Barrack’s Jerusalem–Ankara–Damascus Shuttle Puts SDF Integration at Center of Turkey’s Syria Concerns
According to Turkish journalist Murat Yetkin in Yetkin Report, the Ankara leg of Barrack’s trip was marked by unusual opacity: no detailed readout was provided on his meeting with Fidan, and claims that he also met President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did not appear on the Turkish presidency’s official website. Yetkin writes that Turkish sources speculated the agenda included discussions on moving to a “second phase” in Gaza—focused on Hamas disarmament and making the ceasefire permanent—alongside the increasingly thorny question of Syria’s U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
In Damascus, Barrack’s meeting with Shara was reported to have covered two high-stakes files: the prospect of an understanding with Israel, whose forces have moved within sight of Damascus, and the “integration” of the SDF into Syria’s state structures. Speaking publicly while in Damascus, Barrack drew a careful distinction between groups, saying he did not label the SDF as a direct branch of the PKK, but argued the YPG emerged from PKK derivatives and that the SDF emerged from YPG-derived structures. He also emphasized U.S. recognition of the Syrian Arab Republic and argued Syria should remain “one country, one nation, one army,” while minority rights should be protected through agreements with the central administration. For Barrack, a strong Syrian military posture at home and abroad requires integrating the SDF—an existing process that should not be rushed.
That “no rush” message, however, clashes with Ankara’s sense of urgency. Turkish officials fear that delays heighten domestic tensions and complicate the government’s “terror-free Turkey” narrative, especially as the SDF signals that Turkish concerns are not its problem. Meanwhile, the article notes, imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan is seen in Ankara as sending mixed signals, including messages that could keep PKK disarmament outside any broader political bargain.
Shortly after Barrack’s comments, London-based Syria in Transition reported, citing Defense Minister Muhraf Ebu Kasra, that Damascus had made an offer accommodating key SDF demands. The report said the SDF would retain three divisions—one tasked with securing the northeastern border (including parts of Turkey’s frontier east of the Euphrates), one women’s fighters division, and one counterterrorism division focused on ISIS—while also receiving positions in the Interior and Defense ministries and a deputy chief of staff role. Yetkin cautions the reported document was framed as a “final offer,” and argues that such terms would effectively place Turkey-facing border security in SDF hands rather than compel SDF disarmament.
Despite these developments, Ankara’s senior circles are said to be broadly “satisfied” with Barrack. The reason, as one Turkish state official described it, is speed and access: a conventional ambassador might write cables through layers of bureaucracy, but Barrack, as special envoy, can speak directly to President Donald Trump and deliver rapid answers. The unresolved question in Ankara remains whether fast answers will translate into outcomes that serve Turkey’s interests—on Gaza, on Syria’s future order, and on the SDF-PKK dilemma at its border.