The SETA report, titled "Security in New Syria: Structure and Threats," frames the current period as a race against time for the new administration in Damascus. Its primary objective is to transition from a collection of armed factions into a unified, institutional state. This effort centers on the ambitious task of integrating disparate armed groups—most notably those under the umbrella of the Syrian National Army (SMO) and the former HTS-led Military Operations Directorate—into a single, centralized national army.
The Grand Project: Forging a National Army
The new Syrian Ministry of Defense is attempting to build a military structure based on three core principles, fundamentally breaking with the sectarian and coercive model of the former regime. The first is a Volunteer-Based Model, replacing compulsory conscription with a system designed to attract technically skilled personnel and ideologically aligned volunteers. This aims to create a more modern and disciplined force. The second is a National Ideological Doctrine, shifting loyalty from a party or individual to the state and a new "Syrian identity" that incorporates Islamic values while moving away from the divisive, Alawite-Nusayri-dominated policies of the past.
Crucially, the third principle is the adoption of a Hybrid Structure, designed to equip the new army with both conventional and asymmetric warfare capabilities. This is where the strategic partnership with Turkey becomes indispensable. The report highlights Turkey's role as the new government's most significant backer, providing political and military support for national security and territorial integrity. Turkey has actively encouraged the full integration of the approximately 80,000-strong Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SMO) into the central command.
This cooperation was formalized with a military training and consultancy Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in August 2025 between the Turkish and Syrian Defense Ministers. The analysis suggests that Turkey is poised to provide military equipment, including its highly effective Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (SİHA) and First Person View (FPV) drones. This transfer of technology and experience is viewed as a critical "force multiplier" to enable the new Syrian army to adopt a hybrid military doctrine capable of countering high-tech threats, particularly from Israel.
Internal Fault Lines: Separatism and Proxies
While the military integration project is underway, the new government faces severe internal challenges that threaten to fracture the country's territorial integrity. The SETA analysis identifies two primary internal separatist agendas: the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDG/YPG) and the Druze militias in the south.
The SDG/YPG, which the report describes as having a "separatist agenda," presents a complex challenge. The new Damascus administration, under the supervision of Ankara and Washington, is reportedly seeking a compromise to break the maximalist demands of the Kurdish-led forces. The analysis notes that while the current geopolitical situation prolongs the SDG's existence, medium-to-long-term dynamics will severely challenge its position, suggesting that Turkey is exercising "strategic patience" while coordinating with Damascus to fortify the country's unity.
However, the most immediate and volatile internal crisis is the situation in Suwayda, home to the Druze community. The report explicitly labels the Tel Aviv-backed Druze militias, led by Hikmet Hijri, as an Israeli proxy actor. The crisis, which escalated in July 2025, is seen as a deliberate attempt to create a de facto Druze autonomy and undermine the central authority of Damascus. The analysis points to three levels of crisis generated by the Suwayda file: the erosion of state authority, the deepening of Israeli influence through financial and military support to the separatist militias, and the danger of territorial expansion. The report notes the provocative renaming of the Druze region from "Jabal al-Arab" to "Jabal Bashan"—a biblical name for the area—and the Israeli operation's name, "Arrow of Bashan," suggesting a long-term Israeli ambition to expand its occupation zone into southern Syria.
Other internal security risks include the terrorist activities and attempted rebellions by remnants of the former Assad regime, as well as the continued presence of foreign fighters, particularly those concentrated in the Idlib region.
The Existential External Threat: Israel
The SETA analysis reserves its sharpest focus for the external threat, unequivocally stating that Israel’s increasing military engagement is the most critical external threat to post-revolution Syria. The report argues that Israel perceives the new, Turkey-aligned, Sunni-majority government as a far greater threat than the former Assad regime.
This perception is reflected in a dramatic escalation of military action. The analysis reveals that Israel has conducted over 1,000 air strikes since the fall of Assad on December 8, 2024, a staggering increase compared to the 334 air strikes carried out in the six years leading up to the opposition's final offensive. These strikes have targeted numerous military objectives, including strategic weapons systems, and have been used to directly support the Druze militias in Suwayda.
The core argument of the Turkish think tank is that Israel’s policy is not merely defensive but aims to prevent the emergence of a strong, centralized, and unified state in Syria. The report states that Tel Aviv prefers "weak, fragmented state structures with ethnic and sectarian fault lines" over a cohesive government capable of resisting its expansionist tendencies. In addition to the air strikes, Israel has expanded its occupation area beyond the Golan buffer zone, established new military fortifications, and unilaterally declared the area a demilitarized zone.
Diplomacy and Deterrence
Faced with this multi-faceted security matrix, the new Syrian government has adopted a strategy of diplomatic maneuvering and seeking international support. The administration is actively building strategic relationships with Ankara, Washington, and Riyadh to create diplomatic and military space. A key move to bolster international legitimacy and security support was the decision to join the International Coalition Against ISIS.
In dealing with the Israeli threat, the new government has refrained from military retaliation, instead focusing on diplomatic solutions. It is leveraging its relationship with Washington to encourage the US to exert a limiting influence on Israel. Furthermore, Damascus is negotiating a continued Russian presence in the Quneitra region, a move reminiscent of the former regime's strategy, to provide a counter-balance to Israeli military expansion.
In conclusion, the path to a stable Syrian state, as viewed by the Turkish security establishment, hinges on the successful management of three critical factors: internal integration, regional cooperation, and international support. The ultimate success of the new government will be determined by its ability to consolidate the central army's control across the country, neutralize separatist agendas like the SDG/YPG and the Israeli-backed Druze militias, and, most critically, establish a credible deterrence against the escalating military aggression from Israel. The struggle for the new Syria is fundamentally a struggle for sovereignty against powerful internal and external forces determined to keep the country weak and fragmented.