In a development reminiscent of a Cold War espionage novel, the shadow war between Tehran and Jerusalem has shifted violently to the heart of Africa. New intelligence indicates that the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched a covert operation recruiting a local Ugandan construction worker to serve as a forward observer for terror operations. The objective was chillingly clear: to surveil Israeli diplomatic missions in Uganda and Senegal and procure weaponry for potential attacks.
According to exclusive materials and a recorded debriefing reviewed by Iran International, European intelligence sources have uncovered the granular details of this recruitment drive. The outlet reports that the Ugandan recruit was explicitly tasked with filming the security perimeters of Israeli embassies and acquiring handguns and grenades, highlighting Tehran’s expanding operational footprint on the continent.
The mechanics of the plot reveal a mix of deadly intent and bizarre pop-culture bravado. The Ugandan man stated in a debriefing that he was initially approached by a Pakistani national, Zahid Jawad, who professed allegiance to the Quds Force. Following this introduction, Iranian operatives contacted the recruit via WhatsApp to direct his actions. In a strange twist, the operatives referred to their new African asset as “Rambo,” named after the American action movie character. Screenshots of the communications reviewed by the source allegedly show handlers sending images of a grenade to the recruit, instructing him to purchase a similar device. The Ugandan national claimed his contact consulted a supervisor to approve funds for the purchase, which were to be transferred to his account.
Intelligence sources have identified three specific Iranian operatives driving the scheme: Meysam Sahraei, Reza Ghabadi, and Abbas Mohammad Naeim. All three are reported to work for Unit 840 of the Quds Force. This secretive division, commanded by Yazdan Mir—known by the alias Sardar Bagheri—is believed by Western intelligence to be specifically tasked with targeting dissidents and Israeli interests beyond Iran's borders.
The operation utilized what intelligence sources describe as a “proxy-of-a-proxy” model, a strategy designed to provide Tehran with plausible deniability. By using foreign nationals to recruit other foreign nationals, the IRGC creates layers of separation between the commanders in Tehran and the agents on the ground. This mirrors a similar plot exposed three years ago in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where a student was recruited by a Pakistani member of the Zainabiyoun Brigade to scout targets.
Beyond surveillance, the intelligence suggests Uganda is becoming a critical logistical node for the IRGC. Following the loss of strategic transit hubs in Syria after the reported fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime last year, Iran has sought new corridors to move hardware. Sources within Iran's Mahan Air told reporters that the IRGC has been transporting weapons aboard a Boeing 747 registered with Fars Qeshm Air.
Flight registry data indicates that on September 24, the aircraft flew from Bandar Abbas to Entebbe, Uganda. The source alleges that the plane, laden with heavy cargo, was forced to refuel in Bandar Abbas before making the trip to East Africa, potentially en route to Yemen. As of this report, neither the Ugandan nor Senegalese embassies have responded to the allegations.