even this much depends on the lifting of US sanctions for sustainability.
The Kurdish components of the SDF, which are extensions of the PKK, are the YPG and YPJ. The political wing is the PYD. While 60 percent of the SDF's armed forces consist of Arabs, Kurds are not an overwhelming majority anywhere in the SDF-controlled region. The Euphrates River, flowing from Turkey into Iraq, administratively separates this region from the rest of the country. Therefore, history, politics, topography, and demography do not evoke the context of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
It is also not true that Israel poses a strategic threat to Turkey through the SDF. According to this claim, the SDF cooperates with Israel while listening to Öcalan like everyone else. Meanwhile, the same Öcalan constantly warns against the Israeli threat.
On the ground, the SDF's primary partners are the United States and, subsequently, France.
The CHP made the right decision by not sending a member to the parliamentary delegation that went to İmralı. The CHP also correctly decided to remain on the commission. The new program includes provisions such as the implementation of the Council of Europe's local government charter, aligning the definition of terrorism with the EU acquis, and education in one's mother tongue, alongside general and fundamental democratic republican principles.
However, if the focus of the latest İmralı visit is Syria, should we assume that Ankara has granted Öcalan proxy authority in its Syria policy? If the goal is to "take over" the SDF using Öcalan—through a soft move, or in other words, through the "sympathy channel"—then the visit has effectively granted Öcalan legitimacy in foreign policy as well.
Thus, both Öcalan and the PKK have been made far more visible. Yet wasn't the opposite being claimed?
Returning to Syria as a whole, Israel aims for Syria to be sufficiently weak yet sufficiently strong. Earlier, while explaining El-Shara's dilemma, we touched on relations with the SDF and Israel. Erdoğan's dilemma is not very different. Erdoğan is also aware that he can only overcome the Congressional obstacle by, in a sense, "going along with" Israel. Because the Congressional obstacle cannot be overcome by Trump's pressure alone. This is why, while TRT broadcasts terms like "genocidal" or "killer Israel," the National Security Council and Erdoğan prefer a much more moderate tone.
So where do we stand now? The SDF has openly become PKK-ized. The PKK has not laid down its arms. The parliamentary delegation went to İmralı and made Öcalan a legitimate negotiating partner and even a foreign policy actor.
Those who speak of "working on conflict resolution" constantly bring up FARC and ETA. These experts do not mention that the FARC process was rejected in Colombia with less than half participation in the referendum. They also do not explain how Spain underwent a thorough and rapid democratization process between 1975 and 1982, crowning it with NATO and EU membership.
Yet the horse must be put before the cart, not the other way around. There can be no resolution without democratization, the rule of law, and a foundation of freedom of expression. The National Intelligence Organization (MİT) should handle contacts that need to remain closed, while the parliament and civil society should drive the democratization that needs to be open. Otherwise, an agreement between two authoritarian leaders can only lead Turkey to disaster. Neither peace nor democracy can emerge from that.
* Namık Tan is a veteran Turkish diplomat and foreign policy expert with extensive experience in international relations, having served in key diplomatic positions including as Turkey's Ambassador to the United States. This article was originally written in Turkish, published in the T24 news site, and has been translated into English by The Levant Files for its readers.*