The trajectory of events on the northern front of occupied Palestine is shifting from gradual escalation to a qualitative transition. This is likely due to Israel’s belief that the approach of gradual escalation has reached its peak without achieving its desired goals.
By Mohammed Halsa
The assassination of Haytham Tabatabai, Hezbollah’s Chief of Staff, in the Southern Suburbs (Dahiyeh) of Beirut, marked a significant turning point in the escalating military pressure campaign Israel has been waging since the signing of the ceasefire agreement with Lebanon a year ago.
His assassination falls within the framework of the Israeli army’s efforts to weaken the party and prevent it from rebuilding its strength—a strength Israel claims is growing as "Hezbollah makes progress in reconstruction efforts and smuggles funds and weapons."
Since the assassination, it has become clear that the course of events on the northern front is moving from gradual escalation to a qualitative shift. Israel seemingly believes that the gradual approach has maxed out without achieving the objective of forcing the Lebanese state to forcibly disarm Hezbollah.
According to indicators, Israel is preparing for a major operation unlike the previous war. This shift does not come out of nowhere; rather, it stems from a combination of internal Lebanese, regional, and international factors that overshadow Israel's rush to resolve the issue of the party’s weapons—and perhaps its leadership—before it is too late.
Perhaps Donald Trump’s realization that Netanyahu is deviating from the regional agenda his administration is working on prompted him to call Netanyahu and invite him to Washington at the end of this month. This is an attempt to reset the trajectory of the hot files in Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon according to the American rhythm.
While Washington works to prevent war, Israel is building attack scenarios so that the spark remains dependent on the appropriate political and military moment. Washington estimates that continued Israeli attacks could lead to a broad escalation in the north amid increasingly fragile field conditions.
Despite this concern, Washington still views Israeli violations in Lebanon as being carried out in the context of "working to enforce the ceasefire agreement." Meanwhile, it considers that Lebanese authorities are not making sufficient efforts to push the disarmament of Hezbollah, emphasizing that "the party’s weapons must be removed."
Although US officials acknowledge "the task will be difficult and complicated," and that progress may be "one step forward and two steps back," they see it as a "great opportunity, and if it requires taking difficult steps, they must be taken."
Practically, Israel seeks to outline a strategy that translates what it calls "the achievements of the Israeli army" in the war against Hezbollah—coinciding with what it terms the "disintegration of the Iranian-led axis" and the failure of the "ring of fire around Israel" strategy, including the collapse of the Assad regime and the repercussions of the war between Israel and Iran—into a new security reality along the border with Lebanon and the construction of a better relationship with the Lebanese leadership. Thus far, this strategy has included a mix of continuous military action to strike Hezbollah and prevent its rehabilitation, alongside political and economic moves to weaken it.
The ceasefire agreement with Lebanon was based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701. However, this time, it granted Israel two clear advantages it is exploiting well: First, maintaining the freedom of military action to respond to what it calls "violations, and neutralizing threats developing against it in Lebanon," based on a side letter it claims to have received from the United States. Second, the central role granted to the US in implementing the agreement; the US, which shows understanding for Israeli concerns and ambitions, leads the five-member committee overseeing the agreement's implementation.
Israel is also betting on the change in Hezbollah’s policy regarding the use of force following the last war. The party was forced to temporarily abandon the "deterrence equations" strategy pursued by the late martyr Sayyed Nasrallah, adopting instead a new strategy based on "containment" and avoiding direct responses to Israeli army operations against it.
Israel believes that Hezbollah’s continued reliance on this path—which aims primarily to restore its status and strength without falling into a direct confrontation with Israel or the Lebanese Army—is linked to the progress of its rearmament and rehabilitation efforts on one hand, and its ability to withstand military and political pressures with relative success on the other.
At the same time, however, Hezbollah is preparing for the possibility of another conflict or broad military confrontation. It shows determination to prevent any progress in disarmament efforts, preferring to proceed with dialogue on this issue with the Lebanese leadership and expressing readiness to formulate a joint "national defense strategy."
It appears that the source of Israel’s anxiety is its realization that Hezbollah is waiting for the timing and method of its choosing to announce the abandonment of the "containment strategy" and begin responding to Israeli army violations against Lebanon. Indeed, Israel fears the party may initiate offensive operations inside "Israeli territory" in an effort to activate the "deterrence equations strategy."
It is true that the party realizes the Israeli army will respond forcefully. However, it would be armed with confidence built on the renewal of its arsenal and personnel; pride in the Israeli army's failure to prevent it from rebuilding its power; and perhaps a decision based on growing regional and international criticism of Israeli violations despite the ceasefire. Finally, it may rely on the weak domestic support for the Lebanese leadership, which is failing to protect the Lebanese people from Israeli aggression and is unable to force Israel to withdraw from Lebanese lands.
Based on the above, Israel believes that what it calls the post-war weakness of Hezbollah and its Iranian patron, combined with the Lebanese leadership’s adoption of the disarmament vision, offers an opportunity to change the security reality along its northern "border" and build a new relationship with the Lebanese state in the long term.
However, Israeli anxiety stems from the fact that this is a temporary window of opportunity. It will gradually diminish as Hezbollah manages to restore its capabilities and internal standing in Lebanon, and as its assessment of its ability to resume military confrontation with Israel grows.
Israel also takes into account that the time for both governments is limited, as Lebanese elections are scheduled for May 2026, and Israeli elections for November 2026.
Consequently, the Israeli conviction is strengthening that the approach it has followed toward Hezbollah over the past year will not prevent the rebuilding of the party's capabilities—especially if Israel faces difficulty in maintaining its implementation over time due to political pressure, in addition to dissatisfaction within Israel due to the lack of security stability for settlers in northern occupied Palestine.
It is also likely that these violations will weaken the Lebanese leadership, given Hezbollah’s accusations of its inability to deal with Israeli aggression. More dangerously for Israel, this approach will not, over time, prevent the possibility of Hezbollah returning to action against the Israeli army and northern settlements.
Therefore, another broad military operation to occupy southern Lebanon, extend Israeli control to the Litani River, and expand the security zone appears to be a "bitter but necessary Israeli option."
The main Israeli advantage of this option lies in the potential to improve the army's ability to prevent the party from regaining its strength, and indeed to deepen the damage inflicted upon it. However, its drawbacks are numerous: Hezbollah and its capabilities would pose a genuine challenge and threat to the Israeli army; Israel would once again be bogged down in a long and bloody war of attrition; and the operation would require the investment of additional financial resources for the army, burdening Israel after the long wars it has fought over the past two years.
Will Israel continue with its current approach, hoping it will eventually lead to the disarmament and weakening of the party? Or will the phobia and fear of Hezbollah that inhabits it drive it into the adventure of a wide-scale war to take its head?
* The article first published on 5 December 2025 in Al Mayadeen and translated to English by The Levant Files for its readers.