A recent analysis from the Ankara-based think tank, the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM), which maintains close ties to the Turkish presidency and security establishment, has cast a stark light on the accelerating fragmentation of Yemen. The report suggests that the country is closer to an institutional bifurcation than at any point since the conflict escalated in 2015, driven by the swift, yet fragile, eastward expansion of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). While the STC's territorial gains might appear to signal the consolidation of a cohesive southern political project, ORSAM's assessment is far more cautious, warning that the impending division is less a triumph of southern unity and more a consequence of the total collapse of the national framework.
The STC, a separatist body advocating for the restoration of the former South Yemen state, has recently executed a significant military push, extending its influence across the oil-rich governorate of Hadramout and moving into the easternmost province of al-Mahra. This advance unfolded with "surprising speed," often meeting little to no visible resistance. In Hadramout, STC-aligned forces capitalized on a weakened central government presence and existing divisions among local elites. The transition in al-Mahra was even quieter, with local authorities publicly downplaying the significance of the movement. These developments have not only further weakened Yemen’s internationally recognized government, which is now geographically constrained primarily to the Marib region, but have also entrenched parallel systems of authority across the country, creating a new, unstable reality on the ground.
The Fragility of Southern Consolidation
ORSAM’s central argument is that interpreting these events as a "decisive southern consolidation" would be premature. The analysis highlights a critical distinction: while the STC now holds "geographic continuity" across most southern governorates, this continuity is "political rather than structural." The Council’s authority, the report contends, is "uneven" and "fragile," often depending on "negotiated arrangements" and the vacuum left by the collapse of national institutions, rather than "deep-rooted popular legitimacy" .
The STC’s governance model is described as a brittle mix of security control, symbolic messaging rooted in historical southern aspirations, and pragmatic local alliances. This formula, while effective during moments of institutional collapse, is unlikely to prove durable in a more contested political environment. The report stresses that the STC lacks the fundamental components necessary for a stable political order, including "administrative depth, revenue systems, and locally anchored legitimacy" .
Region | STC Support Level | Local Identity & Resistance | Key External Tie |
Aden, Lahj, al-Dhalea | Strongest (Heartland) | High alignment with STC identity politics | N/A |
Hadramout | Tolerated/Ambivalent | Unique social/religious traditions; resisted broader southern movements | N/A |
Al-Mahra | Ambivalent/Suspicious | Strong tribal cohesion and localism | Cultural ties to Oman |
A Mosaic of Identities and Interests
The challenge for the STC lies in the diverse political and cultural landscape of the south. The Council’s support base is strongest in the traditional heartland of southern identity politics—Aden, Lahj, and al-Dhalea. However, as the movement pushes eastward, the picture changes dramatically. Hadramawt, with its distinct social and religious traditions, has historically resisted being subsumed into broader southern political movements. Al-Mahra, in particular, presents a significant challenge due to its strong tribal cohesion, fierce localism, and deep cultural ties to neighboring Oman .
In these eastern regions, the acceptance of STC authority appears to be motivated less by ideological alignment and more by the pragmatic need for stability in the face of institutional collapse in Sanaa and the shifting priorities of regional powers. The local communities, the report notes, simply adapt to whoever can deliver basic order, a dynamic that does not translate into "durable political loyalty." This makes the STC’s expanded authority highly conditional on its performance and restraint, as it attempts to unify a "mosaic of identities, histories, and economic interests" under a single political framework .
The Regional Chessboard and External Influence
The external environment, dominated by regional actors, adds another layer of complexity and fragility to the STC’s position. The ORSAM analysis explicitly acknowledges the significant role of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which provides the STC with military, logistical, and political support. Crucially, the report suggests that Abu Dhabi’s priorities are primarily "strategic and economic," focused on stability along key maritime corridors, rather than an ideological commitment to a fully independent southern state .
Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, finds itself in a difficult position, caught between competing concerns: resisting Houthi expansion in the north, maintaining its own influence in eastern Yemen, and avoiding an open confrontation with its UAE-backed ally, the STC. The most immediate external concern, however, comes from Oman. The Sultanate views the STC’s encroachment into al-Mahra with "deep unease," perceiving it as a potential disruption to its border security and local social networks. These complex and often conflicting external calculations help explain the STC's smooth advance, but they also represent a significant vulnerability. The report warns that the STC’s hold could be severely tested if regional alignments were to shift.
A Bleak, Divided Future
Yemen is now facing a "bleak, divided future." With the Houthis dominating the north with "coherence and confidence," and the STC establishing a contiguous, if fragile, presence across the south, the country is undeniably bifurcated. The ease of the STC’s expansion, while reflecting its organizational discipline, may ultimately conceal underlying fragilities. The risk, ORSAM concludes, is that Yemen will "drift into de facto partition not because a coherent southern project has succeeded, but because the national framework has failed" .
The key question for the coming months is not whether Yemen will split into two—a scenario that appears increasingly inevitable—but whether any actor, including the STC, can "sustain effective governance across large, diverse territories without triggering new cycles of contestation." The STC currently occupies a position of unprecedented influence, but this influence is not synonymous with stability. Its authority is real yet conditional, expanding yet fragile, and tolerated yet not always embraced. The period ahead will be crucial in determining whether the current moment represents the foundation of a new southern political reality or merely a pause before the next, potentially more violent, reconfiguration of the Yemeni conflict.