As 2025 closes, the US/Israel–Iran confrontation is no longer a low-grade shadow struggle managed mainly through diplomacy and proxy conflicts; it is an openly articulated deterrence contest in which leaders have publicly tied credibility to “red lines” and rapid retaliation. President Trump has stated that if Iran rebuilds its nuclear capabilities or continues rebuilding missile capacity, the response could be immediate and more severe—language that reduces room for quiet de-escalation once a new incident occurs. At the same time, Iran has replied with warnings of harsh consequences for any renewed attacks, reinforcing a mutual-threat environment where misperception and political signaling can substitute for verifiable facts.
Against that backdrop, the key analytical point for 2026 is not whether a “full war” is the default outcome; it is that the probability that a limited clash escalates into a broader, sustained conflict is meaningfully elevated because the stabilizers that normally prevent spirals—credible verification, workable diplomacy, and ambiguity-management—have weakened simultaneously.
The Analysis
1) The most dangerous ingredient in 2026 is the verification vacuum.
Even when rivals exchange threats, escalation is less likely if both sides can reliably observe what the other is doing. That stabilizer has eroded. In November 2025, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution demanding Iran provide timely information and access regarding safeguarded facilities and nuclear material accountancy, explicitly highlighting that verification of Iran’s enriched uranium inventory is “long overdue.” This matters because when inspectors cannot confirm stockpiles or facility status, decision-makers tend to plan against worst-case assumptions—compressing timelines for preventive strikes and increasing the chance that ambiguous activity is interpreted as a sprint to reconstitution.
2) Military reality is mixed: infrastructure damage reduces immediate nuclear risk, but uncertainty about material sustains crisis pressure.
Post-strike assessments indicate Iran’s enrichment program suffered major setbacks, with satellite-based analysis concluding that key sites were severely damaged and that Iran does not appear able to enrich uranium in significant quantities in the near term. Yet the crisis driver persists because the central question is not only whether centrifuge halls are operating, but whether sensitive material exists outside monitoring. Prior to the June 2025 attacks, the IAEA estimated Iran held roughly 440.9 kg of uranium enriched up to 60%, which is close to weapons-grade in technical terms, and afterward emphasized the urgency of accounting for that stock. When that inventory cannot be independently verified, leaders may feel compelled to act on intelligence signals or partial indications—exactly the kind of environment in which limited actions can cascade into wider war.
3) The likely 2026 trigger is missiles—not necessarily the nuclear file—because it is easier to “see,” easier to strike, and politically easier to justify.
Recent US and Israeli signaling has emphasized ballistic missiles as a central threshold. Trump explicitly linked potential future action to Iran rebuilding missile capabilities, publicly indicating support for follow-on strikes if missile rebuilding continues. This matters because missile infrastructure, tests, and production lines generate more visible indicators than covert nuclear work; that visibility can create a “use it or lose it” logic on both sides: Israel may perceive urgency to prevent regeneration, while Iran may feel pressure to demonstrate deterrent capability after earlier strikes.
4) Diplomacy is constrained by sanctions hardening and mutually exclusive end-states.
The E3’s triggering of the JCPOA “snapback” mechanism in August 2025, with a pathway toward reimposed UN sanctions, reflects a broader tightening of the diplomatic environment. In practical terms, harsher sanctions reduce Tehran’s incentive to accept restrictive terms without immediate relief, while US/Israel demands—framed publicly as non-negotiable—reduce political space for incremental bargains. The result is a narrowing of off-ramps precisely as rhetoric and military postures intensify.
Conclusion
A “full war” in 2026 is not preordained: the costs of a sustained regional conflict are enormous, and the physical damage to core enrichment infrastructure appears to have reduced Iran’s short-term capacity to resume large-scale enrichment. However, the system is more prone to escalation than in a typical crisis cycle, and that is the critical answer to “how close” we are. The reason is structural: leaders have made highly public deterrence commitments (“we’ll knock the hell out of them” if rebuilding is confirmed), while the verification mechanisms that would clarify whether rebuilding is occurring have degraded, leaving room for worst-case assumptions and rapid military decision-making.
Therefore, in 2026 the core risk is best described as elevated escalation susceptibility: a limited exchange—say, strikes on missile-related assets followed by Iranian retaliation—has a meaningfully higher chance than normal of expanding into a broader, sustained conflict, not because either side necessarily seeks total war, but because the guardrails that prevent spirals (verification, credible signaling channels, and diplomatic sequencing) are weaker simultaneously.
Photo: CNN