TLF SPECIAL: Did Syria’s Kurds Secure Autonomy or Surrender It? New Damascus Deal Suggests a Fragmented Trade-Off
According to detailed announcements by senior Kurdish officials published by the Hawar News Agency (ANHA), a new agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syria’s Interim Government represents a fundamental dismantling of the region’s de facto autonomous administration in the core territories of Jazira and Kobani, yet potentially secures a narrow pathway to localized self-governance in formerly occupied Kurdish regions—a complex bargain that suggests Kurds traded broad federal autonomy for the restoration of specific ethnic homelands.
In a series of statements that include remarks from negotiation committee member Fawza Youssef and Ilham Ahmed, Co-Chair of the Department of External Relations of the Democratic Autonomous Administration, the agreement’s provisions reveal a systematic transfer of military, security, and administrative authority to Damascus in the resource-rich eastern regions, while holding out the possibility of self-rule in the northwestern cantons lost to Turkish occupation in 2018-2019.
Military Integration: The End of Autonomous Defense
According to Fawza Youssef, speaking to ANHA regarding her appearance on “Al-Youm” TV channel, the Syrian Democratic Forces will be reorganized into military brigades stationed in the Jazira and Kobani regions, with specific mention of “three military brigades” and a separate “Kobani brigade” designated within the Aleppo Division. This restructuring effectively dissolves the SDF’s autonomous military command, placing these units under the organizational hierarchy of the Syrian state’s armed forces.
The SDF Media Center, in a statement reported by ANHA, confirmed this military integration, noting the agreement includes “a gradual process to integrate military and administrative forces between the two sides” and the withdrawal of all forces from contact lines to “main bases.” While guarantor parties—including the United States and France, according to Ilham Ahmed—will monitor implementation, the military autonomy that allowed the SDF to operate as an independent force since 2015 appears to be ending in the core territories.
Security: Transitional Local Presence, Ultimate State Authority
On internal security, the announcements suggest a transitional arrangement heavily weighted toward eventual central control. According to Youssef, Asayish forces will retain responsibility for protecting Kurdish-majority areas, but forces affiliated with the Interim Government’s Ministry of Interior will enter Hasakah and Qamishlo—albeit temporarily—to “coordinate” integration. Notably, Youssef confirmed that the deputy commander of internal security in Hasakah will be appointed by the SDF, suggesting some residual local influence.
However, Ilham Ahmed clarified that the “deployment of security forces comes to ensure a responsible and gradual integration process,” emphasizing that this process aims at “partnership” but ultimately serves “Syria’s unity.” The SDF Media Center statement confirmed that “Internal Security Forces affiliated with the Ministry of Interior [will enter] into the centers of the cities of Hasakah and Qamishli” to begin integration, indicating that final security authority will rest with Damascus.
Administrative Dissolution in the Core Territories
Perhaps the clearest evidence that Kurdish officials have abandoned the autonomous administration model in the Jazira heartland lies in the institutional arrangements. According to Ilham Ahmed’s press conference reported by ANHA, “the institutions of the Autonomous Administration will be integrated into Syrian state institutions without any change,” with employees remaining in their positions.
Key economic and sovereign assets—previously controlled by the autonomous administration—will revert to central authority. According to Youssef, “border crossings, the airport, and oil fields will be administered by the central authority,” though local administrative staff will be employed. Additionally, media institutions will now require licensing from Damascus, and while educational institutions will retain their “specific character,” joint committees will determine curricula and languages of instruction, with Damascus accrediting all certificates.
Geographically, the deal confirms the loss of autonomous territorial claims in the east. According to Ahmed, Kobani will now be “administratively affiliated with Aleppo Governorate,” effectively subordinating the symbolic capital of the Rojava project to the central state’s provincial system.
The Occupied Territories Exception: A Strategic Territorial Swap?
A crucial provision that complicates the narrative of total capitulation concerns the formerly Kurdish-majority areas occupied by Turkey since 2018-2019. According to ANHA’s report of Fawza Youssef’s statements, “the administration of currently occupied areas such as Afrin and Serekaniye will be managed by the residents of those areas.”
Ilham Ahmed, in separate remarks to ANHA, reinforced this by confirming that “Turkish forces had withdrawn from Afrin and Serekaniye and were no longer present there,” and that work would proceed to “enable local residents to manage institutions themselves” and ensure “the safe and dignified return of the residents of Afrin and Serê Kaniyê to their areas.”
This suggests a potential strategic trade: Kurdish negotiators may have accepted the dismantling of the broad autonomous administration in the Jazira and Kobani regions (evidenced by military integration, oil field handovers, and Kobani’s subordination to Aleppo Governorate) in exchange for restored local governance in the occupied cantons that were lost to Turkish occupation.
However, the provision rests on critical ambiguities and implementation risks. First, the term “residents” remains undefined—whether it refers to the original Kurdish populations displaced by ethnic cleansing (implying a form of ethnic self-governance) or the current Arab and Turkmen inhabitants (implying only municipal decentralization under Damascus sovereignty). Second, Turkey’s actual withdrawal from Afrin and Serekaniye remains unverified as of the agreement date; if Turkish forces and their proxy administration remain, the “residents’ administration” clause risks becoming unenforceable.
If implemented as Kurdish officials appear to intend—with original populations returning to self-manage—the clause could establish localized autonomy in the northwest even as the broad federal project dissolves in the east. If it fails, the agreement reduces to a unilateral surrender of the AANES heartland in exchange for vague promises.
What Remains: Cultural Rights and the YPJ Question
The concessions secured by Kurdish negotiators beyond the territorial question appear focused on cultural preservation. Ahmed emphasized that educational certificates will be officially recognized and that discussions continue regarding curricula and Kurdish language instruction. She also stressed that Kurdish rights “will be discussed during the upcoming visit of the Kurdish delegation to Damascus” regarding the future constitution.
Notably, the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ)—a symbol of the autonomous administration’s progressive social model—were excluded from the current agreement. According to Youssef, “they were not mentioned in the agreement, but will be addressed as a separate file in the next stage”—suggesting their future remains uncertain as the military integration proceeds.
Conclusion: Fragmented Restoration or Conditional Surrender?
Based on the ANHA reports citing Youssef, Ahmed, and the SDF Media Center, the agreement does not provide Kurds with the comprehensive, constitutionally-recognized self-governance they pursued for 14 years. The Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) as a continuous, self-governing federal region with its own military and resources is being systematically dismantled in the Jazira heartland through military subordination, administrative integration, and territorial recentralization under Damascus authority.
However, the Afrin-Serekaniye clause prevents a simple characterization of total surrender under military pressure. Instead, the agreement appears to represent a strategic retreat or territorial swap: the abandonment of the unwinnable fight for broad federal autonomy across the oil-rich east, in exchange for a winnable—though precarious—fight for restoration of specific ethnic homelands in the northwest under localized self-rule.
Whether this constitutes a salvage of Kurdish self-governance or its ultimate dissolution depends entirely on whether Damascus and Ankara actually permit the “residents’ administration” to materialize as Kurdish self-management in Afrin and Serekaniye, or whether this clause proves to be a symbolic consolation prize for abandoning the autonomous project in the rest of North and East Syria.