A year has passed since the collapse of the Assad regime marked a historic turning point for Syria, yet the country’s path toward stability remains fraught with complexity. A comprehensive new report released this week by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy offers the first detailed assessment of the transitional government in Damascus, led by interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa. The study highlights a dichotomy in the new administration: while there have been tangible successes in restoring basic services and diplomatic ties, the persistence of a "shadow government" and opaque economic practices threatens to undermine long-term stability.
The findings are detailed in a policy note titled "Institutions and Governance in the New Syria: Continuity and Change from the Idlib Model," authored by Dr. Aaron Y. Zelin, the Gloria and Ken Levy Senior Fellow at the Institute. Drawing on two recent field visits to Syria as well as extensive written and oral sources, Zelin maps the progress and obstacles facing the post-Assad authorities. The full analysis can be accessed at the source: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PolicyNote163Zelin.pdf.
In the report, Zelin argues that the United States must carefully calibrate its policy, balancing the potential for sanctions relief with strict demands for transitional justice to ensure the new Syria does not slide back into conflict. According to the report, the transitional leadership has managed to achieve what many skeptics thought impossible in such a short timeframe. The government has restored critical infrastructure, including reliable electricity and schooling, which had been decimated during the civil war.
Furthermore, al-Sharaa’s administration has successfully reopened diplomatic channels and courted foreign investment, notably securing economic partnerships with regional powerhouses like Saudi Arabia. These moves have provided a semblance of normalcy to a population exhausted by over a decade of war.
However, the report warns that these gains are fragile. Zelin points to the replication of the "Idlib model" of governance on a national scale, where formal institutions often mask a deeper, less accountable power structure. This "shadow government," rooted in the organizational history of the former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), continues to exert significant influence over decision-making. The study identifies opaque economic practices and a lack of clear accountability for crimes committed by the former regime—and current actors—as major hurdles. Without addressing these structural flaws, public trust is likely to erode.
The report concludes that Syria’s ultimate trajectory remains an open question. The transition from an insurgent group governing a province to a national government is unprecedented in the region. Zelin emphasizes that the leadership will need extraordinary discipline to avoid the pitfalls common to post-civil war states, such as renewed internal strife or authoritarian entrenchment. For the international community, the challenge lies in engaging with the new reality in Damascus to promote regional stability while holding the administration to its promises of reform and inclusivity.