The fall of Bashar al-Assad last December was supposed to herald a new chapter for Syria—one of healing, reconstruction, and political renewal. Instead, only months into Ahmed al-Shara's rule, the country once again teeters on the brink of large-scale conflict. Once known as a jihadist commander under al-Qaeda's Syrian branch, Shara has reinvented himself as Syria's interim leader, attempting—with mixed success—to present a pragmatic and stabilizing image to domestic factions and foreign powers alike. Yet his government's pursuit of a heavily centralized political order is worsening sectarian fault lines and igniting new cycles of bloodshed.
According to a September 2025 essay in Foreign Affairs, "How to Avoid Another Syrian Civil War: Start With Embracing Federalism," by Steven Simon and Adam Weinstein, the danger lies not in Shara's murky past but in Washington's uncritical acceptance of his centralized vision for a fractured country. Simon and Weinstein argue that the United States, rather than backing strongman politics, should promote a federal solution that grants minorities a degree of autonomy. Without it, they warn, Syria risks falling back into internecine violence, with minority groups seeking external patrons and regional states exploiting the turmoil.
Their concern is not abstract. In March, government fighters massacred some 1,500 Alawites, an atrocity openly justified as revenge against communities accused of supporting Assad. In July, Druze villages across Suwayda Province were attacked by Bedouin militias allied with Shara's government. Hundreds of Druze civilians were killed, humanitarian convoys were blockaded, and sectarian propaganda flooded social media channels. Israeli airstrikes eventually halted the onslaught, citing a duty to protect its own Druze minority and prevent the extremist tide from spilling across the border.
Meanwhile, Syria's Kurdish population has become increasingly wary. Once potential partners in a post-Assad future, Kurdish militias now fear they may be the next targets of the interim government's "centralization by force" policy. Planned negotiations with the Syrian Democratic Forces broke down in Paris this summer. Damningly, Kurdish leaders now describe their outlook as divided between "pre-Suwayda" and "post-Suwayda" eras—a shorthand for lost trust following the government's complicity in anti-minority violence.
The United States has found its leverage shrinking. Having withdrawn most troops from northeastern Syria, Washington must now rely on limited diplomatic influence. President Trump initially praised Shara as "tough" and "attractive," but optimism has given way to unease as the interim regime condones sectarian attacks and resists meaningful reforms. Even U.S. envoy Tom Barrack, once a skeptic of decentralization, conceded last month that "something short of [federalism]" may be necessary.
Shara, however, remains determined to consolidate. His government claims to have recruited 100,000 soldiers—figures experts consider inflated—and continues to mobilize Bedouin tribes via jihadist-linked online networks. Multiethnic militias, such as the newly unified Druze guard in Suwayda and resilient Kurdish forces in the northeast, prepare to resist absorption. The longer Shara insists on Sunni-majority dominance, the more he erodes hopes of nationwide reconciliation.
Syria today resembles a land stitched together by fragile bargains, historical grudges, and exhausted communities desperate for peace. Federalism may not offer neat solutions, but as Simon and Weinstein observe, it could provide a structure that limits bloodshed, grants minorities security, and prevents endless foreign meddling. What is certain is that without some form of inclusive governance, this latest "new Syria" risks becoming tragically indistinguishable from the old: defined less by unity than by unrelenting cycles of fear, fire, and loss.