Iran appears to be standing at a historic crossroads. Renewed nationwide protests, deep economic hardship, and the advanced age of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have fueled speculation about whether the Islamic Republic can endure. Yet while debates rage over whether the regime will collapse—and what might replace it—the decisive factor is not the regime’s weakness but the opposition’s strength. As long as Iran’s opposition remains fragmented, mistrustful, and organizationally incoherent, the Islamic Republic is likely to survive, not because it enjoys widespread support, but because no unified alternative exists.
In their mew article, Sanam Vakil, Director of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Program, and Alex Vatanka, Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute, argue that the Iranian opposition’s deep internal fractures are the primary obstacle to meaningful political change. They contend that only a broad, inclusive coalition built around a minimal shared platform can realistically challenge the regime and manage a stable transition should it fall.
Unlike opposition movements in countries such as Belarus or Venezuela, Iran’s anti-regime forces lack a central leader or unifying infrastructure. Instead, they form what Vakil and Vatanka describe as an “archipelago” of disconnected groups divided by ideology, geography, generation, and political experience. Labor unions, student organizations, women’s rights groups, ethnic minority movements, reformist insiders, and diaspora activists all oppose the current system—but they often distrust one another as much as they distrust the regime. Accusations of foreign influence or covert collaboration with the government are common, making sustained coordination nearly impossible.
Ethnic minority movements, including Kurdish, Baluchi, Ahwazi Arab, and Azerbaijani groups, bring strong organizational capacity and long-standing grievances, especially demands for decentralization and cultural rights. Yet tensions persist between these groups and more centralized, Persian-dominated opposition factions, which fear territorial fragmentation. Similarly, reformist insiders such as former Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani face repression from the regime while also struggling with credibility among younger protesters who view them as compromised by their past participation in the system.
The Iranian diaspora represents another powerful but divided front. Prominent figures abroad possess financial resources, media platforms, and access to Western policymakers. Monarchists aligned with Reza Pahlavi, for example, have gained visibility as dissatisfaction with the Islamic Republic grows. However, critics question their organizational depth inside Iran and warn that overt foreign backing risks reinforcing regime narratives of external interference. Other groups, such as the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, remain highly controversial due to their history and internal practices. Efforts to unite diaspora factions—such as the 2023 Mahsa Charter initiative—have collapsed under ideological and strategic disagreements.
Vakil and Vatanka argue that if the opposition hopes to succeed, it must narrow its focus to a small set of shared principles: ending clerical supremacy, guaranteeing civil and political freedoms, preserving Iran’s territorial integrity, and committing to a time-bound, internationally observed transition. Contentious issues—monarchy versus republic, decentralization, foreign policy orientation—should be deferred to a future elected constitutional assembly. This pragmatic approach would allow diverse groups to collaborate without resolving every ideological difference in advance.
Beyond agreeing on principles, the opposition must also prepare for governance. Fear of chaos, civil war, or state collapse remains one of the regime’s strongest tools of deterrence. A credible transition plan—focused on stabilizing the economy, maintaining basic services, preventing violence, and setting a clear timeline for elections—would reassure both the public and potential defectors within the system. Inclusivity is equally essential; the authors warn that a post-regime order that marginalizes minorities or rival political traditions could repeat the cycle of exclusion that followed the 1979 revolution.
Ultimately, Iran’s opposition possesses considerable assets: mobilized labor networks, experienced ethnic movements, courageous civil society leaders, and reformist technocrats within the state. But without coordination and mutual trust, these strengths cancel one another out. The Islamic Republic may be increasingly brittle, but brittleness alone does not ensure collapse. The decisive question is whether Iran’s disparate opposition forces can overcome their divisions and present a coherent alternative. If they cannot, the regime may endure—not through legitimacy, but through the absence of unity among those who seek to replace it.
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