By Khalid bin Rashid AlKhater
Perhaps only the naive would have believed the American narrative that President Trump had no prior knowledge of the premeditated Israeli strike on Hamas leadership in Doha. The US claims that President Donald Trump was unaware of Israel’s plans to target Hamas leaders in Qatar until the aircraft were already airborne. In effect, their warning to Qatar(as if to save face), was too late.
It would have totally been possible to request directly from the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, not to carry out the strike. Intead, the US clearly gave the green light. In fact, Israeli officials and Israeli media spoke of prior knowledge and coordination with the US regarding the attack.
Even on the assumption that Washington's account is true, the incident unfolded near the Al Udeid Air Base, the largest American military facility outside the US. Its air defence systems failed to detect the attacking aircraft or their refuelling operations. This has also raised concerns about the effectiveness of US-supplied defence systems and the broader security umbrella on which Gulf states have long depended.
Washington’s interests often conflict with those of Gulf states, but they are neither fixed nor assured, particularly when US commitments to Israel clearly take priority. The depth of US-Israeli coordination increasingly puts American policy at odds with the security needs of its Arab partners.
Israel's expansion project and subjugation of regional states is seen as part of a larger American/Western-backed settlement project, which threatens the sovereignty and stability of neighbouring states. This poses the question of how the US can strike a balance between its close ties with Israel and its parallel security partnerships throughout the region.
Indeed, past experiences with American allies show that Washington cannot always be trusted or relied upon, even regarding its weapons systems. Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad said US aircraft and weapons are largely ceremonial and cannot be used for defence or attack without American permission. Operational codes held by Washington allow it to control or deactivate the systems remotely, and spare parts, maintenance, or ammunition can be withheld at will.
Only Israel and Europe are granted full operational access; Arab states are excluded.
Former Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq described how dealing with the US is like handling coal, leaving only blackened hands and face. Similarly, the Shah of Iran - once seen as a strong US ally - provides another cautionary example. The words of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, that the United States has no permanent friends or enemies, only pragmatic, self-interested calculations, continue to ring true.
This pattern has been observed in practice. The Trump administration left Saudi Arabia exposed after the Aramco attacks, and the Biden administration later withdrew some US missile-defence batteries.
A similar situation occurred with Turkey: after a Russian fighter violated its airspace, the US withdrew Patriot systems, leaving Ankara to face Moscow alone. Recognising the limits of American support, Turkey acquired the Russian S-400 system, prompting US sanctions and its removal from the F-35 programme.
These examples highlight the risks of over-reliance on external protection. Ultimately, Gulf states may need to build independent capabilities to defend themselves and maintain operational control over the systems on which their security depends.
Trump did not introduce anything new; he revealed America’s foreign policy clearly, without ambiguity: selling protection for money. Yet he proved the failure of that model after receiving the payment. After all, the blockade of Qatar occurred during his first term, and the Israeli attack happened during his second, using American weapons.
Imagine if the opposite had occurred, with planes from Qatar or another Gulf country striking Israel? It is unimaginable, especially given it is forbidden to hit Israel with American weapons. It seems that it is only permissible to hit Arabs, even if allies, with US weapons.
So what should Gulf states do? To start, they must re-evaluate reliance on “foreign protection umbrellas”. Trump, as the largest marketer of protection for money, proved that protection cannot actually be bought. The umbrella was full of holes.
Gulf states should also reevaluate and examine the operational limits of US weapons systems, many of which remain restricted or dependent on external oversight. The defence capabilities that cannot be independently operated offer limited value in a crisis.
There must be a shift from dependency to a balanced partnership with the US built on mutual interests and respect, and long-term strategic interests while leveraging changes in global power balances. Because whilst Gulf states have the resources to strengthen local production, until now they have advanced slowly due to decades of reliance on imports.
Additionally, soft power must be supported by credible military capability. Success requires having a joint Gulf defence production to benefit from economies of scale and entering partnerships with external allies to expand production, technology, and expertise.
Gulf countries should enter unified projects with partners that share high values and strategic interests, such as Turkey and Pakistan. Gulf states can provide finances, infrastructure, research and development, and military production, and the partners could provide technical expertise, labour, and technology transfer.
Production can start with ammunition, spare parts, assembly, and small to medium-sized weapons, moving to advanced systems like drones, smart munitions, and cyber defence. Advanced partnerships with global allies can support technology transfer and R&D. Not to mention, human capital is as important as material capital in developing national defence capabilities and in operating advanced foreign weapons locally.
Such efforts may face resistance from Western powers, especially the US, seeking to maintain leverage by limiting access to advanced technology. They might provide some alternative suppliers that appear attractive, but they likely wouldn't provide the independence or sustainability required.
However, it is important not to slide into the misleading comparison of local production costs, especially in early stages, with cheaper, more advanced imports. This is because long-term strategic and national security goals outweigh short-term costs. Gulf states can learn from partners like Turkey in order to bypass these challenges and accelerate technology acquisition.
A successful national defence industry could drive wider industrial and technological growth, creating spillover effects across the economy, fostering research and support industries, boosting innovation, generating jobs, and enhancing competitiveness. As analysts have pointed out, this could also support long-term economic diversification, a strategic goal that has historically challenged Gulf states.
* This article was first published on 15 December 2025 in the New Arab. The opinions expressed in this translated or hosted article do not necessarily reflect the views or editorial positions of TLF.
Map: Wikipedia