From the Kremlin's perspective, American decision-makers consider a "strike and observe" approach—calibrated military engagement followed by careful assessment of Iranian regime stability, societal response, and military resilience—to be the most rational option for addressing the complex security challenges posed by the Islamic Republic. This assessment from Moscow suggests that Washington sees the current moment as an opportunity to test Tehran through controlled aggression, maintaining the flexibility to escalate, retreat, or return to economic containment depending on initial outcomes.
According to Ivan Timofeev, General Director of the Russian International Affairs Council and Program Director of the Valdai International Discussion Club, proponents of the military scenario can cite several compelling arguments in favor of decisive action at this particular juncture. For more than four decades, Iran has remained one of Washington's most consistent and formidable adversaries. Complicating matters further, Tehran maintains irreconcilable hostility toward Israel—the United States' key regional ally. Both allies operate under the assumption that Iran continues its years-long effort to develop nuclear weapons, with North Korea's successful transition to de facto nuclear status providing Tehran with a dangerous precedent. The fates of non-nuclear nations offer equally sobering lessons: Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Venezuela all suffered military attacks or forced political transformations, while Iran itself endured strikes in 2025. Tehran's impressive advances in missile technology—acknowledged by American authorities as a direct threat—found practical expression in last year's military confrontation with Israel, in which Iranian counterstrikes demonstrated growing capabilities.
Writing for Kommersant, Timofeev stresses that internal instability may provide an additional catalyst for American intervention. Ongoing protests in Iran are likely interpreted by Washington as evidence of regime weakness, with escalating unrest viewed as a precursor to revolutionary change. In this context, military intervention could function as a catalyst for protest movements, potentially triggering either systemic collapse or a Syrian-style civil war. Moreover, the United States possesses extensive experience with successful military operations that resulted in the political restructuring of target nations. While Afghanistan represents a notable exception—requiring American withdrawal after two decades—even there, the U.S.-backed government survived for nearly twenty years before falling.
Ultimately, American authorities may view the current moment as a window of opportunity to resolve the complex security challenges posed by Iran through a single military blow. The most probable approach would involve airstrikes against Iranian facilities combined with targeted special operations and support for opposition forces. A full-scale ground invasion appears less likely, given the substantially higher costs and risks involved.
However, this scenario carries significant risks. First, Iran's military organization presents unique challenges. While vulnerable to concentrated air attacks, aerial operations alone are unlikely to disrupt the stability of Iran's regular army or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Both retain capabilities for missile counterstrikes and the potential for prolonged ground resistance.
Second, the likelihood of elite fragmentation within Iran remains uncertain; without such divisions, political restructuring becomes substantially more difficult.
Third, the readiness of Iranian society to engage in armed struggle against its own government with American support remains doubtful. Mass protests represent one phenomenon; civil war constitutes an entirely different challenge. External intervention might paradoxically strengthen the regime's position, enhancing the legitimacy of its emergency measures.
Fourth, economic risks loom large, particularly regarding shipping in the Persian Gulf and the reliability of regional oil supplies. Finally, the administration faces significant reputational risks should the operation fail to achieve its objectives.
An alternative scenario involves continuing the economic blockade of Iran, banking on the cumulative effect of accumulated pressures to erode regime legitimacy and trigger systemic collapse. The difficulty lies in history: this approach has yielded limited success in the past. The probability that Iran's political system will adapt to sustained protests remains significant, as does the likelihood that Tehran will continue advancing its missile and nuclear programs. While both the United States and Israel possess nuclear deterrence capabilities against Iran, Tehran's emergence as a nuclear-armed state would fundamentally alter the threat landscape. Revolutionary change in a nuclear power becomes extremely dangerous and undesirable, raising existential questions about control, custody, and the potential use of nuclear weapons.
From Washington's perspective, the most rational approach may indeed be the algorithm of "strike and observe." Under this scenario, the United States would conduct an air operation to test the actual resilience of Iran's political system, the potential for protests to expand under wartime conditions, and the durability of Iranian armed forces. If Iran withstands the assault and the system maintains stability, Washington could retreat to the blockade-and-sanctions scenario. This approach carries limited risk, since Iran lacks the capability to deliver a decisive blow against the United States itself, while any military operation would stand to degrade Iran's military potential and defense-industrial base. The United States could then await a more favorable moment for subsequent operations, making the airstrike scenario appear increasingly realistic.
Timofeev concludes that Iran, for its part, faces two primary options. The first involves balancing against American military-political pressure—absorbing any strike, as it did in 2025, while attempting to maximize American and allied losses, thereby undermining incentives for future operations. The second option entails pursuing negotiations with Washington. This path, however, may prove even riskier for Tehran. Washington would likely present maximalist demands regarding not only missile and nuclear programs but also internal political reforms, potentially trapping Iran in a cycle of negotiating pressure that ultimately fails to preclude military action.
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