ONLY IN TLF: Damascus Strives to Rebuild the State. A Year After Regime Change, Consolidation Masks Reform
One year after the dramatic regime change that swept across Syria, the transitional government in Damascus is engaged in a highly visible campaign to rebuild the state apparatus, signaling a new era of national unity and institutional renewal. However, a closer examination of recent moves—particularly within the judiciary—suggests that this rebuilding effort is inextricably linked to a profound consolidation of executive power, raising questions about the nature of the "new Syria" being forged.
The most prominent signs of this reintegration drive are found in the diplomatic and military spheres. In a move aimed at restoring the country's international standing, the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates recently issued a decree reinstating 19 diplomats who had defected from the former regime. This group, which includes ambassadors, consuls, and administrative officials, has been restored to their prior positions, following formal appeals from the Ministry since April 2025 to defectors to return and "revive their essential role in building a renewed Syria".
A parallel effort is underway to reconstitute the armed forces. The Syrian Ministry of Defense is actively working to reintegrate non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and volunteers who had defected from the former army into the ranks of the new Syrian army. This follows a successful process of integrating defected officers, with over 2,000 already serving out of 3,500 interviewed, and six senior defected officers appointed to key leadership posts, including a Lieutenant General and several Brigadier Generals. The Ministry views this reintegration as a priority, leveraging the "accumulated military and technical expertise" of those who participated in the revolution.
Yet, as the executive branch extends an olive branch to defectors in the military and diplomatic corps, it has simultaneously tightened its grip on the third pillar of the state: the judiciary. Reports indicate that the post-Assad transitional government has systematically dismantled judicial independence, prioritizing loyalty over legal merit.
The subversion of the judiciary has been swift and sweeping. By mid-2025, more than sixty per cent of the judicial workforce had been removed through mass dismissals, often justified by vague invocations of "public interest" and without legal basis. These purges were followed by appointments that openly defied the Judicial Authority Law, such as naming individuals without law degrees to senior roles like the president of the Court of Cassation.
The most significant blow to the separation of powers came with the Constitutional Declaration of March 13, 2025, which abolished the Supreme Constitutional Court—the highest body responsible for reviewing the constitutionality of legislation. With no alternative body designated for judicial oversight, the executive branch has effectively insulated itself from legal challenge. Furthermore, new recruitment criteria for judicial vacancies have been introduced that exclude large segments of qualified law graduates, transforming judicial appointment into a political test of loyalty.
The dual strategy of the Damascus government—reintegrating defectors to project stability while simultaneously subduing the judiciary to consolidate power—paints a complex picture of the state-building process one year on. While the return of diplomats and military personnel suggests a move toward national reconciliation, the systematic dismantling of judicial independence underscores a deeper commitment to executive control, ensuring that the new Syrian state is built on a foundation of political loyalty rather than institutional checks and balances.
Photo: Manus AI