What appears from the outside to be mere fleeting chaos is, in reality, deliberate engineering that exploits the weakness of the Palestinian civil and governmental structure to produce controllable alternative models.
By Hassan Lafi
The phenomenon of militias collaborating with the Israeli "Army" in the Gaza Strip is not merely a passing event; rather, it is the product of an extremely complex landscape formed under the shadow of a war of extermination. This landscape consists of security chaos, institutional collapse, and local groups attempting to fill the void in isolated areas under Israeli surveillance.
What appears from the outside to be mere fleeting chaos is, in reality, deliberate engineering that exploits the weakness of the Palestinian civil and governmental structure to produce controllable alternative models.
With the decline of the civil security system in the eastern areas of Rafah—particularly near the Kerem Shalom crossing—armed groups of a criminal nature emerged. These groups subsist on stealing humanitarian aid, creating a shadow economy, and employing marginal elements within an expanding system of anarchy.
Over time, this criminal phenomenon transformed into tools that could be utilized by "Israel" within a broader political-security context. When the Israeli "Army" invaded the city of Rafah and displaced its residents, this reality became an opportunity to test a new local model, titled: "An Alternative to Hamas" or "The New Gaza."
Israel’s strategic wager on these groups is predicated on three primary functions. First, it aims to reduce human casualties by relying on alternative local forces to navigate a complex combat environment riddled with tunnels, booby-trapped houses, and camouflaged ambushes. Second, it attempts to market a model of local governance, creating an alternative political façade to obscure the absence of a "Day After" plan and buy time to prolong the war, even though these militias are almost certainly destined for failure. Finally, it seeks to manage the population by establishing militia-run military zones alongside monopolized humanitarian entities—such as the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation—that operate under Israeli military protection. By concentrating security and relief in a single hand, the goal is to relocate residents to the Rafah area after security vetting, paving the way for demographic concentration projects that could open the door to forced or voluntary displacement arrangements along the border with Egypt.
However, this entire construct collapsed before a fundamental truth: no force lacking societal legitimacy can transform into a sustainable political player.
Popular rejection was decisive. The residents treated any military-backed security-political initiative as an extension of the occupation, not a "national alternative." Furthermore, societal memory—filled with experiences like those in southern Lebanon and elsewhere—was sufficient to topple the experiment before it could grow.
With the receding possibility of employing this "local alternative" as a political façade, its role shifted to a more dangerous function: an operational tool for the occupation within populated areas used for assassinations, kidnappings, or inciting chaos. This only deepened the crisis between the militias and the community, making their removal a matter of popular consensus.
Amidst this chaos, a pivotal truth emerges for any society under occupation: Internal Palestinian differences—no matter how severe—cannot take precedence over the fundamental conflict with the Israeli occupation.
When internal disagreement becomes greater than the basic contradiction, the national front disintegrates, marginal forces rise, and the doors are flung open for alien models to be forcibly imposed on the people.
The experience in the south clearly shows that "Israel" invests in internal Palestinian differences to market them as the primary conflict, allowing it to evade the responsibility of occupation and portray Palestinians as a case requiring "tutelage and rehabilitation" to manage their own disputes.
The experience of militias in Gaza speaks volumes, demonstrating that while the occupation is capable of managing chaos, it remains incapable of managing a society that denies it legitimacy. It highlights that any imposed local model inevitably collapses when its pillars collide with public refusal, and that no project for a post-war Gaza can succeed unless it stems from the will of the community itself. Consequently, putting the Palestinian house in order is a necessity, not only to confront the occupation but to effectively block any marginal or international force attempting to impose its guardianship on the Palestinians.
Ultimately, the failure of the militia experiment is linked to its collision with a political and societal culture that knows perfectly well the difference between leadership that arises from the embrace of the people and leadership manufactured under the shadow of the occupation's military might.
Palestinians—under fire, hunger, and displacement—realize that their greatest struggle is not with one another, but with the occupation.
Here, the essential truth appears: The solution in Gaza will not be security-based, humanitarian, or via militias, but radically political, linked to Palestinian national rights and the people's right to establish a state and achieve national liberation.
In this popular consciousness lies the true immunity against any project manufactured in closed rooms or at the barrel of the occupier's gun.
The opinions mentioned in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Al Mayadeen, but rather express the opinion of the author exclusively.
* This article was first published on 6 December by Al Mayadeen and translated by The Levant Files for its readers.