by Kaan Devecioğlu
The diplomatic normalization process between Türkiye and Egypt, which has regained momentum over the past two years, appears to have acquired an institutional and strategic framework with the second meeting of the Türkiye-Egypt High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council held in Cairo on Feb. 4. Statements by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Egyptian counterpart, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi at their joint news conference suggest that relations have entered a new phase, not only bilaterally but also within the broader regional geopolitical context.
The most striking aspect of the meeting was the clear intention to move beyond “normalization” and recast relations within a “multidimensional strategic partnership.” Coupled with an emphasis on deeper cooperation in the economy, energy, transportation and cultural fields, and growing diplomatic coordination on crises such as Gaza, Libya, Sudan and Somalia, this shift suggests that the Ankara-Cairo axis is being restructured across a broad geopolitical space stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea.
Economic Foundation: Carrying Column Of Politics
The leaders’ call to raise bilateral trade from $9 billion to $15 billion underscores their intention to anchor the strategic depth of relations in economic cooperation. From Türkiye’s perspective, Egypt already ranks among its largest trading partners in Africa. Turkish investments nearing $4 billion and employing about 100,000 people further suggest that economic ties serve as a form of “balancing insurance” against political fluctuations.
This picture suggests that the two countries are consolidating their relations through the institutionalization of shared interests. Their willingness to pursue joint projects in energy and transportation carries broader implications, particularly in the geopolitical context of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Maritime transport, port connectivity and energy transit routes could position the two not only as economic partners but also as “co-stakeholders in the region’s logistics and energy architecture.”
Another notable development is the reactivation of cultural and institutional diplomacy tools. Signals pointing to a renewed presence of institutions such as the Yunus Emre Institute, TİKA, Anadolu Agency and TRT in Egypt indicate that soft power is being treated as a complementary instrument supporting economic and political ties. This approach reflects a desire to deepen relations not only at the interstate level but also on a societal foundation shaped by nearly a millennium of shared history.
Regional crisis management via Türkiye-Egypt coordination
One of the clearest areas of convergence between Ankara and Cairo is the Gaza crisis and the Palestinian issue. Both leaders stressed that despite the establishment of a ceasefire, the humanitarian tragedy in Gaza persists, openly criticizing Israel’s attacks and actions that undermine the truce. Egypt’s role through border crossings and humanitarian corridors, combined with Türkiye’s readiness to provide humanitarian aid and support reconstruction, positions the two as complementary actors. Taken together, this suggests that the Palestinian issue serves not only as a shared diplomatic narrative but also as a normative foundation legitimizing cooperation, reflecting the emergence of a common, humanitarian-centered language in their regional policies.
However, Egypt’s energy-based strategic interdependence with Israeli gas—within the framework of Eastern Mediterranean natural gas production and exports—remains a structural factor shaping Cairo’s diplomatic room for maneuver on the Palestinian issue. This dynamic may at times compel Egypt to adopt a more cautious, balancing approach to regional affairs. At the same time, the growing political coordination between Türkiye and Egypt carries the potential to provide a platform through which sensitivities arising from energy geopolitics can be managed through sustained dialogue and diplomacy.
In Libya, once one of the most pronounced areas of disagreement between Ankara and Cairo, a more aligned discourse is now emerging. Erdoğan and Sisi’s shared emphasis on preserving Libya’s “unity, integrity and stability” does not imply that the two have abandoned contacts with different Libyan actors. It does, however, underscore a common priority: support for a political process that safeguards Libya’s institutional integrity. This shift suggests that the Libya file, previously an arena of competition, has been recast within a framework of controlled diplomatic coordination, reflecting a growing preference for convergence around minimum common denominators in crisis management rather than direct confrontation.
In Sudan, both leaders’ prioritization of ceasefire and sustainable peace is noteworthy. Considering Egypt’s historical and geographical ties with Sudan and Türkiye’s increasing diplomatic and humanitarian engagement in recent years, there appears to be an overlapping approach aimed at preventing further deepening of the crisis rather than engaging in competition in this file. This convergence demonstrates that the two countries evaluate Sudan not as a sphere of influence competition but as “a fragile area whose regional instability must be prevented from spreading.” Indeed, when it is taken into account that the Libya file is directly connected with developments in Sudan, it can be argued that Türkiye-Egypt regional coordination has consolidated not only at the bilateral level but also across a broader strategic space extending to interconnected crisis geographies.
Erdoğan’s explicit rejection of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland underscores Ankara’s commitment to Somalia’s territorial integrity. Similarly, Sisi’s emphasis that Egypt opposes Somalia’s fragmentation highlights convergence between the two countries in the Horn of Africa on the principle of “state sovereignty and territorial integrity.” This file indicates that Türkiye and Egypt are developing an overlapping security perspective in the region, viewing the strengthening of non-state actors and the risk of fragmentation as undesirable scenarios.
Turkish president’s emphasis that “a stable and politically unified Syria would benefit the entire region,” along with Sisi’s statements supporting Syria’s unity, indicates that both parties are approaching the issue within a similar framework. However, the language used here is notably more cautious than in the Libya and Gaza files. This caution reflects differing priorities and sensitivities regarding the Syrian crisis, yet the convergence at the discourse level around the common denominator of “preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty” creates a diplomatic foundation that prevents divergences from escalating into confrontation. This common ground aligns with the principled decisions of regional organizations such as the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), of which both Egypt and Türkiye are members, regarding the preservation of Syria’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political unity. The institutional framework thus provides a complementary reference point, allowing differences in approach to be managed through multilateral diplomacy rather than generating rivalry.
Although the joint press conferences projected a strong picture of alignment, it is natural that nuances in tone and priorities exist in the two countries’ approaches to regional crises. What stands out, however, is that these differences are addressed through institutional consultation mechanisms. In this context, the regular meetings of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council and the decision to hold the third summit in Ankara demonstrate the parties’ intent to treat divergences not as crises but as “manageable diplomatic files.” This suggests that relations are not fragile, but are instead settling into an increasingly institutionalized and predictable framework.
In conclusion, the emerging picture suggests that the new phase in Türkiye-Egypt relations represents not just the normalization of bilateral ties, but the formation of a regional balancing axis. Across a broad crisis geography—from the Eastern Mediterranean to Gaza, Libya, Sudan, and Syria—Ankara and Cairo’s increasing alignment around shared principles points to the emergence of a new line of stability in Middle Eastern and North African geopolitics. This line is not based on absolute consensus, but on “strategic maturity in which differences can be managed without turning into confrontation.” Strengthened economic interdependence, institutionalized diplomatic dialogue, and the expansion of minimum common denominators in regional crises all have the potential to transform Türkiye-Egypt relations into a framework that fosters stability not only for the two countries, but for the wider region. The messages delivered in Cairo thus strongly indicate that Türkiye and Egypt are now guided by “geopolitical reasoning that prioritizes coordination over rivalry.”
Photo: Gemini AI