A once-quiet divergence between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi now threatens to engulf the Horn of Africa in a wider contest for regional dominance, with devastating consequences for already fragile states.
What was once a subtle rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has escalated into an overt and consequential rivalry stretching across the Horn of Africa. While the two Gulf powers long cooperated as pillars of a shared regional agenda, their strategic visions have diverged sharply — first in Yemen and now across Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Libya. The question facing policymakers is whether this competition can be managed or whether it will deepen instability in one of the world's most fragile regions.
According to Jonathan Fenton-Harvey, writing for The New Arab on 9 February, the rivalry stems from a fundamental clash between Abu Dhabi's maritime-centric, proxy-driven model of influence and Riyadh's emphasis on state sovereignty, central authority, and border security. The UAE has built deeply embedded networks across the Horn over the past decade, investing in ports such as Berbera in Somaliland, cultivating ties with sub-state actors, and brokering key diplomatic deals like the 2018 Ethiopia-Eritrea peace agreement. Saudi Arabia, while less entrenched, has increasingly sought to push back against Emirati influence, particularly as the fallout from Yemen has spilled into neighbouring theatres.
Yemen as the catalyst has been central to this story. The late 2025 advances by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council prompted Saudi airstrikes on Emirati-linked shipments — a rare kinetic escalation between nominal allies. Riyadh demanded Emirati withdrawal and the dismantling of STC command structures, signalling that it would no longer tolerate Abu Dhabi's parallel agenda on the Arabian Peninsula.
The ripple effects have been most acutely felt in Sudan, where the devastating civil war that erupted in April 2023 has become a proxy battleground. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have aligned behind the Sudanese Armed Forces, while the UAE has faced intense scrutiny for its backing of the Rapid Support Forces, driven by gold trade interests and opposition to Islamist movements. Joint Saudi-Egyptian efforts have sought to restrict RSF logistics, including pressuring Libya's Khalifa Haftar to close supply routes — though with limited lasting success.
Somalia has emerged as another critical fault line. The UAE maintains significant economic ties with Somaliland, whose contested sovereignty makes Emirati port investments politically sensitive. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, by contrast, support Somalia's territorial integrity. When Somalia's federal government voided UAE agreements in January 2026, DP World's operations nonetheless continued, underscoring the limits of central authority and the resilience of Emirati networks.
The rivalry also intersects with Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a source of deep anxiety for Egypt over Nile water security. Abu Dhabi's close ties with Addis Ababa place it at odds with Cairo and, by extension, Riyadh, raising the prospect that dam negotiations could become the next arena for Gulf tensions.
Analysts warn the consequences could be severe. Cameron Hudson, a former US government official, cautioned that "Gulf states are picking their own political winners and subverting the others' efforts," adding that "the result of their competition could be more wars like Sudan or, even worse, inter-state wars that engulf the entire region." David Shinn, former US ambassador to Ethiopia, offered a similarly stark assessment, noting that all parties "seem to be seeking short-term political advantage, which will not serve any of the parties well and will be especially destructive for the countries in the Horn of Africa."
As Saudi Arabia and Egypt deepen their alignment around sovereignty and Red Sea security, and the UAE doubles down on its entrenched networks, the Horn of Africa risks becoming the defining arena of a Gulf rivalry with no clear resolution in sight.
Photo: The source